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1 Introduction 
Productivity, i.e., the efficiency with which nations, industries and firms use resources 
to achieve economically valuable results, is perhaps the most important measure 
available to policy-makers to gauge the health of an economic system (Economist, 
2009). In view of its importance for the prosperity of nations, theoretical contributions 
after the seminal work of Solow (1957) have devoted much effort to identifying what 
lies behind productivity differentials and growth rates. Likewise, empirically oriented 
studies promoted by international organisations have addressed methodological issues 
on productivity measurement and comparison across nations and over time (e.g., 
O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009).  
 Early empirical explorations based on country- or industry-level data relied on 
representative firm paradigms. However, the increasing availability of firm-level data 
has provided robust evidence for the existence and persistence of wide productivity 
differentials among firms (Nelson, 1981; Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Dosi et al., 
2010). In the past few decades, applied research has found that factors such as 
differences in technology and innovation effort (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000) and  
management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), the quality of labour employed 
(Fox and Smeets, 2010), international trade (Melitz, 2003) and location (Rosenthal and 
Strange, 2004) all play a role in explaining firm productivity heterogeneity, although 
what determines firm productivity differentials is far from being clearly understood 
(Syverson, 2011). In particular, questions regarding what supports such wide 
heterogeneity, which factors matter most, whether factors influencing productivity can 
be controlled by firms or are purely external products of the operating environment 
(Syverson, 2011) and which policies can be used to boost productivity growth 
(Bartelsman, 2010) are all of primary importance. 
These issues are even more critical in the services sector. Taken as a whole, the 
services sector accounts for over two-thirds of value added in advanced economies 
(OECD, 2005). Recent studies emphasise the importance of services in the productivity 
growth of countries. For instance, Van Ark et al. (2008) analysed the industry-level 
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productivity growth of Europe and the United States and concluded that the major factor 
causing the divergence of aggregate-level productivity between them is the different 
productivity of the services sector. That of local services (e.g., transport, hotels) is in 
fact increasingly viewed as a problem, since it explains most of this productivity gap 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2010).  
There is still little knowledge on firm-level productivity in the services sector, 
although pioneering studies have suggested that firm productivity dispersion is even 
greater in this sector than in manufacturing (Oulton, 1998; Faggio et al., 2010).  The 
most obvious reasons are that in services, and personal services in particular, firms 
generally face huge differences in demand (Morikawa, 2012), are greatly affected by 
location (Morikawa, 2011) and have access to diverse externalities. The extension of the 
debate to the tourist sector is a substantial one, as it has immediate practical 
consequences on tourism policies. This sector is of increasing importance for countries 
like Italy, in which the current economic crisis has fuelled a debate on the sustainability 
of a model of economic development focusing largely on manufacturing. Tourism is 
characterised by the simultaneous occurrence of production and consumption, and 
productivity thus mainly depends on demand conditions and location factors, generally 
beyond the control of single firms. In this respect, two critical questions are whether 
there is a role for public policies aimed at strengthening the sector in the face of 
increasing competitive pressure, and whether interventions should focus more on 
external than firm factors - for instance, by reinforcing destination management - or 
whether they should aim at improving the internal features of tourist firms. 
 This thesis contributes to the empirical literature on firm productivity with three 
core papers. The first re-examines the slowdown in productivity in Italian 
manufacturing by studying the link between innovation, imitation and human capital, 
which sustained wide heterogeneity of firm productivity behind the aggregate flat 
productivity trend. The second paper extends analysis to the services sector, in 
particular to tourism. At a very disaggregated level, it identifies the various sources of 
differences in productive efficiency of hotels stemming from entrepreneurial and 
managerial factors, and external to firm factors. The third paper examines the effect of 
public policy in tourism. A methodological advance is proposed by defining an 
econometric framework, which allows us to identify and estimate not only the direct but 
also the indirect effects which public policies may have on hotel performance, in a 
dynamic treatment setting.  
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 The thesis is structured as follows. In the rest of this introductory chapter, we 
first define productivity and efficiency and discuss the main difficulties involved in 
their measurement (section 1.1). Section 1.2 presents an overview of the literature on 
the factors determining firm productivity and its evolution, with particular emphasis on 
those factors which are of main interest in this thesis. Section 1.3 discusses the role 
which policy-makers may play in boosting firm productivity growth. Section 1.4 
addresses the links with the three papers (Chapters 2, 3 and 4), which represent the main 
contribution of this thesis. Chapter 5 concludes, with a general summary of the main 
findings and their implications. 
 
1.1 Efficiency and productivity: definition and measurement issues 
 
Productivity is the measure of the ability with which a production system transforms 
input into output. The literature uses two basic types of productivity measures, single-
factor and multi-factor. 
Single-factor measures involve one particular input. Labour productivity, i.e., the 
ratio of output (either total sales or value added) over the number of employees or 
number of worked hours, is the most widely used proxy of single-factor productivity at 
several levels of analysis, as it is the unit of measure which best reflects the 
competitiveness of an economic sector or country, but does not require any assumption 
regarding the relationship between input and output. However, single-factor measures 
have the disadvantage of being affected by the intensity of use of the excluded inputs. 
Multi-factor or Total Factor Productivity (TFP) indexes overcome the limitations of 
single-factor measures in that they involve multiple inputs. TFP is a residual, and is the 
unexplained part of the variation of output after variations in inputs have been taken 
into account. 
The concept of eﬃciency is closely related to that of productivity, and is 
frequently used as a synonym to indicate the performance of a production unit (country, 
region or firm). In fact, from the theoretical point of view, productivity and efficiency 
are separate concepts. Productivity is defined as the ratio of the outputs of a production 
process to its inputs; eﬃciency refers to the comparison between observed and optimal 
outputs and inputs (Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 2008). Therefore, efficiency 
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measurement requires the existence of a benchmark. Firms operate inefficiently for two 
reasons: either, given input prices, firms fail to allocate resources in the most eﬃcient 
manner (allocative ineﬃciency) or, given their optimal allocation), they are unable to  
exploit their resources (technical inefficiency). In other words, even if two firms have 
the same resource allocation, one firm may produce less output than the other.  
Section 1.1.1. examines the key issues in the measurement of efficiency and 
productivity. 
 
1.1.1 Measuring productivity and efficiency 
 
For a formal description of productivity and efficiency measurement, let us consider a 
production unit which employs an array of inputs to achieve a single output. The 
production process of the i-th unit at time t can be formalised as a function: 
     
Y
it
= A
it
F X
it( )            Eq. 1.1 
 
where Yit is the amount of output, Xit is a vector of inputs, and Ait represents the 
productivity index. In particular, Ait is a measure of Multi-factor or TFP: 
 
A
it
= TFP
it
=
Y
it
F X
it( )           
Eq. 1.2 
 
 Single-factor productivity measures are obtained as a special case when Xit is a 
scalar, for instance, a measure of labour use.  
 Productivity is a relative concept (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). In the production 
function framework, a measure of productivity can be obtained in a given period of time 
t, considering the mean value of productivity obtained by N units in the observed 
sample: 
 
TFPit =
Ait
Ajt
j=1
N
∑
           
Eq. 1.3 
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 A measure of productivity growth can also be obtained by considering a given 
unit at two different times: 
 
ΔTFP
it,t+1 =
A
it+1
A
it                        
Eq. 1.4 
 
 Production unit i may be inefficient, i.e., its observed output at time t may be 
lower than the maximum potential output obtainable, given the input. Therefore, we 
have:  
 
Yit ≤ Ait F(Xit)           Eq. 1.5 
 
 Introducing a parameter which measures the level of technical efficiency in Eq. 
1.1, we obtain: 
 
Yit = AitF(Xit) · TeEff (Xit, Yit)          Eq. 1.6 
 
where TeEff (Xit, Yit) ≤ 1 is the level of technical efficiency of unit I. After accounting 
for technical inefficiency, the productivity growth of a given unit between two time-
points is clearly composed of two parts: one accounting for technological changes and 
the other for changes in the efficiency with which technologies are exploited. Formally, 
we therefore have: 
 
ΔTFPit,t+1 =
Ai,t+1
Ai,t
TeEff (Xi,t+1,Yi,t+1)
TeEeff (Xi,t,Yi,t )
=
Yi,t+1 F(Xi,t+1)
Yi,t F(Xi,t )
TeEff (Xi,t+1,Yi,t+1)
TeEeff (Xi,t,Yi,t )    
Eq. 1.7 
 
 Alternative measures of productivity can be obtained, the differences in which 
depend on how F(Xit) is calculated (Del Gatto et al. 2010; Van Biesenbroek, 2007). The 
literature refers to three families of methods: index numbers; econometric estimation of 
the average relationship between inputs and outputs; and frontier estimation based on 
either parametric or non-parametric techniques. 
 Index numbers (Caves, 1982; Diewert, 1976) are the basis for growth accounting 
and are widely used in comparisons of productivity growth across nations. Econometric 
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estimation comprises semi-parametric methods (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and 
Petrin, 2003) and Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 2000). 
 In the frontier framework, efficiency and productivity are functions of distances 
from the production frontier. Estimates are obtained by an econometric stochastic 
frontier approach (Battese and Coelli, 1992; Greene, 2008): distributional assumptions 
of the unknown productivity component separate it from random error. A second 
method of frontier estimation is non-parametric (Daraio and Simar, 2007; Simar and 
Wilson, 2008, 2013). Among non-parametric estimators, Data Envelopment Analysis 
(Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984; Thanassoulis et al., 2008) is an estimator 
based on piecewise construction of a convex production frontier from a set of 
observations, without any assumptions regarding its functional form, which shows good 
statistical properties (see Simar and Wilson, 2008, 2013). 
 The choice of relying on parametric versus non-parametric estimation is a matter 
of debate. As noted by Simar and Wilson (2008) “a parametric form for the production 
function allows easier, perhaps richer, economic interpretation and is often easier to 
estimate. But the parametric specification must be a reasonable approximation of the 
underlying true model”. Non-parametric estimation does seem to be more appropriate in 
the case of services, where the assumption of a stable relationship between input and 
output (i.e., a well-defined production function) seems even more unlikely. However, 
non-parametric approaches have their drawbacks. In particular, the DEA estimator faces 
the so-called “curse of dimensionality”, as the rate of convergence of the estimator is 
much slower than in the case of parametric estimation, depending on the numbers of 
observations and inputs and outputs taken into account (the dimensionality of the 
problem). Second, DEA is sensitive to outliers, which may define an efficient frontier. 
Using large datasets and methods to detect outliers (e.g., Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic, 
2005; Simar, 2003) does improve estimation, and bootstrap procedures are available 
which allow inferences to be made of DEA efficiency measures (Simar and Wilson, 
1998). In addition, in the DEA framework, analysis of productivity dynamics and its 
decomposition is possible with the Malmquist index (Färe et al., 1992, 1994; Färe and 
Grosskopf, 1996). 
Productivity (and efficiency) is a residual which explain variations in output, 
unrelated to observable variations in input. In this definition, outputs and inputs are 
assumed to be homogeneous and measured as physical quantities. Much of the literature 
typically measures output by revenue divided by an industry-level deflator. With a 
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monetary instead of a physical quantity, output and productivity are influenced by 
within-industry price differences. On one hand, higher prices are associated with high-
quality products, which in turn implies higher output and consequently higher 
productivity – this is particularly important in services in which revenue is preferred to 
physical quantity measures (Grönroos and Ojasalo, 2004). On the other hand, if prices 
also reflect idiosyncratic demand shifts or market power variations across firms, then 
high-productivity firms may not be particularly efficient from the technological 
viewpoint. This problem becomes less important when the observed firms are micro and 
small, i.e., they probably do not have the power to influence the equilibrium price of 
goods and services in the output market. In addition, when the analysis is framed within 
a longitudinal setting, in which comparisons are in terms of variations, the problem of 
comparisons among firms may even be reduced. 
In this thesis, both single-factor and Total Factor Productivity measures are 
used. We decided to apply the more flexible non-parametric frontier estimation of TFP 
and efficiency indexes. The next section addresses the question of how to identify 
which factors influence productivity and efficiency in the non-parametric framework. 
These factors are neither inputs nor outputs, but they influence the ability with which 
firms transform inputs into outputs.   
 
1.1.2 Explaining productivity and efficiency in the nonparametric frontier 
framework 
 
The non-parametric literature on efficiency and productivity refers to factors which 
influence efficiency and productivity in an “environmental” or “contextual” sense. 
Researchers have proposed several approaches to measure the effects of these external 
variables on the production process (e.g., Fried et al. 1999; Daraio and Simar, 2007). 
The methods can be classified into distinct classes: 
• The separation approach, based on the seminal work by Charnes et al. (1981), is 
directly applicable to dichotomous or categorical environmental variables. The 
impact of an environmental variable is estimated by stratifying the observed 
units analysed according to the value of the variable, and subsequently 
estimating efficiency within subsamples. Portela and Thanassoulis (2001) 
derived an efficiency decomposition approach by solving two DEA models. As 
a first step, they estimated within-group efficiency and then overall efficiency in 
INTRODUCTION 
! 8 
the pooled dataset. A similar method is the metafrontier approach within the 
DEA framework (O’Donnel et al., 2008), in which a metafrontier is defined as 
the convex hull of the union of the group frontier. Information on the effects of 
external factors is then obtained by comparing efficiency, estimated by pooling 
all observation and efficiency values are obtained by examining only firms 
within each group. 
• In the one-stage approach (e.g. Banker and Morey, 1986a,b), environmental 
variables are incorporated directly into the definition of the production 
possibility set (PPS) – the space of feasible input/output combinations - and then 
into the models. This approach requires prior knowledge of whether the 
environmental variable is an input or an output of the production process.  
• In the two-stage approach, a type of envelopment estimator (mostly DEA 
estimators) is used to obtain efficiency scores, which are then regressed against 
the environmental variables. Although this approach, first introduced by Ray 
(1991), is now widely used, how the second-stage regression should be carried 
out is debated. Two different approaches have recently been proposed to 
overcome ad hoc strategies of analysis in the second-stage regression. Both 
approaches develop proper Data Generating Processes (DGP) which provide 
formal links of the first stage (in which efficiency scores are obtained) with the 
second stage (in which the regression analysis is performed). The former 
approach was proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007), who addressed several 
problems in order to obtain consistent estimation and inference in the second-
stage regression, in which the DEA score is the dependent variable. First, DEA 
efficiency estimates are serially correlated, since perturbations of observations 
lying on the best-practice frontier cause changes in the efficiency scores of other 
observations. Second, since the explanatory variables are correlated with both 
inputs and outputs (otherwise there would be no need for a second-stage 
regression), these variables must also be correlated with the error term of the 
second-stage regression. In addition, since the efficiency scores are truncated at 
one by construction and not because of censoring, a censored (Tobit) regression 
is not the correct procedure to follow. Lastly, explanatory variables may affect 
efficiencies by means of two mechanisms: influencing the shape of the 
distribution of efficiencies, or affecting the support of input or output variables, 
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i.e., the set of production possibilities (Daraio et al., 2010). Simar and Wilson 
(2007) rationalised the two-stage approach by taking these problems into 
account and proposed using maximum likelihood (ML) estimators of truncated 
regression and smooth bootstrapping to improve inferences. The second 
approach, by Banker and Natarajan (2008), uses a DGP, in which the use of 
simple ordinary least-squares (OLS) or even Tobit estimation in the second-
stage parametric regression is theoretically justified. Another view, the called 
“instrumentalist” view as defined by McDonald (2009), considers the DEA 
score as a descriptive measure of the relative distance of a unit to the observed 
best-practice frontier. In this approach, the DEA scores do not cause arise any 
particular concern in regression analysis, as they are treated like as any other 
dependent variable. Parameter estimation and inference in the second stage may 
be carried out with using appropriate, but standard procedures (Ramalho et al.,  
2010). Under this view, McDonald (2009) has argued strongly against a Tobit 
model, on the grounds that the DEA efficiency scores are not censored but can 
be seen to be as a special instances of fractional dependent variables. He 
recommends thea quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) in the context 
of fractional data, but notes that the OLS procedure would provide a reasonable 
approximation.   
• Also multi-stage (three- and four-stage) approaches have been proposed 
(Ruggiero, 1998; Fried et al., 1999; Muniz, 2002). Multi-stage models make it 
possible to consider both continuous and discrete environmental variables as 
well as potential slacks. However, models following this approach assume that 
the operational environment influence only efficiency distribution and, most 
importantly, inference is not possible (Daraio and Simar, 2007). 
• Another class of models, the conditional approach, has recently been proposed 
(Cazals et al., 2002; Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007b; Badin et al. 2012). It 
incorporates environmental variables into a conditional frontier, established in a 
probabilistic formulation of the production process. Daraio and Simar (2005) 
introduced this method and extended the framework to DEA models (Daraio and 
Simar, 2007b). The difficulty with this approach is that handling multivariate 
covariates and categorical and dummy variables is not easy. 
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1.2 Sources of firm productivity differentials: an overview 
!
Given its importance for the prosperity of contemporaneous societies, research has 
devoted an enormous effort to understand the sources of differing level of efficiency 
and productivity.  
The observed differences in productive efficiency can be a side effect of firm 
decision meant to achieve diverse objectives. Operations management researchers, for 
instance, have debated the significance of efficiency and slack – excess inputs for the 
same level of output (Bourgeois, 1981) – in generating competitive advantage (e.g., 
Adler et al., 2009). On the one hand, increasing levels of efficiency raise the possibility 
of internal frictions within a firm and reduce the firm’s ability to create new knowledge 
and buffer against discontinuity in its supply chain. For instance, planning and budget 
decisions are usually made under uncertainty, slack in the form of excess use of 
resources may thus be useful as a buffer against uncertain demand and furthermore 
provides flexibility which facilitates the coordination of the internal working of the firm 
(see e.g. Cyert and March, 1963). What is not clear, however, is the level of slack firms 
have to choose with respect to their financial performance, mostly when competition 
increases. Following the economic literature (e.g., Leibenstein, 1966) the alternative 
view argues that slack resources imply sub-optimal resource utilization and thus reveal 
waste. Further, strategic management researchers have argued that resource efficiency is 
often characteristic of valuable and rare firm capabilities formed as a result of complex 
path dependencies (Peng et al., 2008), and thus enable competitive advantage (Teece et 
al., 1997).  
Management studies and strategic research have used decomposition techniques 
to outline a strict relationship between productivity growth and enhanced financial 
performance, after controlling for a price recovery effect (Miller, 1984; Miller and Rao, 
1989). Later contributions have extended the original framework allowing factors like 
product mix and capacity utilization to influence the ultimate financial performance of 
the firm. Drawing on these methods, applied research has shown how increasing 
productivity has counterbalanced a dramatic drop in prices and positively affected 
profitability in the US telecommunications industry (Banker et al., 1996). Likewise, 
productivity and in particular its technical change component, has been found to provide 
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a large positive contribution to the operating profits of Spanish commercial bank sector 
in the early ‘90s (Griffel-Tatjé and Lovell, 1999).  
According to Syverson (2011), the factors determining observed differences in 
firm productivity can be classified as either internal or external to firm factors. 
Although theoretically productivity and efficiency are different concepts, the empirical 
literature on what determines different levels and rates of growth of both measures 
shows a  substantial overlap.  
 In the following, we discuss the role of explaining the productivity and 
efficiency heterogeneity of the main internal and external productivity drivers reported 
in the literature on firm productivity and efficiency. 
 
1.2.1 Internal levers 
 
Internal to the firm factors are within-firm factors, the “levers”, according to Syverson 
(2011), which firms can directly control and which can be activated to enhance firm 
productivity.  
Empirical research has shown a positive relationship between a firm’s internal 
working and its productivity. That is, within-firm factors such as re-organisation of 
work-shifts, transfer of responsibility to teams, innovations in  workplace organisation, 
and the use of incentives have been shown to be effective mechanisms for improving 
productivity at both firm (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004) and plant level (Ichniowski et 
al., 1997). Firm productivity appeared to be positively affected by the adoption of new 
technologies (Brynjholfsson and Hitt, 1996). There is also growing evidence which 
establishes significant links between returns to new technologies (i.e., Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs)) and the internal organisation of firms. In 
particular, the productivity gap between the US and Europe in the 1990s has been 
associated with two factors: firms in the US are organised in a way which allows them 
to be more flexible within their organisational structure and to use new technologies 
more effectively (Bloom et al., 2012).  
Below, we discuss in more detail the three internal factors which are of primary 
importance in this thesis. First, we examine the effects of adopting innovation and 
technology to explain the evolution of productivity dispersion. Then we address the role 
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of management as a driver of the productivity differential. Lastly, we introduce the role 
of human capital. 
 
1.2.1.1 Technology, innovation and imitation 
 
One reason for the heterogeneity of inter-firm productivity is that firms can use various 
production technologies. Empirical analyses have shown that even plants within the 
same narrowly defined industry may use quite different technologies. Indeed, these 
differences tend to persist over time and spatial differences are significant (e.g., Rigby 
and Essletzbichler 2006).  
 Technical change plays a central role in models explaining the evolution of 
productivity distribution. One strand of research considers the skill-biased nature of 
technological change (Acemoglu, 2002; Aghion, 2002). Technological change is skill-
biased when changes in production technology favour skilled over unskilled workers by 
increasing their relative productivity and, as a consequence, their relative demand. 
Along these lines, Caselli (1999) associated the evolution of productivity dispersion 
across firms with the diverse rates of technology adoption across them. Those firms 
with more highly skilled workers tended to adopt new technologies faster. The 
difference in adoption rates thus led to increased dispersion of inter-firm labour 
productivity. Since new technologies allow capital to be re-allocated to its best use, TFP 
increases in firms which introduce a new technology, so TFP dispersion also rises. 
Dunne et al. (2004) in the US, Faggio et al. (2010) in the UK, and Ito and Lechevalier 
(2009) in Japan found evidence consistent with the technological explanation of 
productivity dispersion. Indeed, for effective enhancement of productivity, technical 
change must be accompanied by organisational change (Nelson, 1991) which affects the 
composition of the workforce (Piva et al. 2005) and may be an even more dramatic 
source of productivity dispersion across firms.  
 A more complex view of the impact of the role of technology acknowledges the 
interplay between innovation and imitation. Whereas innovation tends to increase the 
heterogeneity of production technologies in an industry, already available diffusion and 
imitation of technologies tend to reduce heterogeneity and dispersion of performance 
across firms.  
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 Iwai (2000) presents the characterisation of innovation, imitation, in an 
evolutionary framework. Firms are associated with the various technologies available 
on the market, which in turn determine their productivity. Two processes drive the 
evolution of productivity dispersion: innovation, which is the result of an expensive and 
uncertain search for new technologies, and imitation, which results from the adoption of 
the best technologies already existing on the market. These two processes 
counterbalance each other and induce productivity differentials over time. Explaining 
these dynamics depends on two aspects. On one hand, innovation enlarges the set of 
available technologies, supporting firm heterogeneity; on the other hand, imitation of 
more productive techniques drives firms to become more homogeneous in technologies. 
Firms can always use the best technologies available on the market, ignoring the 
possibility that they often adopt less efficient ones. Consequently, this model can hardly 
explain the persistence of productivity differentials over time. 
Very recently Konig et al. (2012) proposed a model based on technological 
advance driven by innovation, based on investment in Research and Development 
(R&D) combined with a process of imitation of external technological knowledge. 
These authors apply to firm level the distance-to-frontier framework inspired by growth 
models in the Schumpeterian tradition (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2006), in which countries 
on the frontier engage in innovative activity and backward ones try to reach the frontier 
through imitation. The model theorises that firms close to the (industry) technological 
frontier innovate, driving movement of the productivity frontier; firms lagging behind 
the frontier, which choose to imitate, have different ability to assimilate and exploit 
existing technologies, i.e., different absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Although firms can increase their absorptive capacity over time, they can only do so up 
to a certain point. This limited capacity of imitating new technologies is crucial in the 
model, as it allows productivity diﬀerentials among firms to persist.  
 The distance-to-frontier framework has also been applied at firm level in recent 
empirical studies which empirically shown the link between corporate strategy and 
distance to the technological frontier (e.g., Coad, 2011). 
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1.2.1.2 Managers and/or Managerial practices 
 
From the economic viewpoint, there are various perspectives showing the link between 
management and firm productivity. According to Bloom et al. (2013), three 
perspectives can be used: management as design, management as production input, and 
what the above authors call “management as technology”. Each leads to a different 
prediction about the potential relationship between the quality of managerial practices 
and the firm’s performance.  
In the design approach, management is viewed through the lens of the 
“contingency” paradigm (Woodward, 1958): heterogeneity derives from the adoption of 
various practices and is essentially linked to the different environments in which firms 
operate. Different management practices are chosen by firms to maximise their profits 
in not perfectly competitive markets. In this perspective, there are no correlations 
between management practices and either productivity or profitability; only correlations 
with the intensity of various factor inputs are expected. 
Management may also be viewed as a factor of production, like labour or 
capital. In this case, there is a market price under which firms determine their optimal 
level of management input. As a result, differences in management practices are 
correlated with differences in productivity, but no correlation with profitability is 
expected. However, this perspective does not explain the fact that management 
decision-making has the power to influence the productivity of all the other factors of 
production. Syverson clarifies this point: “Managers are conductors of an input 
orchestra. They coordinate the application of labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. Just 
as a poor conductor can lead to a cacophony rather than a symphony, one might expect 
poor management to lead to discordant production operations” (Syverson, 2011, p. 
336). This aspect therefore means that considering management simply as another 
production factor is problematic.  
The large dispersion of firm productivity even in narrowly defined sectors has 
given rise to an alternative view, in which management also incorporates features 
resembling “hard” technologies (Bloom et al., 2013). Referring to the production 
function as a tool to represent the production process, management is no longer 
considered as a further argument of the function, but is now embodied in the 
productivity measure.  
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Management quality embedded in managers' talents translates into productivity - 
specifically TFP, because firms with better managers produce more output than other 
firms using the same amount and quality of inputs. Productivity improvements are thus 
transferable across workers and plants which are under the control of managers, and 
management quality is transferred between firms when managers move across firms. 
Empirical studies have shown that CEO attributes are significant predictors of relative 
R&D spending (Barker and Mueller, 2002) and that there is a “fixed effect” which 
CEOs bring with them when they move across firms (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).  
However, relying as it does essentially on the human capital of managers, this 
view does not explain why the productivity of a firm may persist over time, in spite of 
manager turnovers. An extension of this perspective is that management quality – 
specifically, that embedded in managerial practices, i.e., what managers do - is partially 
transferable even without management mobility (Bloom et al., 2013). As for 
technologies, genuine managerial innovations may arise (Birkinshaw et al., 2008). 
Managerial practices should resemble technology also in the process of adoption that 
characterises technological innovations. Therefore, models of technological diffusion 
(e.g. Hall and Khan, 2003; Geroski, 2000) should become important tools to 
understanding the spread of management practices. Management as technology predicts 
positive correlations between management and productivity and profitability. 
Although there are fewer studies in the economic literature examining the 
adoption of management practices and its relationship with firm productivity, two 
factors do appear to be important predictors of the quality of management practice in a 
firm. More intense competition is positively correlated with best-practice management 
(Van Reenen, 2011).  Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) have also shown that management 
practice scores are lower when firms are family-owned and primogeniture determines 
the current CEO’s succession. These two factors explain most of the cross-country 
differences in average management quality.  
However, family ownership per se is not necessarily detrimental for efficiency 
and productivity. Research in this field has shown that firms run by family managers are 
likely to benefit from lower agency costs, since there is an alignment of interests and 
reduced information asymmetry between owners and managers if firms are both family-
owned and managed (Chrisman et al., 2004; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Family ties 
may eventually lead to higher efficiency, especially in small firms, in which low agency 
costs are also expected between managers and family members employed in firm 
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operations (Herrero, 2011). Firm size is in fact an important indicator of administrative 
complexity, which encompasses the need for more complex control and monitoring 
systems. These factors elevate the skill requirements of managers and may reduce the 
advantage in terms of agency costs (Galbraith, 1995; Mintzberg, 1979). The practice of 
choosing top managers only among family members may be detrimental when firm size 
increases.  
The open question is to understand whether is the managers’ human capital - i.e., 
managers’ talents, and what they know – or what managers do – i.e. managerial 
practices – that plays a role in increasing the productivity of a firm (Syverson, 2011). 
 
1.2.1.3 Human capital 
 
Firm productivity appears to be positively correlated with the personal characteristics of 
its workforce, for example, the education, training, and experience of its staff (Fox and 
Smeets, 2010). The role of human capital is closely related to the two internal factors 
discussed above: the effectiveness with which managers implement managerial 
practices, and the adoption and application of new technology. The education levels of 
workers and managers are correlated with high management scores (Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2010). Highly educated managers are more likely to be aware of the benefits of 
modern management practices, and implementation of these practices may be easier 
when the workforce is more knowledgeable. Indeed, case studies and econometric 
analyses have emphasised the importance of complementarity between organisational 
practices, investments in new technologies, human capital, and the economic 
environment in which firms operate (Brynjholfsson and Hitt, 2000, Bresnahan et al., 
2002; Tambe et al., 2012). 
Labour flexibility practices can be a source of productivity and efficiency 
outcomes. Flexibility can be introduced through various channels. First, flexibility can 
be related to the responsiveness to external shocks. For instance, firms can adjust the 
amount of labour employed (i.e., numerical flexibility achieved by using fixed-term or 
part-time contracts and reducing working hours) or modulate the dynamics of wages in 
response to external shocks. An alternative way through which firms can achieve 
flexibility is related to the reorganization of the workforce by means of training and the 
development of multi-skilled employees. Schuler and Jackson (1987) linked human 
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resource practices to the strategic posture of firms. In particular, human resource 
practices appear effective for achieving competitive advantage only where the firm 
emphasizes the importance of either quality enhancement or innovation within its 
strategy. In organizations pursuing a cost based strategy, the most logical approach 
would be to emphasize numerical flexibility and wage cost minimization. The effect of 
labour flexibility on firm productivity is however mixed. A rigid labour market may 
have a negative impact on aggregate productivity (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002; Scarpetta 
and Tressel, 2004). Other scholars suggest instead a negative relationship between 
increased labour flexibility and innovation and productivity at firm level (Arvanitis, 
2005; Kleinknecht et al., 2006; Michie and Sheehan, 2001, 2003).  
 
1.2.2 External factors 
 
The effect of factors external to firms may not directly influence their productivity, but 
they can affect firms’ incentives to apply productivity-enhancing actions. They can also 
influence the extent to which such efforts are successful at moving firms to a higher 
position within their industry productivity distribution (Syverson, 2011). In other words, 
the external environment may operate as a moderator of the potential productivity-
enhancing effect of changes in the internal working of the firm by making it 
comparatively harder or easier for firms operating in various environments to reduce 
their distance to the production frontier. 
 
1.2.2.1 Competition, internationalization and market conditions 
 
A competitive environment affects the productivity level of firms. That is, the more 
competitive the markets in which a firm operates, the lower the dispersion of inter-firm 
productivity.  
A highly competitive environment is expected to influence productivity distribution 
through two main mechanisms. First, higher competition affects the selection process of 
firms: a more competitive environment boosts re-allocation of market shares and 
resources to more productive firms (e.g., Foster et al., 2006), forcing poorly productive 
firms to leave the market. In the long term, this selection process gives rise to less 
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productivity dispersion, higher average productivity, and a greater share of output 
produced by high-efficiency firms. The second mechanism works within a firm: 
heightened competition induces existing firms to undertake costly productivity-raising 
actions which they would not otherwise make (e.g., Schimitz, 2005). Which of the two 
mechanisms predominates and in what conditions is an open question (Syverson, 2011). 
However, the ability of markets to select more efficient firms appears to be in doubt, 
whereas most aggregate productivity dynamics appear to be driven by within-firm 
changes in existing firms (e.g., Bottazzi et al., 2010). 
The relationship between competition and innovation in existing firms is probably not 
linear. In certain conditions, heightened competition can actually diminish a firm’s 
incentives to make productivity-enhancing investments. The propensity to invest in new 
technologies and new production processes for incumbent firms close to the frontier is 
expected to increase as and when competition increases, but the incentive to innovate of 
firms far from the frontier is low, as their expected profits are reduced because their 
efficiency is too low to allow them to compete with more efficient firms (Aghion et al, 
2005; Iacovone, 2012). However, empirical evidence is mixed. Konings and 
Vandenbussche (2007) find that decreased competition due to anti-dumping protection 
helps more laggard EU firms than efficient ones. In Czech and Russian industries, 
Sabirianova et al. (2005) found that increased competition raised the efficiency of 
foreign firms, which were assumed to be closer to the technological frontier, but had a 
negative effect on the productive efficiency of less efficient domestic firms. Conversely, 
Bernard et al. (2006) found no evidence of a different impact on firm productivity due 
to trade cost reduction in US manufacturing. Topalova (2004) also showed how trade 
liberalisation within Indian industries had similar productivity improvements in firms 
with both high and low productivity prior to the reform.  
Closely related to the effect of competition is that of internationalisation on firm 
productivity. Greater exposure to international trade should be characterised by reduced 
productivity dispersion because of higher competition. Beyond the competition effect, 
globalisation may increase productivity dispersion because of the cumulative impact of 
two effects: firms’ self-selection in exporting, and learning from exporting (see Wagner, 
2007, 2012, for a review of empirical works). If these two potential effects reinforce 
each other, internationalisation may produce an increasing dispersion of productivity. 
The theoretical literature on heterogeneous firms and trade (e.g., Melitz, 2003) was 
inspired by these empirical findings (see Redding, 2011, for a review).  
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 Demand-side explanations of the evolution of productivity have also been 
proposed. Syverson (2004) showed how low product substitutability prevents customers 
from changing from purchasing goods made by relatively less productive firms to ones 
made by relatively more productive ones. Thus, anything that increases product 
substitutability should have lower productivity dispersion. Demand-side factors play an 
important role in services. In tourism, demand is increasingly global, but the supply of 
tourism-related goods and services remains constrained to the place of consumption, 
making the problem of product substitutability crucial and closely related to location 
factors. 
 
1.2.2.2 Location factors: agglomeration, urbanization and natural advantages 
 
Understanding the implications of firms' performance of where economic activities are 
located has attracted the interest of scholars from the fields of both economics 
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Puga, 2010) and management (McCann and Folta, 2008). 
What clearly emerges from both fields is that firms crucially interact with the local 
environment, and that either positive or negative externalities eventually emerge. 
Geographically proximate firms may draw benefits from supply-side as well as demand-
side externalities (McCann and Folta, 2009). 
 Several studies have addressed the role of agglomeration in various sectors. In 
the hotel industry, for instance, Baum and Mezias (1992), Baum and Haveman (1997) 
and Baum and Ingram (1998) focused on the Manhattan hotel industry, Chung and 
Kalnins (2001) studied the Texas lodging industry, and Kalnins and Chung described 
the hotel industry as an economic sector in which “agglomeration benefits and resource 
spillovers likely play a role in location decisions” (Kalnins and Chung, 2004, p. 690).  
 Two general explanations associate performance with firm location. First, firms 
may benefit from positive externalities which accrue from agglomeration economies: 
they benefit by being located close to other firms.  In this case, agglomeration generates 
benefits for two separate reasons, depending on whether the agglomeration consists of 
similar or diverse industrial activity. The best-known form of externality is the presence 
and scale of other companies in the same industry. Marshall (1920) identified three 
main supply-side benefits emerging from the concentration of a given industry in a 
region: knowledge spillovers between firms, labour market pooling, and input-output 
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linkages. An example of substantial demand-related externality is the reduced search 
cost for customers stemming from the geographic proximity of firms. The spatial 
concentration of unrelated firms may benefit from urbanisation economies. These 
externalities derive from the geographic concentration of aggregate economic activities, 
as in cities. Firms benefit from urbanisation externalities because industrial diversity 
fosters fertilisation of ideas across industries (Jacobs, 1969). Supply and demand-side 
agglomeration differs in terms of composition, relationship complexity, and geographic 
scope (McCann and Folta, 2009). In particular, the type of relationship is less complex 
in demand-side agglomeration, in which the existence of relationships between firms is 
not a necessary condition for gain from geographic proximity. For instance, a group of 
hotels whose managers never speak to each other and who share no information among 
themselves still receive the benefits of demand-side agglomeration externalities 
(McCann and Folta, 2009). Thus, such agglomerations may exist even without 
interconnections among firms. In this case, the fact of being located close to each other 
is sufficient to allow gain from enhanced demand. 
 The second explanation regards externalities due to factors exogenous to 
economic actors, i.e., benefits which are not linked to the presence of other firms. 
Marshall (1920) argued that the chief explanation for industrial location was the unique 
physical condition of particular areas. Examples of factors which might attract firms to a 
particular area include unique raw materials, specialised workers, transportation 
facilities, and  the capacity of a particular location to attract consumers.  Ellison and 
Glaeser (1999) showed that the percentage of agglomeration predicted by natural 
advantage proxies is about 20%. However, these authors argued that, since the proxies 
they used were imperfect, the fraction of agglomeration which might be explained by 
natural advantages was probably larger. Exactly how much larger is unclear, but they 
conjectured that “at least half of observed geographic concentration is due to natural 
advantages” (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999, p. 316). Externalities stemming from natural 
advantages are very important for personal service firms. In particular, the attraction 
factors of the area in which firms operate, such as natural environmental features 
(beaches, scenic landscapes, or pleasant weather), or man-made features (historic, 
artistic and architectural attractions), or even more practical ones (such as good tourism 
facilities) can be very important demand-related sources of success in the tourist trade.  
 Lastly, it is still standard for economists to employ cluster-based methods in 
evaluating the geographic distribution of firms. These methods measure the spatial 
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concentration of economic activity according to predefined geographic limits 
(administrative districts, city, regions, counties, etc.). Measures obtained with these 
methods introduce bias resulting from the quite arbitrary concept of space chosen. 
Distance-based methods, which definitely reduce bias by using a continuous approach 
to space in order to gauge geographic concentration of activities, have recently been 
introduced (Arbia and Espa, 1996; Marcon and Puech, 2003, 2010; Duranton and 
Overman 2005). 
 
1.3 The role of the policy makers in stimulating firms productivity 
growth 
 
For policy-makers, “the state of affairs of productivity research is frustrating, at best. 
The main question on the table seems fairly straightforward: which policies can be used 
to boost productivity (growth)?“ (Bartelsman, 2010, p.1891). In order to improve 
aggregate productivity, government can influence many of the productivity drivers 
discussed above. Public interventions in economic activities take on various forms, 
ranging from regulatory interventions with no direct financial implications for the 
government’s budget, to direct provision of funds (i.e., subsidies) to private firms 
(Buigues and Sekkat, 2011).  
At first, policy-makers may influence the factors shaping the external 
environment in which firms operate. Many policy reforms have plausibly productivity-
enhancing effects. For instance, policy-makers can change trade policy and market 
regulation design with implications on the competitive conditions, allowing the market 
to operate more effectively in selecting more efficient firms.  
However, market failures represent an important hampering factor behind the 
functioning of markets. The traditional argument for subsidising particular kinds of 
investments is the possibility that there are divergences between private and social 
returns due to externalities (references). In th case of market failure, policy 
interventions targeted directly towards firms, such as subsidies, can accelerate 
technological progress, and therefore productivity. 
There are different sources of technological change at firm level. On one hand, 
firms undertake in-house R&D. In this case, the argument on divergences between 
private and social returns is straightforward because, due to knowledge spillover, firms 
INTRODUCTION 
! 22 
making R&D investments do not appropriate the entire gains originating from their 
innovative effort (Nelson, 1959). On the other hand, firms may incorporate new 
technological knowledge embodied in new machinery and equipment acquired in the 
market (Pellegrino et al., 2011). DeLong and Summers (1991) argued that even 
investments in equipment, as opposed to other kinds of fixed capital, may generate 
externalities and that private return from this kind of investment would be below social 
returns. This suggests the possibility of under-investment by market economies and 
scope for government intervention. However, a stronger rationale explaining lack of 
investment is inefficiency in the capital market. In fact, because of credit risk and 
information asymmetry, borrowers tend to set the price of money on above-optimal 
levels or to rationalise credits. Thus, in order to finance investments, firms tend to 
follow a hierarchical approach (Myers and Majluf, 1984): they first rely on internal 
sources and then turn to external ones (primarily debt, usually that with the lowest cost). 
Credit rationing is problematic, especially for small firms (see Carreira and Silva, 2010, 
for a review), since information asymmetry may be more severe in their case. 
Therefore, small businesses rely heavily on internal resources to finance growth 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  As a result, they may not be able to raise the necessary 
amount of money to fulfill their investments when internal financial capital is not 
sufficient, and may postpone, partially reduce, or even abandon their growth objectives. 
The support of investments in physical capital plays an important role in tourism, since 
the productivity and competitiveness of tourist firms is influenced by investments which 
provide equipment and infrastructures and facilitate the introduction of new 
technologies (Blake at al., 2006).  
Public subsidisation is effective when policy-makers can improve market 
outcomes. Although subsidies are seen as effective and highly acceptable policy 
instruments, their implementation may raise concern, due to governmental budget 
constraints. Indeed, what might be contended is the ability of policy-makers to provide 
effective private incentives to rectify market failures and to avoid the introduction of 
additional distortions to the economic system. Governments, in general, may not be able 
to substitute markets in processing decentralised information, and lobbying and 
corruption may further distort their decisions (Rodrik, 2007). Lastly, subsidies may 
improperly support firms which are more interested in subsidy-seeking than productive 
activities and which capture subsidies in the form of slackness or lack of effort, so that 
subsidies give rise to inefficiencies (Bergstrom, 2000).  
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1.4 The main contributions of the thesis 
 
This thesis is composed of three core papers, the main contributions and results of 
which are summarized in the following sections. 
 
1.4.1 First paper: A new look at the evolution of productivity of Italian firms. 
 
The competitive environment faced by Italian firms has changed dramatically since the 
mid-1990s, mainly due to the increased competitiveness of new industrialising countries 
and the introduction of the euro. On the input side, Italian firms faced a sequence of 
labour reforms which introduced more flexible practices into the labour market. In this 
context, the Italian economy has witnessed slowed productivity, although the extensive 
heterogeneity of firms' behaviour in flat overall productivity growth seems to emerge 
from recent studies (Bugamelli et al., 2010; Dosi et al., 2012). In particular, a tendency 
towards “neo-dualism”, in which dynamic firms coexist with less technologically 
progressive ones has emerged in terms of labour productivity dynamics (Dosi et al., 
2012). 
 The first paper (Chapter 2) re-examines the Italian productivity slowdown. 
Instead of labour productivity, we analyse the TFP dynamics of a sample of Italian 
manufacturing single-plant firms in the period 1996-2006 by means of the distance-to-
frontier framework (Acemoglu et al., 2006; Konig et al., 2012). Here, the interplay 
between technological advance driven by innovation combined with a process of 
imitation is essential, in order to explain inter-firm heterogeneity; the distance to the 
frontier operates as a moderator of this process.  
 In the first part of the paper, two separate components of TFP growth are 
distinguished. The first is technological progress associated with the movement of the 
best-practice production frontier of an industry, due to successful innovators. The 
second component is technical efficiency, which explains changes in firms’ distance to 
the technological frontier over time. Both components are then further decomposed into 
subcomponents. We identify a clear-cut discontinuity after the adoption of the euro, 
highlighting the increasing gap between firms which contribute to technological 
advance and others whose performance worsened and which have moved away from the 
technological frontier. 
INTRODUCTION 
! 24 
 The second part of the paper extends analysis of the causes of the increased 
dispersion of productivity. We classify firms into four types, according to their initial 
efficiency level (i.e., distance to the frontier) and productivity dynamics over time, and 
explore the hypothesis that the increased dispersion of productivity is due to the 
differing strategic adaptation of firms to external shocks. Firms belonging to the least 
dynamic group, i.e., those characterised by greater distance from the frontier and slower 
productivity growth, use labour of poorer quality and draw from the flexible labour 
market more extensively than other firms.  
  
1.4.2 Second paper:  The influence of managerial and location factor on hotel 
efficiency 
 
The problem of which factors matter most in determining firm productivity is crucial 
for managers, for whom lack of knowledge of the relevant sources of efficiency 
differences over which they have control may hamper improved performance. 
Distinguishing these various sources is particularly interesting for research in services, 
where knowledge of what determines firms’ differences in productivity is still limited. 
 The second paper (Chapter 3) contributes to the empirical literature on the 
determinants of firm productivity and efficiency by an in-depth exploration of the 
determinants of hotel productive efficiency. The production process of personal service 
firms, like hotels, is characterised by the simultaneous occurrence of production and 
consumption. This implies that these firms cannot use inventories to smooth production, 
so that productivity depends to a great extent on demand conditions, mainly due to 
different locations (Morikawa, 2011, 2012). For instance, Morikawa (2011) found 
significant economies of demand density for firms in the personal services industries, 
such as beauty salons, fitness clubs and movie theaters in Japan, where the TFP of firms 
increases by 7–15% when the population density of the municipality in which firms 
operate doubles.  
 We question the predominance of location factors by showing that other factors 
may also play important roles. We exploited a detailed and unique dataset of a large 
representative sample of hotels operating in the Trentino province (north-east Italy), 
obtained by integrating several data sources. We first isolated the component of 
inefficiency arising from location factors, linked to destination, by non-parametric 
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metafrontier analysis. Differing destinations explain only part of the efficiency 
dispersion, which still remains ample within each destination. In the second step, we 
regressed inefficiency scores on a set of firm-level variables related to factors directly 
controllable by firms. We distinguished between factors related to manager/owner 
human capital and those related to management choices on investing behaviour, quality 
of management practices, hotel organisation, and family involvement in the hotel. Our 
results point to the significant impact of managerial choices and family involvement on 
hotel efficiency. The role played by owner/manager characteristics are less important. 
Our findings are confirmed even after controlling for fine-grained intra-destination 
location factors. 
 
1.4.3 Third paper: Evaluating the effect of public capital subsidies on firm 
performance 
 
In the third paper (Chapter 4) we studied the effect of policy intervention in the tourist 
sector. Tourism-related industries must increase their competitiveness by exploiting 
scarce resources in more efficient and more innovative ways in order to develop and 
market competitive products (OECD, 2008). Physical capital plays an important role in 
raising the productivity and competitiveness of tourism firms (Blake at al., 2006), and  
governments should play a role by stimulating and supporting this type of  productivity-
based growth (OECD, 2008).  
 Whether a policy is effective or not is a matter of ex-post evaluation. In this 
respect, it is crucial to set up evaluation models to identify and estimate not only the 
direct effects of policies on the performance of those firms supported by them, but also 
indirect effects, due to the externalities which public policies may generate, which 
eventually also influence non-supported firms. In this paper, several steps were 
followed in the construction of the econometric model and estimation, starting with 
standard assumptions, and addressing and overcoming empirical and methodological 
issues in each step. We assessed whether subsidies for investment in renewing hotel 
buildings, equipment and facilities are beneficial in terms of increased hotel 
performance. We also tested to what extent subsidies cause spillover on neighbours. In 
principle, spillovers, or more generally externalities, may be positive or negative. 
Externalities are positive if public support to renewing hotels not only increases its own 
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performance, through enhanced quality and attractiveness, but also improves the quality 
and attractiveness of the neighbourhood in which the hotel is located. This will 
eventually be beneficial for all the other hotels in the same neighbourhood, and for the 
overall image of the destination. In this case, non-subsidised neighbours may add 
positive externalities to their production process and improve their performance. 
However, externalities may also be negative if the incentives offered by policies cause 
heightened competition. If hotels within a destination compete to become tourists’ first 
choice, the support received by some hotels may negatively affect the performance of 
unsubsidised ones.  
 If these kinds of policies cause externalities, these effects cannot be disregarded. 
Examining both treated and control units in the eligible area should be the preferred 
strategy in order to achieve comparability among units. However, if policies generate 
externalities, the estimated effects are biased, as the presence of externalities violates 
the assumption of no interference (the SUTVA assumption in Rubin’s causal 
framework) on which policy evaluation models are based. 
 The contribution of this work has both econometric and empirical applications. 
We propose a methodological advance by defining an econometric framework which 
can identify and estimate not only the direct effects of subsidies on hotel performance, 
but also the indirect ones. We relax the standard assumptions of Rubin's classical causal 
framework by allowing subsidy receipts to interfere across hotel outcomes, i.e., we 
relax the SUTVA assumption. The framework is applied in a dynamic treatment context 
in which we evaluate the effect of the sequence of treatments obtained by a hotel over a 
period of time on its final outcome, also accounting for the effect due to the sequence of 
treatments given to other hotels. Our econometric framework also allows estimation of 
both direct average treatment and indirect effects by considering only hotels located in 
the eligible area. 
 This empirical application also contributes to the literature on policy evaluation. 
We evaluate the effect of a place-based subsidisation programme directed to co-finance 
capital investments of micro and small hotel businesses, which represent the bulk of 
firms in many destinations. Quantitative analysis is scanty in this respect, and previous 
studies (e.g., Bernini and Pellegrini, 2013) do not shed light on the effectiveness of 
public subsidies directed to micro and small firms. 
 The analysis is carried out on several measures of hotel productivity. Our results 
point to the positive direct effects of subsidies on hotel performance. We also find 
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empirical evidence of SUTVA violation and indirect subsidy effects. Specifically, our 
results indicate negative externalities generated by heightened competition among 
hotels within destinations, as a result of public intervention. 
 
 !
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2 A new look at the evolution of productivity of 
Italian firms: distance to the technological frontier, 
human capital, and technological progress 1 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1990s, in a context of increased competitivity of new industrialising 
countries with cheaper labour available in their internal labour market (e.g., China) and 
after the introduction of the euro, which eliminated competitive devaluation leverage, 
Italy has sunk into long-lasting economic stagnation. 
Empirical analyses have given various explanations for the poor productivity 
dynamics of the Italian productive system: the overwhelming predominance of small 
and medium-sized firms (Zanetti and Alzona, 2004; Onida, 2004; Foresti et al., 2008), 
export composition (Boffa et al., 2009), inadequate endowment of public infrastructures 
(La Ferrara and Marcellino, 2000) and of public capital (Marrocu and Paci, 2010), and 
little innovation and technical progress (Daveri and Jona-Lasino, 2005; Hall et al., 
2008). Faini and Sapir (2005) argued that the insufficient innovative capacity of Italian 
firms and their inability to introduce new technologies, essential for increasing 
productivity, were due to insufficient numbers of educated and qualified workers. The 
lack of skilled workers not only prevented the adoption and effective use of new 
technologies, but also adaptation to new organisational models (Bugamelli and Pagano, 
2004; Fabiani et al., 2005).  
However, recent studies have emphasised the wide heterogeneity of firms' 
behaviour under flat aggregate productivity dynamics. Bugamelli et al. (2010), using 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
1 This chapter draws on a joint research project with Roberto Gabriele, Sandro Trento and Enrico 
Zaninotto on the Italian productivity slowdown at DEM-University of Trento. The chapter extends some 
results of the research already published in Tundis et al. (2012). 
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labour productivity as an indicator of firm restructuring, argued that increased 
competitive pressure, mainly due to the adoption of the euro, forced Italian firms to 
make internal changes, even though the effects of this restructuring were unevenly 
distributed across firms. In addition, the shock due to the arrival of the euro, which may 
be considered as equivalent to a trade liberalisation shock, did not seem to spur the 
selection process as one would expect. In fact, Dosi et al. (2012), analysing a large 
sample of firms in all economic sectors, highlighted the apparent weakness of markets 
in selecting more eﬃcient incumbent firms and found that the support of the sectoral 
distribution of firms’ labour productivity between 1989 and 2004 was ample and did not 
shrink over time, giving rise to a kind of “neo-dualism” among firms (Dosi et al., 2012). 
Recently, the establishment of a two-tier labour market has been put forward as a 
possible reason for the increase in labour productivity dispersion among Italian 
manufacturing firms (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007), although thorough analysis of the 
existence and evolution of productivity dispersion is still lacking.   
From the firm level perspective, the contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, 
instead of considering labour productivity, we estimated and decomposed firm Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) dynamics for a sample of manufacturing firms.2 We relied on 
a framework which makes use of non-parametric production frontier methods (i.e., Data 
Envelopment Analysis), which  allows several meaningful decompositions of firm level 
TFP variations (Färe et al., 1992, 1994; Färe and Grosskopf, 1996). Two distinct 
components of TFP growth were distinguished. The first is technological progress 
associated with shifts of the best-practice production frontier of an industry, i.e., 
changes made by successful innovators in a sector. The second component is technical 
efficiency, which is related to improvements in the ability with which firms make use of 
technologies previously introduced to an industry. This component accounts for 
changes in firms’ distance to the technological frontier over time. Both components 
were then further decomposed into their related subcomponents.  
Our measures give further confirmation of the widespread heterogeneity of 
Italian firms. In particular, we show how the contribution of the two main sources of 
productivity growth - technological change and efficiency change - varied dramatically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Note that, unlike labour productivity, inter-firm differences in TFP also account for differences in 
relative input factor intensities. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 – A NEW LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY OF ITALIAN FIRMS 
31 
over the period analysed. In particular, we identify a clear-cut discontinuity after the 
adoption of the euro, highlighting the increasing gap between firms which contribute to 
technological advance, and firms whose performance worsens and which have moved 
away from the technological frontier.  
Secondly, the chapter extends analysis of the causes of the increased dispersion 
of productivity. We examined the hypothesis that firms adapted to external shocks in 
different ways. In particular, more dynamic firms choose more highly skilled labour in 
order to achieve a quality- or value-added advantage over competitors; in other words, 
they take the “high road” (Michie and Sheehan, 2001, 2003). In contrast, less dynamic 
firms choosing a cost-cutting strategy take the “low road” – for instance, by giving  
employees short-term contracts and/or part-time work, and accepting less skilled labour 
as a solution to cope with the new competitive environment. For these firms, the 
introduction of flexible practices in the labour market is an extra competitive option.  
After classifying firms into four groups based on their  initial efficiency level 
(i.e., distance to the fronter) and productivity dynamics over time, we explored the 
relationship between firms belonging to groups and a set of their characteristics - in 
particular, the quality and composition of the workforce. Firms belonging to the least 
dynamic group, i.e., those characterised by greater distance from the frontier and slower 
productivity growth, use labour of poorer quality and draw from the flexible labour 
market more extensively than other firms.  
The analysis exploited an original database of single-location firms over 11 
years, from 1996 to 2006, obtained by integrating detailed and highly reliable data on 
firm employment from the Italian Institute of Social Security (INPS) with information 
on balance-sheet data, sector of activity and location. The level of analysis close to the 
single establishment level allowed us to avoid almost entirely the spurious effect 
stemming not only from mergers and acquisitions but also intra-group reallocation of 
the workforce, and also to capture technological and efficiency changes stemming from 
actual changes in production processes. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 2.3 presents the productivity estimation strategy. Section 2.4 
describes the database, and section 2.5 presents results from the analysis of productivity 
growth and its components. Section 2.6 isolates some factors characterising firms’ 
performance. Lastly, section 2.7 concludes the chapter, with a summary of its main 
implications. 
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2.2 Literature review 
 
Two important issues emerged from the empirical literature on productivity. The first is 
the slowed productivity which has affected many countries worldwide in the recent past 
(Cameron, 2003; Oliner et al., 2007, Mas et al., 2008). The comparison between Europe 
and the United States at macro level reveals a number of factors which may account for 
the recent productivity decline in several countries: late development of industries with 
high intellectual capital intensity in Europe (Van Hark et al., 2008), the generalised 
increase in total factor productivity for industries which use new technologies (i.e., IT) 
in the U.S. (Jorgenson et al., 2008), and the impact of different institutional settings 
(Scarpetta et al., 2002).  
Secondly, the improvement over sectoral and macro studies obtained by 
examining a firm, the unit of observation which actually makes decisions, showed the 
existence of great productivity dispersion among firms (Nelson, 1981; Bartelsman and 
Doms, 2000; Syverson, 2011). Considerable productivity heterogeneity remains even 
after taking into account input and output quality (Fox and Smeets, 2011), measurement 
issues (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Foster et al., 2008) and differing measurement 
methods (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). The observed widespread differences in efficiency 
across firms and plants do appear to be independent of the level of sectoral 
disaggregation in question (Griliches and Mairesse, 1997). For instance, Bottazzi et al. 
(2007) revealed the wide heterogeneity at three-digit disaggregation in the Italian 
industry. Syverson (2004, 2011) found that, for U.S. manufacturing industries, even at 
four-digit disaggregation, the 90-10 percentile average labour productivity ratio was 4:1 
and, after controlling for other factors, the average TFP ratio was nearly 2:1. Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) found even larger dispersion in China and India, with average 90-10 
TFP ratios over 5:1. 
While the early literature on firm level productivity documented the distribution, 
evolution and growth of productivity over time (Baily et al., 1992; Bartelsman and 
Doms, 2000), more recent studies have made advances in our knowledge of what 
determines firm productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Syverson, 2011, Mohnen 
and Hall, 2013). However, further investigation of this issue is recommended. First, the 
existence, magnitude, and way in which productivity dispersion evolves over time is 
still puzzling: in particular, which factor matters most is still the object of enquiry 
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(Syverson, 2011). Examination of the reasons for the existence of large productivity 
disparities among firms within sectors will certainly provide interesting insights to 
policy-makers aiming at fostering the economic growth process of countries 
(Economist, 2009).  
Various theoretical underpinnings have been advanced to explain the evolution 
of productivity dispersion. One prominent explanation is related to technology, 
particularly technological change (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). There are two sources of 
technological change, the result not only of the adoption of existing technologies, but 
also of innovation. Thus, the evolution of firms' productivity distribution stems from the 
interplay of innovation and imitation (König et al., 2012; Iwai, 2000): innovation 
increases heterogeneity, whereas imitation tends to reduce it. The most recent 
theoretical papers on this topic have assigned a crucial role to the distance to the frontier 
as the mediator of these processes. Notably, König et al. (2012) predict that firms which 
are close to the frontier innovate, driving the movement of the frontier; firms lagging 
behind choose to imitate, and the probability of successful imitation increases with the 
distance to the frontier. 
Some consequences on the role of human capital emerge from the relationship 
between distance to the frontier and technological progress. Support for the hypothesis 
that education plays a role in reducing the distance (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) comes 
from cross-country empirical works (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Acemoglu et al. 
2006; Aghion et al., 2008). In particular, for several OECD countries, Vandenbussche et 
al. (2006) show that a skilled workforce has a higher growth-enhancing effect closer to 
the technological frontier. Instead, there is little firm-level empirical research on the role 
of the quality of human capital at different distances from the technological frontier in 
explaining the evolution of firm productivity distribution (Batelsman et al., 2013).  
Labour market institutions, especially those introducing labour flexibility 
practices, have also been considered as an explanation for productivity differentials, 
although empirical evidence varies in this regard. A rigid labour market may have a 
negative impact on aggregate productivity. The more easily inputs can move towards 
more productive firms, the faster the market share reallocation mechanism works (Hsieh 
and Klenow, 2009). In addition, when institutional settings do not allow adjustment 
costs of labour (hiring and firing costs), then rigidities in the labour market become 
detrimental for innovation and the adoption of new technologies, leading to lower 
productivity (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002; Scarpetta and Tressel, 2004).  
CHAPTER 2 – A NEW LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY OF ITALIAN FIRMS 
34 
Other scholars, however, suggest that there is a negative relationship between 
increased labour flexibility and innovation and productivity at firm level. In order to 
adopt new technologies successfully and to be able to integrate them within their 
organisations, firms must invest in developing new skills and/or to upgrade their 
employess' levels of skill. However, investing in training flexible workers is not always 
convenient for firms, and temporary and part-time employees are expected to apply less 
eﬀort, for reasons connected with individual motivations and incentive structures which 
are different than those of regular workers. Acharya et al. (2010) empirically found that 
innovation and economic growth are fostered by stringent laws governing dismissal of 
employees in the United States, especially in the more innovation-intensive sectors. On 
innovation for British firms, Michie and Sheehan (2001, 2003) found a positive effect 
of internal flexibility, but a negative effect of external flexibility. Kleinknecht et al. 
(2006) obtained similar results with reference to the labour productivity growth of 
Dutch firms. Arvanitis (2005) found no significant effect of external flexibility on 
labour productivity in a sample of Swiss firms. Basing their results on Spanish data, 
Dolado and Stucchi (2008) found that higher numbers of temporary workers decrease 
firms’ total factor productivity.  
As regards Italy, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) argue that the decline of labour 
productivity and its increased dispersion among Italian manufacturing firms over the 
period 1995–2000 was related to labour reforms which established a labour market with 
two components, one rigid and one flexible. Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2009) confirmed 
the negative effect of an increase in the share of fixed-term contracts on labour 
productivity growth in a sample of Italian manufacturing firms during the period 2001–
2003. Lotti and Viviano (2010) also estimated the negative impact of the proportion of 
temporary employees on the efficiency and profitability of a sample of firms from the 
Invind survey of the Bank of Italy.   
In this chapter, we aim to shed further light on the productivity slowdown which 
has affected the Italian productive system since the mid-1990s. We first investigate TFP 
dynamics as stemming from the interplay of technological progress and the movements 
of firms behind the frontier. Lastly, we examine the relationship between productivity 
dispersion and firms’ choices in investing in human capital.  
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2.3 Measuring and decomposing Total Factor Productivity  
 
Several models and techniques have been proposed to estimate TFP and its dynamics 
(Del Gatto et al., 2011; Van Biesebroeck, 2007; Heshmati, 2003). In this chapter, we 
use a non-parametric approach to the frontier framework as an estimation strategy. 
Specifically, we employ the DEA technique (Cooper et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984), 
since it has some characteristics which make it very appealing for analysis. First, it 
yields consistent estimates of the production frontier (Kneip et al., 1998, 2008; Simar 
and Wilson, 2008); second, when firms are likely to employ different technologies, 
DEA estimates are among the most robust (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). Third, DEA does 
not make a priori assumptions about the shape of the frontier function. Lastly, the DEA 
framework allows measures of Total Factor Productivity change to be obtained by 
means of the Malmquist index.  
The Malmquist index was first introduced by Caves et el. (1982). Färe et al. 
(1992) combined Farrell’s (1957) measurement of efficiency with that of Caves et al. 
(1982) to develop a new Malmquist index of productivity change. This index computes 
firm productivity change over time directly from input and output data and allows 
meaningful decomposition of productivity dynamics in one technological component – 
related to the best-practices frontier shift – and another component linked to efficiency 
improvements – related to firms' distance from the frontier. It allows us to relax the 
assumption of neutral technology in dividing the technical change component into bias 
and magnitude index terms (Färe and Grosskopf, 1996). 
Within this frontier framework, the shape of the frontier and consequently the 
estimated productivity change depends on the choice of production set. One possibility 
is to employ contemporaneous frontiers, i.e., production sets are constructed at each 
point in time from observations at that time only. In this case, production sets can 
expand or contract from one year to another, and outward (technological progress) as 
well as inward (technical regress) shifts of the frontier can occur with respect to the base 
time period considered. Alternatively, a single intertemporal production set, obtained 
from the full dataset, or a sequential frontier, obtained from accumulated data until the 
baseline year, can also be constructed (Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut, 1995). In both 
cases, no inward shift of the frontier is allowed. As in the the original  Malmquist TFP 
approach (Färe  et al., 1992, 1994) and the majority of Malmquist TFP applications in 
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the literature (Heshmati, 2003), this study employs the contemporaneous frontier 
approach, allowing for both upward and inward shifts of the frontier. This choice is 
particularly useful, since it reveals how best-practices firms and firms below the frontier 
move with respect to each other over time. 
 
2.3.1 The Malmquist index 
 
Let us consider a firm producing a vector of outputs, , from a vector of inputs, 
. We assume a convex production possibility set with freely disposable inputs 
and outputs. The output distance function3 can then be defined on the technology 
, as in Shepard (1970)4: 
 
                     Eq. 2.1 
   
 The distance function defined in Eq. 2.1 is relative to each firm and can be 
interpreted as the potential increase of output which can be achieved by a firm which 
uses a given amount of inputs. In particular the scalar   identifies the potential 
expansion of the output y, so that the production possibility  lies on the efficient 
frontier T. Therefore a firm will be efficient (laying on the frontier) iff .  
Since the production possibilities set T is not known, we estimate it by means of 
the Data Envelopment Analysis estimator. The DEA production set assuming Constant 
Return to Scale (CRS) (Cooper et al, 1978) is defined as: 
 
               Eq. 2.2 
 
and also assumes a Variable Return to Scale (VRS) by (Banker et al 1984): !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 An input-oriented distance function can be symmetrically defined. In this chapter we present however 
only the output-oriented case. 
4 Shepard (1970) discusses assumption regarding Technology set T, that is convexity, that all production 
requires use of some inputs, and that both inputs and outputs are strong disposable. See also Battese 
(2005) et al for further details. 
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           Eq. 2.3 
 
where in both cases  is an estimate of the true production set T based on the observed 
data. The consistent estimators of 
 
defined in Eq. 2.1 can then be obtained by 
substituting the true, but unknown, production set T with estimator  (Simar and 
Wilson, 2008). In practices, estimates of  under the assumption of CRS, are 
computed by solving a linear program. Specifically, the distance of a firm from the 
empirical production frontier is estimated by solving the following linear programming 
model:  
 
     M. 2.1 
            
where  is the estimated distance of a firm at time k = t, t+Δt  from the CRS 
frontier at time p = t, t+Δt. Estimates of distance assuming VRS are computed (Banker 
et al., 1984): 
 
    M. 2.2 
 
For each firm, the Malmquist index represents productivity changes between 
two periods, t and t+Δt. This index can be derived as the ratio of distances from the 
CRS production frontier – composed of the best-practice firms in the observed set of 
firms – in each period. The link between calculated distances and TFP change is:
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Eq. 2.4 
  
 This is the ratio between the distance of the firm in period t+Δt from the frontier 
in period t, and the distance in period t from the frontier in period t+Δt. The Malmquist 
index can also be defined with respect to the frontier at time t+Δt as follows: 
 
                    Eq. 2.5 
 
Färe et al. (1994) defined a Malmquist index as geometric average between the 
two indexes defined in Eq. 2.4  and 2.5 as follows: 
 
   
   Eq. 2.6 
 
The index can be decomposed as follows: 
 
    
Eq. 2.7 
 
where productivity change is broken down into two parts. The first part is the ratio of 
the distances of a firm to the frontier at two different time-points, and shows how much 
closer (or further away) a firm gets to the best-practice frontier. It is higher (lower) than 
one if there has been an increase (or decrease) in efficiency. The second part can be 
considered as a proxy of the shifts of the empirical production frontier (i.e., the growth 
rate of technological progress) from t to t+Δt, and reveals the extent to which the best-
practice firms are changing their performance (improving or deteriorating). 
Efficiency change (EffCh) can be further decomposed as follows (Färe et al., 
1994): 
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     Eq. 2.8 
                 
where PEffCh and SEffCh are measures of pure efficiency change – i.e., efficiency 
change with respect to the VRS frontier – and change in scale efficiency, respectively. 
Values higher (or lower) than one indicate an increase (or decrease) in these quantities. 
While pure efficiency change and scale efficiency change are related to VRS 
frontier movements between two different periods, TeCh variation still refers only to 
CRS frontier shifts over time. Wheelock and Wilson (1999) observed that if a generic 
firm in the input-output space remains fixed between time t and t+∆t, and the only 
change which occurs is in the VRS estimate of technology, the TeCh component, as 
measured in previous equations, is equal to one, indicating no change in technology, 
since the only way in which TeCh can change is if the CRS estimate of the technology 
changes. This being the case, the CRS estimate of the technology is thus statistically 
inconsistent. Since the VRS estimator is always consistent (Kneip et al., 1998), a further 
decomposition of Technological change is proposed by introducing VRS estimates: 
 
     Eq. 2.9 
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times t and t+∆t. When STeCh is greater than one, the indication is that the technology 
is moving farther from CRS and is becoming more and more convex. Conversely, when 
this index is less than one, the technology is moving towards CRS; an index value of 
one indicates no changes.   
Differing decompositions of technological change are also possible. Technical 
progress can in fact be independent of or dependent on any changes in the composition 
of input used and/or output produced by firms. Therefore, the technical change 
component may be rewritten as follows (Fare and Grosskopf, 1996): 
 
               Eq. 2.10 
 
 MaTeCh (Magnitude Tchnical Change) is related to Hicks-neutral technical 
change. If the magnitude effect is greater (lor ower) than one, it means that output of the 
same composition but greater (or lower) in terms of volume is obtained with the same 
input mix. IbTeCh (Input Biased Technical Change) refers to a non-neutral shift in the 
best-practices production frontier due to a different input mix, and ObTeCh (Output 
Biased Technical Change) refers to a non-neutral shift in the best-practices production 
frontier due to different output mix. Values of IbTeCh (or ObTeCh) greater than one 
indicate that the biased technical change amplifies TFP growth, and values of IbTeCh 
(or ObTeCh) less than one signify that the biased technical change shrinks TFP growth. 
 
2.4 Database and variables description 
 
The primary source of the data used in this study is the Bureau Van Dijk’s AIDA 
database, which provides detailed information on the financials, geographical location, 
number of employees and local units for a large sample of limited liability Italian firms. 
A subsample of single-location manufacturing firms which were continuously active 
during the period 1996-2006 was selected from the original data collection. Since the 
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original employment figures were missing for several firms, data were supplemented 
with workforce information from the Italian Institute of Social Security (INPS). This 
additional source yielded the yearly average number of employees for all firms in the 
sample. The data also allowed us to decompose the workforce into white- and blue-
collar workers, as well as between full and part-time contracts for the eleven years 
covered in this analysis. 
Lastly, the empirical analysis exploits an original dataset containing information 
on 7,712  Italian manufacturing firms (84,832 observations) over the period 1996-2006. 
The database represents a unique collection of data for Italy and allows us to extend 
understanding of the dynamics of incumbent firms over a relatively long period of time. 
In addition, dealing with single-location firms means that we can work at a level of 
analysis which is as close as possible to the single establishment level. Focusing on 
single-location firms also means that changes such as mergers, acquisitions and 
divestitures only marginally affect the group of firms in the sample. The spurious effect 
stemming from the intra-group reallocation of equipment and personnel is also 
neutralised. The industry distribution of our dataset generally reflects the distribution of 
firms described by the ISTAT “8° Censimento Industria e Servizi” in 2001  – the mid-
point in the observation period (see Table 2.1).  
 
 
Table 2.1. Number of Firms and Employment for industries. Year, 2001 
 Firms Employees 
Industry ISTATa Our Database ISTATa Our Database 
 Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Food and beverages 8,328 7.2 564 7.3 220,922 6.8 25,404 6.2 
Textiles and clothing 13,929 12.0 911 11.8 352,291 10.8 51,645 12.6 
Leather goods  4,869 4.2 365 4.7 113,573 3.5 19,971 4.8 
Wood  3,281 2.8 204 2.6 56,284 1.7 9,071 2.2 
Paper and printing 9,838 8.5 479 6.2 178,708 5.5 21,419 5.2 
Petroleum 352 0.3 22 0.3 24,192 0.7 1,045 0.2 
Chemicals  3,797 3.3 309 4.0 197,340 6.0 17,313 4.2 
Rubber and plastic mat. 5,993 5.2 492 6.3 175,330 5.4 26,858 6.5 
Non-met. mineral prod. 6,399 5.5 433 5.6 175,035 5.4 21,676 5.3 
Fabricated metal prod. 20,545 17.7 1,445 18.7 503,712 15.4 77,814 19.0 
Machinery and equip. 15,879 13.7 1,137 14.7 498,507 15.3 62,991 15.3 
Electronics 11,291 9.7 574 7.4 344,198 10.5 31,104 7.6 
Transportation equipment 2,697 2.3 161 2.1 253,778 7.8 10,691 2.6 
Other manufacturing  8,716 7.5 616 7.9 174,104 5.3 32,288 7.8 
Manufacturing 115,914 100.0 7.712 100.0 3,267,974 100.0 409,290 100.0 
               NOTE: a Values refer to entire population  
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2.4.1 Input and output variables 
 
 
Input and output variables were constructed from balance-sheet data, with the exception 
of data on labour. The raw data were corrected and deflated in order to obtain real 
values. In this study, we used sectoral deflators constructed from ISTAT data. 
Output was measured by revenues from sales and services at the end of the year, 
net of inventory changes or changes to contract work in progress; labour input was 
measured as the total number of employees at the end of the year. Two intermediate 
inputs were considered: (a) costs of raw materials consumed and goods for resale (net of 
changes in inventories); (b) cost of services; the capital stock estimate in a given year 
was proxied with a modified perpetual inventory method on the nominal value of 
tangible fixed assets over the period analysed (See Appendix 2A for further details of 
estimation procedure). 
All monetary measures are expressed in thousands of euros and are deflated by 
the proper industry level index. The deflator for the turnover variable was constructed 
by processing the time series of national production. The deflator for intermediate 
inputs was constructed with a weighted deflator of production, with weights calculated 
as the average of the column coefficients of the input/output matrix for the year 2001 of 
a set of Italian regions. 
 Table 2.2 lists descriptive statistics on the variables of input and output for 2006, 
the final year of observation in our dataset. 
 
2.4.2 Outliers treatment 
 
Several authors have addressed the problem of outliers in DEA efficiency estimation 
(Wilson, 1993, 1995; Simar, 2003; Banker and Chang, 2006). In fact, DEA produces 
efficiency scores by comparing the input/output combinations of each firm with respect 
to a piecewise linear frontier, obtained as convex combinations of the best-performing 
firms in the set. This implies that measurement errors for those observations defining 
the frontier may cause distortions in the measured efficiency for the entire population.  
In order to detect outliers, we carried out a preliminary analysis to check the 
impact of each single observation on the distances of the nearest firm – whose distance 
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depended from that particular observation – using a method based on the concept of 
leverage, that is, the effect produced on the efficiencies of all the other firms when the 
observed firm is removed from the dataset (Stosic and Sampaio de Souza, 2005). 
Observations with a wider impact on the nearest firms were then discarded from the 
final calculation (see General Appendix A for details). 
 
Table 2.2. Input and output variables. Year 2006 
Industry 
 
Turnover 
(Th €) 
Labour 
(n. emplyees) 
Services 
(mgl €) 
Row Mat. 
(Th €) 
Tangible fix. assets 
(Th €) 
Food and beverages Avg 15,669.5 44.31 2,652.3 10,263.4 3,490.4 
 St.dev. 25,117.2 55.56 4,747.6 18,072.1 5,209.3 
Textile and wearing Avg 9,109.3 50.33 2,941.1 3,931.2 1,629.7 
 St.dev. 13,017.2 65.79 4,488.2 6,346.0 3,459.8 
Leather Avg 10,510.2 45.70 2,647.6 5,899.3 1,186.6 
 St.dev. 13,650.8 48.80 3,554.8 8,682.2 1,738.5 
Wood Avg 8,185.0 43.38 1,749.4 4,425.8 2,030.9 
 St.dev. 9,979.3 40.97 2,824.6 5,586.4 3,055.5 
Paper and printing Avg 8,662.5 43.94 2,155.0 3,979.7 2,153.4 
 St.dev. 9,640.1 40.79 2,611.1 5,698.8 3,512.9 
Petroleum Avg 26,414.5 51.24 2,561.3 18,993.9 8,176.1 
 St.dev. 42,909.3 70.51 3,856.4 37,197.5 25,167.8 
Chemical  Avg 18,540.3 59.50 4,234.7 9,706.4 2,764.4 
 St.dev. 38,739.3 75.74 12,159.0 18,641.5 4,774.9 
Rubber and plastic mat. Avg 10,846.8 54.77 2,055.2 5,898.8 2,484.2 
 St.dev. 16,665.0 71.06 2,981.7 10,270.9 7,319.7 
Non-met. mineral prod. Avg 10,014.8 49.65 2,429.3 4,704.8 2,459.3 
 St.dev. 14,122.2 59.21 4,190.4 6,737.6 3,500.9 
Fabricated metal prod. Avg 13,774.9 54.73 2,292.0 8,215.4 2,330.1 
 St.dev. 55,741.7 63.06 4,576.7 50,413.3 4,813.5 
Machinery and equipment Avg 11,097.2 56.81 2,245.3 5,601.1 1,556.4 
 St.dev. 16,495.7 66.52 3,246.3 9,926.1 2,514.6 
Electronics Avg 9,987.7 52.98 1,936.2 5,138.7 1,258.7 
 St.dev. 16,243.5 52.34 2,102.5 12,652.7 2,210.3 
Transportation equipment Avg 14,649.7 63.88 2,836.3 8,344.9 2,115.5 
 St.dev. 28,463.5 70.80 4,474.4 21,173.8 2,719.7 
Other manufacturing  Avg 8,868.7 49.52 2,141.6 4,647.5 1,752.0 
 St.dev. 11,117.8 49.03 3,332.0 6,582.7 2,960.9 
 
 
2.5 The dynamics of productivity 
 
In this section, we focus on analysis of the evolution of productivity, as measured by 
Malmquist indexes and their components over the period 1996-2006. The distances 
from the estimated industry frontier at two-digit level are estimated for each firm and 
combined to construct and decompose Malmquist indexes. We calculate the annual 
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growth rate of quantities of interest for each firm and then take weighted averages of 
annual growth rates for each industry, rather than estimates related to individual firm, 
accounting for the relative importance of each observation the productivity index of 
which enters the average (Zelenyuk, 2006). 
 
2.5.1 Main Results 
 
Table 2.3 lists the annual growth rates of productivity among sectors for the entire 
period 1996-2006. Productivity, with the exception of a few cases such as Machinery 
and Equipment and Electronics, shows annual growth rates below 1%. In the majority 
of industries considered, the annual growth rate was less than 0.5% and in some 
industries it was even negative. The two components of the Malmquist index – 
efficiency change and technological change – also behaved differently in determining 
productivity dynamics. There were industries, such as Textiles and clothing, Leather 
goods, Metal products, and Electronics, in which, on average, technology improved and 
efficiency declined, whereas there were others, such as Paper and Printing and 
Chemicals, in which the opposite occurred. Lastly, there were industries in which both 
components were positive, as in Machinery and Transportation.  
 
Table 2.3. Malmquist index and its decomposition into Efficiency Change (EffCh) and Technological 
change (TeCh). Period 1996-2006. 
 
Industry 
1996-2006  
Malm EffCh TeCh  
Food and beverages 1.069 0.050 1.018  
Textiles and clothing 0.353 -0.221 0.574  
Leather goods -0.004 -0.171 0.167  
Wood  0.268 0.226 0.043  
Paper and printing 0.090 0.534 -0.442  
Petroleum -1.004 -0.685 -0.326  
Chemicals  -0.032 0.147 -0.180  
Rubber and plastic mat. 0.490 0.194 0.296  
Non-met. mineral prod. 0.068 0.041 0.030  
Fabricated metal prod. 0.273 -0.033 0.307  
Machinery and equipment 1.019 0.143 0.873  
Electronics 1.224 -0.120 1.346  
Transportation equipment 0.558 0.169 0.387  
Other manufacturing  0.196 -0.175 0.372  
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The whole period was then broken down into three subperiods: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 
and 2003-2006. This allowed us to capture three different phases: the period just before 
the introduction of the euro (i.e., 1999), the turning-point of the economic cycle around 
2001, and the period before the beginning of the current crisis. Table 2.4 lists results for 
each subperiod. 
 
Table 2.4. Malmquist index and its decomposition into Efficiency Change (EffCh) and Technological 
change (TeCh). Subperiods: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-2006 
 
Industry 
1996-2000  2000-2003  2003-2006 
Malm EffCh TeCh  Malm EffCh TeCh  Malm EffCh TeCh 
Food and beverages -0.849 0.346 -1.189  1.624 0.311 1.315  6.992 -0.511 7.509 
Textiles and clothing -0.355 0.046 -0.400  0.823 -0.235 1.063  1.007 -0.400 1.408 
Leather goods -1.001 -0.106 -0.895  0.860 0.064 0.769  1.295 -0.401 1.676 
Wood  -0.068 0.636 -0.701  0.975 -0.641 1.628  0.479 0.596 -0.118 
Paper and printing -1.579 1.228 -2.775  1.908 0.876 1.021  0.765 -0.584 1.369 
Petroleum -4.327 -0.178 -4.155  8.473 -0.184 8.668  -4.522 -1.587 -2.959 
Chemicals  -1.223 -0.165 -1.058  1.794 1.202 0.579  -0.164 -0.358 0.194 
Rubber and plastic mat. 0.041 0.887 -0.835  1.738 0.597 1.135  0.050 -1.078 1.143 
Non-met. mineral prod. -0.702 0.677 -1.357  0.391 0.496 -0.104  1.144 -0.860 2.033 
Fabricated metal prod. -0.218 0.654 -0.864  1.239 0.396 0.841  0.346 -1.305 1.667 
Machinery and equip. -0.510 0.636 -1.134  0.767 -0.058 0.830  3.544 -0.188 3.740 
Electronics 0.500 0.703 -0.200  1.200 0.258 0.948  2.652 -1.622 4.337 
Transportation equipment -1.010 0.197 -1.206  0.523 0.768 -0.237  2.631 -0.569 3.209 
Other manufacturing  -0.628 0.201 -0.826  0.055 -0.379 0.443  1.649 -0.349 2.005 
 
 
Productivity dynamics showed marked differences over time. First, after the 
negative trend of subperiod 1 in all industries, a widespread increase in productivity 
followed in subperiods 2 and 3. Second, the sign of the technological (TeCh) and 
efficiency (EfCh) components of productivity growth changed radically among sub-
periods. Figure 2.1 shows in more detail the evolution across subperiods of both 
components; we concentrate on the first and last ones. During subperiod 1, the fall in 
productivity levels was driven by a sort of “technological regression” (negative sign of 
TeCh) in all sectors. The downward frontier shift was only partly offset by efficiency 
gains. However, in subperiod 3, productivity growth in all industries was driven 
primarily by technological advance – as shown by the positive sign of the TeCh 
component – while average efficiency decreased – the negative sign of the annual 
growth rate of EffCh.  
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This evidence suggests a process of technological advance which started in the 
early 2000s  and mainly involved those firms closest to the frontier, while the majority 
of firms lagged behind. Consistent with a technological explanation of the increased 
dispersion of productivity (see Faggio et. al, 2007), the shift of the technological 
frontier appeared to be more extensive in industries in which new technologies were 
expected to be more important, such as Electronics and Machinery. The diffusion and 
improved use of technology already in the market (captured by EfCh index) did not in 
fact counterbalance the impact of technical change on dispersion in many sectors. 
Figure 2.2 further clarifies this dynamic, showing the evolution of the distribution of 
estimated efficiencies, i.e., distances to the frontier, for the Electronics industry.5 At the 
end of subperiod 1 (left panel), efficiency distribution had shifted to the right, indicating 
a generalised increase in average efficiency. This changed drastically in subperiod 3 
(right panel), during which the leftward shift of the distribution reveals a widespread 
loss of efficiency among firms, pointing to great heterogeneity in firm behaviour. 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 To obtain kernel estimates of efficiencies, we used the eff.dens() function based on Silvrman’s reflection 
method and available in the R package “Benchmarking” (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011).!
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Figure 2.2 Kernel density estimation of efficiency in the Electronics industry. 
 
 
The estimation method employed here enabled us to extend analysis by: (a) 
isolating the effect of production scale from that of pure efficiency change in the 
efficiency component of productivity change; and (b) separating both the effect of 
production scale and type of technological progress in the technological component of 
productivity. 
Table 2.5 lists the decomposition of the efficiency change for each subperiod. 
Increases in efficiency in subperiod 1 occurred simultaneously, due to reduction in pure 
inefficiencies and a recovery of scale. The opposite occurred in subperiod 3, when the 
loss of efficiency was due to the contemporaneous decrease in pure and scale 
efficiencies. This provides additional evidence of two different stories: what took place 
at the beginning of the observed period (before 2000) and what happened after it.   
The evolution of firm size further supports this idea (see Table 2.6). The average 
firm size, measured in terms of number of employees, increased between 1996 and 2000 
in all sectors, but thereafter stabilised. The average size expressed in terms of nominal 
turnover followed the same pattern, although it is less evident.  
Table 2.7 shows the decomposition of the technological component (TeCh). In 
subperiod 1 the two components – pure (PTeCh) and scale technological change 
(STeCh) – caused the downward shift of the frontier in different ways across industry. 
In subperiod 3, a general upward shift of the frontier prevailed. At the same time, it 
tended to modify its shape, moving towards a constant return to scale (negative sign of 
growth rate of STeCh).  
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Table 2.5. Efficiency Change (EffCh) and its decomposition into Pure Efficiency Change (PEffCh) and 
Scale Efficiency Change (SEffCh). Subperiods: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-2006 
 
Industry  
1996-2000  2000-2003  2003-2006 
EffCh PEffCh SEffCh  EffCh PEffCh SEffCh  EffCh PEffCh SEffCh 
Food and beverages 0.346 0.520 -0.170  0.311 0.216 0.100  -0.511 -0.412 -0.096 
Textiles and clothing 0.046 -0.215 0.268  -0.235 -0.129 -0.100  -0.400 -0.198 -0.189 
Leather goods -0.106 -0.095 -0.009  0.064 0.122 -0.052  -0.401 -0.486 0.088 
Wood  0.636 0.280 0.357  -0.641 -0.314 -0.323  0.596 0.336 0.264 
Paper and printing 1.228 0.841 0.390  0.876 0.946 -0.057  -0.584 -0.707 0.132 
Petroleum -0.178 -0.069 -0.108  -0.184 0.202 -0.385  -1.587 -0.208 -1.382 
Chemicals  -0.165 -0.202 0.040  1.202 0.218 0.991  -0.358 0.194 -0.549 
Rubber and plastic mat. 0.887 0.591 0.303  0.597 0.168 0.432  -1.078 -0.514 -0.562 
Non-met. mineral prod. 0.677 0.545 0.133  0.496 -0.021 0.522  -0.860 -0.857 0.000 
Fabricated metal prod. 0.654 0.011 0.646  0.396 0.186 0.216  -1.305 -0.451 -0.854 
Machinery and equip. 0.636 0.118 0.521  -0.058 0.299 -0.352  -0.188 -1.025 0.865 
Electronics 0.703 0.354 0.361  0.258 -0.578 0.850  -1.622 -1.046 -0.580 
Transportation equipment 0.197 0.124 0.084  0.768 0.538 0.235  -0.569 -0.150 -0.421 
Other manufacturing  0.201 0.071 0.134  -0.379 0.316 -0.686  -0.349 -0.195 -0.149 
 
 
Table 2.6. Number of employee for different years 
Industry  Year 
 1996 2000 2003 2006 
Food and beverages Avg 40.03 44.87 46.35 44.31 
 St.dev. 45.30 53.40 56.22 55.56 
Textiles and clothing Avg 53.62 57.05 53.91 50.33 
 St.dev. 64.86 67.58 64.73 65.79 
Leather goods Avg 52.45 54.74 50.37 45.70 
 St.dev. 59.27 61.22 53.97 48.80 
Wood Avg 39.88 45.10 43.57 43.38 
 St.dev. 34.10 41.07 39.80 40.97 
Paper and printing Avg 41.16 44.87 44.03 43.94 
 St.dev. 39.03 40.35 39.18 40.79 
Petroleum Avg 43.27 44.09 47.14 51.24 
 St.dev. 66.53 60.07 60.57 70.51 
Chemicals  Avg 49.95 56.52 56.40 59.50 
 St.dev. 74.14 80.73 76.81 75.74 
Rubber and plastic mat. Avg 46.12 54.81 54.17 54.77 
 St.dev. 50.17 62.59 65.02 71.06 
Non-met. mineral prod. Avg 44.46 49.43 49.79 49.65 
 St.dev. 48.68 54.80 57.30 59.21 
Fabricated metal prod. Avg 46.26 53.83 53.42 54.73 
 St.dev. 48.68 56.34 58.58 63.06 
Machinery and equipment Avg 49.30 55.37 55.08 56.81 
 St.dev. 51.75 56.71 59.94 66.52 
Electronics Avg 46.35 54.10 52.73 52.98 
 St.dev. 42.92 51.34 52.17 52.34 
Transportation equipment Avg 60.47 67.21 63.57 63.88 
 St.dev. 70.66 74.55 67.01 70.80 
Other manufacturing  Avg 45.67 52.67 51.23 49.52 
 St.dev. 38.33 44.25 46.28 49.03 
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Table 2.7. Technological Change (TeCh) and its decomposition into Pure Technological Change (PTeCh) 
and Scale Technological Change (STeCh). Subperiods: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-2006 
 
Industry 
1996-2000  2000-2003  2003-2006 
TeCh PTeCh STeCh  TeCh PTeCh STeCh  TeCh PTeCh STeCh 
Food and beverages -1.189 -1.042 -0.096  1.31 1.865 -0.490  7.509 - - 
Textiles and clothing -0.400 0.171 -0.492  1.06 0.557 0.516  1.408 1.604 -0.181 
Leather goods -0.895 -0.997 0.144  0.77 -0.746 0.740  1.676 1.642 -0.004 
Wood  -0.701 0.108 -0.742  1.63 1.004 0.511  -0.118 0.873 -0.958 
Paper and printing -2.775 -1.755 -0.814  1.02 0.789 0.172  1.369 2.142 -0.727 
Petroleum -4.155 -5.022 1.037  8.67 8.555 -0.031  -2.959 -4.046 1.120 
Chemicals  -1.058 -0.134 -0.638  0.58 1.631 -1.018  0.194 -0.350 0.610 
Rubber and plastic mat. -0.835 0.174 -0.924  1.13 1.420 -0.262  1.143 1.202 -0.005 
Non-met. mineral prod. -1.357 -0.735 -0.530  -0.10 0.353 -0.432  2.033 2.716 -0.650 
Fabricated metal prod. -0.864 0.011 -0.850  0.84 1.052 -0.252  1.667 1.152 0.560 
Machinery and equip. -1.134 -0.415 -0.680  0.83 0.552 0.284  3.740 5.095 -1.308 
Electronics -0.200 0.537 -0.681  0.95 2.015 -1.119  4.337 4.465 -0.027 
Transportation equipment -1.206 0.138 -1.096  -0.24 -0.017 -0.214  3.209 3.222 -0.054 
Other manufacturing  -0.826 -0.413 -0.357  0.44 -0.161 0.614  2.005 2.018 -0.050 
       
 
Further insights come from analysis of the nature of technological progress 
(Table 2.8). The technological regression observed during subperiod 1 was mainly due 
to a Hicks-neutral shift, whereas in subsequent periods the outward shift of the frontiers 
was both Hicks-neutral and input-biased.  
 
 
Table 2.8. Technological Change (TeCh) and its decomposition into MaTeCh and Input Biased    
 Technological Change (IbTeCh). Subperiod: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-2006 
 
Industry 
1996-2000  2000-2003  2003-2006 
TeCh MaTeCh IbTeCh  TeCh MaTeCh IbTeCh  TeCh MaTeCh IbTeCh 
Food and beverages -1.189 -1.558 0.406  1.315 0.380 0.958  7.509 -0.594 9.473 
Textiles and clothing -0.400 -0.645 0.270  1.063 0.897 0.183  1.408 1.148 0.266 
Leather goods -0.895 -1.213 0.348  0.769 -0.252 1.045  1.676 1.236 0.780 
Wood  -0.701 -1.133 0.461  1.628 1.004 0.641  -0.118 -0.657 0.577 
Paper and printing -2.775 -3.061 0.329  1.021 0.689 0.353  1.369 1.071 0.353 
Petroleum -4.155 -11.724 9.503  8.668 4.349 4.129  -2.959 -7.801 5.914 
Chemicals  -1.058 -1.842 0.958  0.579 0.311 0.279  0.194 -0.231 0.449 
Rubber and plastic mat. -0.835 -1.071 0.252  1.135 0.918 0.237  1.143 0.918 0.236 
Non-met. mineral prod. -1.357 -1.790 0.458  -0.104 -0.380 0.283  2.033 1.774 0.266 
Fabricated metal prod. -0.864 -1.315 0.479  0.841 0.589 0.265  1.667 0.290 1.421 
Machinery and equip. -1.134 -1.343 0.218  0.830 0.661 0.171  3.740 3.396 0.347 
Electronics -0.200 -0.505 0.318  0.948 0.729 0.220  4.337 3.459 0.870 
Transportation equipment -1.206 -1.830 0.742  -0.237 -0.850 0.655  3.209 2.414 0.789 
Other manufacturing  -0.826 -1.047 0.236  0.443 0.188 0.275  2.005 1.593 0.416 
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Lastly, in the proposed DEA framework, the estimated distances to the frontier 
would be biased if the most efficient firms within the population were not observed 
(Simar and Wilson, 1998). Consequently, the Malmquist indexes and their components 
are also biased estimators of productivity growth. We followed Simar and Wilson 
(1999) and estimated also bias-corrected Malmquist indexes and their components by 
bootstrapping distance measures. The resulting bias-corrected estimates confirm our 
results. Appendix 2B lists the procedure in more detail and includes bias-corrected 
annual growth rates of the quantities of interest. 
 
2.5.2 Discussion 
 
It is important to bear in mind the most important changes which took place in the input 
and output markets during the period under analysis.  
The most important change on the input side seems to be the sequence of labour 
reforms which occurred in Italy in the early 1990s. In particular, during this period, a 
series of labour flexibility practices were introduced, which enabled firms to use fixed-
term contracts, to adjust working hours in response to external shocks, and to increase 
wage flexibility at firm level. The introduction of the euro in 1999 was probably the 
greatest external shock which influenced the output side. In a context of increasing 
globalisation and the entry of new competitors, the introduction of the new currency 
eliminated exchange rate policies as instruments to support the competitiveness of 
Italian firms.  
The downward shift of the frontier observed at the end of subperiod 1 is 
puzzling. On one hand, the most efficient firms may have over-invested in productive 
capacity in the early 1990s, when demand was driven by competitive devaluation. On 
the other hand, labour market reforms may have fostered a process of restructuring of 
the input mix which was still ongoing at the beginning of the 2000s. However, the 
breakdown of the technological change index in magnitude (MaTeCh) and input 
composition (IbTeCh) effects suggests that regression from the frontier was mainly 
driven by the output reduction effect. The simultaneous improvement in efficiency may 
partly have been due to a sort of side-effect of the downward shift of the frontier: if the 
frontier regresses, the distance to it of inefficient firms may only be apparently reduced. 
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However, decomposition of the efficiency change indexes indicates that a true reduction 
in inefficiency, based on adjustment of the production scale, did occur.  
As from the early 2000s, the technological frontier shifted upwards and the 
average distance of firms from the frontier increased. On one hand, this suggests that 
firms close to the frontier undertook a process of innovation which led to the upward 
shift of the frontier, both Hicks-neutral and input-biased, with the movement of the 
VRS frontier towards the estimated CRS frontier. On the other hand, the increased 
distance from the frontier of some firms is consistent with technological progress 
unevenly distributed across firms or, at least, that different outcomes took place in terms 
of productivity enhancement. 
In this regard, several analyses (Rossi, 2006; Brandolini and Bugamelli, 2009; 
Bugamelli et al., 2010; De Nardis, 2010) describe a profound process of firm 
restructuring in Italian manufacturing in terms of technological content and quality, 
spurred by the introduction of the euro. Bugamelli et al. (2010) observed an increasing 
dispersion of labour productivity from 1999 onwards. Our results, looking at a measure 
of Total Factor Productivity instead of labour productivity, are also consistent with 
restructuring which had different outcomes across firms, as one would expect during 
such episodes. Antonelli et al. (2013), using a sample of Italian manufacturing firms for 
the period 1996-2005 comparable with our sample, also support this interpretation. 
They addressed the central role of changes in input and output markets in determining 
the diverse innovative outcome of firms (measured in terms of productivity changes). 
Firms innovated to react to external shocks, but their innovations were productivity-
enhancing only for firms whose internal characteristics blended better with the new 
context in which they were operating. Matching our results, the above authors noted an 
increased percentage of persistent innovators after 2000, with respect to the second half 
of the 1990s.  
From a theoretical point of view, our evidence can be framed in a Schumpeterian 
perspective. After the introduction of the euro at the end of the 1990s, which acted as a 
trade liberalisation shock, and after the turning-point of the economic cycle in the early 
2000s, competitive pressure increased, profit margins fell (see Bianco et al., 2012), and 
the incentive for firms already in the market to take costly innovation actions which 
they might otherwise not have taken, increased, allowing those firms to survive. 
However, their incentives to make productivity-enhancing investments because of 
heightened competition may have differed. For instance, an increase in competition may 
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incentivise “good” firms, that is, those close to the frontier, to invest in new 
technologies and new production processes in order to retain their market, but it may 
discourage innovation in “bad” firms, i.e., ones which lag far from the frontier, as their 
expected profits are  reduced because their efficiency is too low to allow them to 
compete with more efficient firms (Aghion et al., 2005; Iacovone, 2012). Empirical 
evidence from various countries (Sabirianova et al., 2005, Konings and Vandenbussche, 
2007; Iacovone, 2012) confirms the non-linearity and heterogeneity of the relationship 
between competition and innovation, as well as of the central role of initial efficiency 
level as a moderator of the impact of competition on firm productivity growth. Our 
results are indeed similar. 
In sum, what emerges in the first part of our analysis suggests the existence of 
various “types” of firm. In the next section, we explore the hypothesis that, since labour 
market reforms made flexible labour accessible at lower prices, some firms could have 
pursued a process of adaptation to the new conditions in the input market by drawing on 
the less protected part of the labour market. In particular, we explore the hypothesis that 
(some) firms reduced the quality of their human capital. Wage flexibility and a less rigid 
labour market may have been an extra competitive option for non-innovating firms 
(Kleinknecht, 1998). Instead of innovating, weak “bad” firms could easily pursue a 
cost-cutting strategy – the  “low road” – by, for instance, giving employees short-term 
contracts and/or offering them part-time work, and accepting less skilled labour, with 
negative effects any on innovation effort as a solution to cope with the more 
competitive environment.  
 
2.6 The role of human capital to explain productivity differentials 
 
This section explores the factors behind the evidence about productivity dynamics 
presented in the first part of this chapter. In particular, we proceed to a second stage of 
analysis, supporting the hypothesis that the increased dispersion of productivity 
observed across years was due to the differing strategies adopted by firms to cope with 
changes in the competitive environment. We focus in particular on factors related to 
firm choices about the quality of human capital. The evidence of the previous section is 
consistent with different strategic behaviour. On one hand, we have a group of dynamic 
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firms which, after the shock of the new currency, followed a path of technological 
innovation leading to a shift in the technological frontier; on the other hand, we have a 
large group of firms which, taking advantage of the new flexibility of the labour market, 
hired less protected workers  and reduced investment in human capital.  
In exploring the relationship between strategic choices and productivity 
dispersion, we believe it is important to take into account both efficiency levels, i.e., 
distance to the frontier, and productivity dynamics6. The mediating role of distance to 
the frontier empirically emerged as important in explaining the effectiveness of firm 
strategies (Coad, 2011). Thus, we first ranked firms with respect to their distance to the 
frontier and observed productivity growth. Then we grouped them, for each of the three 
periods, with respect to the industry average value of the two variables as firms with 
high or low initial efficiency levels at the beginning of each period, and firms with high 
or low productivity dynamics observed in the same period. Figure 3.3 shows the 
resulting classifications.  
Four distinct “types” of firms were identified: laggards (1) are firms with low 
initial efficiency and below average productivity growth; climbers (2) are ones with low 
initial efficiency, which move rapidly towards the frontier and sometimes induce its 
shift. Productivity growth for these firms may be particularly fast, as they can act on 
two factors: efficiency gains related to imitative processes, and independent 
technological advances; static leaders (3) are firms close to the frontier but with low 
productivity growth, which therefore tend, over time, to move away from the frontier; 
dynamic leaders (4) are firms closer to the technological frontier at the onset of the 
period which show above-average productivity growth. These firms are likely to 
improve their productivity, mainly through innovative strategies rather than 
improvements in efficiency.  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Our main interest is in how best-practices firms and firms below the frontier move with respect to each 
other over time.!Consequently,!in!the!second!part!of!the!chapter,!DEA scores are treated as descriptive 
measures of the relative distance of firms from the observed frontier (as in McDonald,!2009). This allows 
us to rank firms and then cluster firms with respect to the measures obtained in the first part of the 
chapter. 
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Figure 2.3  The four types of firms (see definition in text). 
 
A multinomial logit regression model was estimated to isolate some significant 
relationships between a set of explanatory variables and types of firms: 
 
         M. 2.3 
 
where  represents the probability of belonging to group j = 2, 3, 4 
indicationg firm types, x represents explanatory variables and controls, and βj  are the 
parameters to be estimated. Obviously, for the reference group (1) we have: 
 
          M. 2.4 
 
The hypothesis of the existence of differing strategic behaviour as a result of the 
composition of the labour force was studied by means of a set of explanatory variables 
which proxies the quality of human capital employed by firms. In particular, we assume 
that, on average, the higher quality of human capital costs more, and we therefore use 
the unit cost of labour (labour_cost) as a proxy of the quality of human capital available 
to the firm7. However, a different unit cost of labour between firms may represent either !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Labour cost has already been used as an indicator of the level of human capital for Italian manufacturing 
firms. See, for instance, Antonelli et al. (2013). 
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a different quality of labour employed or, in a segmented labour market, labour of the 
same quality but at a lower price.8 However, the effect on efficiency is expected to be 
different in the two cases. In the former case, between-firm variations of cost of labour 
due to the (not observed) use of labour of a different quality results in production 
inefficiency; in the latter case, a difference in cost of labour will only imply allocative 
inefficiency if firms do not adjust the composition of production factors (i.e., if they do 
not employ only less costly labour). The evidence of a relationship between the unit cost 
of labour and productive efficiency should therefore support the hypothesis that a less 
rigid labour market leads to differentiation not only in terms of the price of labour but 
also of firms’ choices about its quality.  
To account for different firm choices as regards the quality of the workforce against 
simple adjustments due to changes in labour costs, we also consider the ratios of white-
collar to blue-collar workers (skill_ratio) and of part-time employees to total employees 
(part-time). The skill_ratio is used as a proxy of the the share of skilled workers and the 
role which upstream and downstream activities have in business strategies (Bugamelli et 
al., 2010); the share of part-time employment on total employment (part-time), is a 
proxy of the use of flexible labour (Arvanitis, 2005), which has a impact on the quality 
of labour under the assumption that the contribution of full-time employees is of higher 
quality than that of part-time employees, for reasons related to individual motivations, 
incentive structure, level and rate of learning (Dolado and Stucchi, 2008). We also 
consider the following control variables: 
• Firm size in terms of number of employees (size). In this regard, in a study of 
American firms, Dhawan (2001) shows that small businesses are significantly 
more productive than larger ones, suggesting a negative relationship between 
productivity growth and firm size. Recently, however, Harris and Moffat (2011) 
showed that manufacturing firms in the UK are operating under increasing 
returns to scale and that firm size is positively related to the dynamics of total 
factor productivity. 
• The age (age) of the firm, which may have a negative or positive effect on 
productivity growth, either due to the effect of technological obsolescence, or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Let us presume that employees are divided into two groups: regular and flexible employees. Two 
scenarios are possible. In the first, firms hire employees of the same quality  but at different cost: regular 
employees cost more than irregular ones. In the second scenario, firms choose only employees in one 
group but pay them differently, depending on their skills or quality.  
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that  learning-by-doing prevails (Argote et al., 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Harris and Moffat, 2011). 
• Cash flow (cash_flow). The literature shows that more stringent financial 
constraints have a negative effect on firm performance in terms of growth and 
profitability (Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006) and productivity (Bottazzi et al., 2008; 
Bottazzi et al., 2011). 
• Three sets of dummy variables account for time, sector of activity, and location 
in terms of geographic area, respectively. These variables control for the various 
external conditions in which firms operate. 
 
2.6.1 Main results 
 
Table 2.9 lists average values and standard deviations of the explanatory variables. 
Laggards have on average a higher number of employees (54.5), use more part-time 
workers (0.043) and are older (22.5) than firms in the other groups. Dynamic leaders 
pay more for labour (23.8), have a higher cash flow (564.3), use more skilled labour 
(0.88), and are younger compared with the other groups. Lastly, static leaders are 
similar to dynamic leaders in terms of labour costs, but use fewer part-time workers. 
However, they have higher cash flows and lower skill ratios.  
The correlation matrix (Table 2.10) shows that the number of employees and 
cash flow are positively correlated (0.597). Correlations are very low for all the other 
pairs of explanatory variables. 
 
Table 2.9. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Laggards  Static leaders  Climbers  Dyn. leaders 
Avg Std  Avg Std  Avg Std  Avg Std 
Labour_cost (Th. €) 20.7 5.2  23.8 7.4  20.0 5.6  23.8 7.5 
Skill_ratio (ratio) 0.46 1.42  0.66 2.53  0.47 1.28  0.88 3.51 
Partime (ratio) 0.043 0.060  0.037 0.053  0.041 0.058  0.039 0.056 
Cash_flow  (Th. €) 393.0 723.0  649.8 1246.6  327.7 576.6  564.3 1151.8 
Size (n. employees) 54.5 52.9  47.5 52.8  53.0 49.6  44.0 46.6 
Age (years) 22.5 12.4  21.7 13.2  21.1 12.4  20.9 12.7 
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Table 2.10. Correlation matrix 
Variable Labour cost Skill ratio Partime Cash flow Size Age 
Labour cost 1      
Skill ratio 0.167* 1     
Partime -0.141* 0.034* 1    
Cash flow 0.225* 0.078* -0.075* 1   
Size 0.147* -0.009 -0.065* 0.597* 1  
Age 0.256* 0.007 0.038* 0.092* 0.158 1 
                                   * indicates significativity at 5% 
 
 
Table 2.11 lists the estimated multinomial model with different sets of 
explanatory variables. In all specifications of the model, we consider the entire set of 
controls on: financial constraints, size and age of the firm, and the dummies for period, 
sector and geographical location. The estimated coefficients represent the log-odds 
ratios, i.e., the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of being in group j (j = 2, 3, 4) to 
the probability of being in the baseline group (j = 1, i.e., laggards)9.  
 Our measure of the quality of human capital (labour_cost) and the probability of 
belonging to the group of leaders, either static or dynamic, compared with the baseline 
category (laggards) are positively related. A higher value of skill_ratio is associated 
with a greater probability of being a leader or a climber with respect to the baseline 
group, whereas increasing the number of part-time employees reduces the probability of 
belonging to any of the groups other than the laggards. Looking at the control variables, 
we see that, compared with the baseline group (laggards) cash_flow increases the 
probability of belonging to a leader group and reduces the likelihood of being a climber 
(the effect, although statistically significant, is very low) and that probability of being a 
leader decreases with the age of the firm. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The multinomial logit model is based on the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA), meaning that the odds ratio between any two choices is not affected by any other alternative choice. 
Rejection of the IIA assumption leads to biased predictions of probabilities by the model. We tested the 
IIA assumption of our model specifications with the Small-Hsiao test. 
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Table 2.11. Multinomial logit estimates  (log-odds ratios). Reference group: Laggards (1) 
 
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3  
Variable 
  
Climbers 
(2) 
Static leaders 
(3) 
Dynamic leaders 
(4)  
Climbers 
(2) 
Static leaders 
(3) 
Dynamic leaders 
(4)  
Climbers 
(2) 
Static leaders 
(3) 
Dynamic leaders 
(4) 
            
labour_cost - 0.021*** 0.118*** 0.122***  - 0.024*** 0.117*** 0.118***  0.003 0.127*** 0.138*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
skill_ratio - - -  0.032* 0.036* 0.060***  0.034* 0.036* 0.061*** 
     (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
partime - - -  - 0.655* - 0.757** - 0.705  - 0.718** - 0.754* - 0.726* 
     (0.353) (0.385) (0.436)  (0.353) (0.385) (0.437) 
p_2 * labour_cost - - -  - - -  - 0.038*** - 0.017* - 0.039*** 
         (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
p_3 * labour_cost - - -  - - -  - 0.042*** - 0.001 - 0.022** 
         (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Controls            
            cash flow - 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 0.0008***  - 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 0.0008***  - 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(age) - 0.143*** - 0.375*** -0.444***  - 0.130*** - 0.369*** - 0.431***  - 0.146*** - 0.374*** - 0.440*** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.041)  (0.036) (0.037) (0.042)  (0.036) (0.037) (0.042) 
ln(size) 0.133*** - 0.968*** -1.033***  0.137*** - 0.961*** - 1.020***  0.135*** - 0.963*** - 1.023*** 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.039)  (0.033) (0.036) (0.040)  (0.033) (0.036) (0.040) 
            
Time dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes  
Sector dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes  
Location dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes  
            
Constant 0.877*** 2.130*** 1.686***  0.900*** 2.132*** 1.703***  0.421** 1.969*** 1.310*** 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.186)  (0.165) (0,170) (0.192)  (0.188) (0.197) (0.221) 
Statistics            
Obs  21.258    21.030    21030  
Log-likelihood  - 26569.4    - 26294.7    - 26274,2  
McFadden’s adj R2  0.076    0.075    0.075  
Nagelkerke R2  0.207    0.205    0.207  
LR χ2 (degr. of 
fred.)  4562.5 (66)    4479.1 (72)    4519.9 (78)  
CHAPTER 2 – A NEW LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY OF ITALIAN FIRMS 
59 !
To extend our analysis further, we estimated the marginal effect of a variable on 
the probability of belonging to each group. 
 
 
Table 2.12. Marginal effects 
 
Variable 
Model 3 
Laggards  
(1) 
Climbers  
(2) 
Static leaders  
(3) 
Dynamic leaders  
(4) 
     
labour_cost - 0.0141*** - 0.0181*** 0.0195*** 0.0128*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
skill_ratio - 0.0070** 0.0006 0.0014 0.0050*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0012) 
partime 0.1260** -0.0432 - 0.0566 - 0.0265 
 (0.0542) (0.0617) (0.0659) (0.0515) 
p_2 * labour_cost 0.0051*** - 0.0045*** 0.0020 - 0.0027*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
p_3 * labour_cost 0.0043*** - 0.0068*** 0.0030** -0.0005 
 (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0010) 
Controls     
     cash_flow - 7.26e-05*** - 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 8.79e-05*** 
 (6.38e-06) (8.02e-06) (6.18e-06) (4.06e-06) 
ln(age) 0.0520*** 0.0264*** - 0.0431*** - 0.0352*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0046) 
ln(size) 0.0961*** 0.169*** - 0.164*** - 0.101*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0043) 
                              Note: controls on time, sector and location are considered 
 
 
Table 2.12 lists the estimated marginal effects (Model 3). An increase in the 
quality of human capital (labour_cost) increases the probability of belonging to the 
group of firms close to the frontier (both static and dynamic leaders) and decreases that 
of being laggards or climbers. The estimated coefficient of labour_cost, although 
remaining negative in all periods, also shows a different evolution over time: there is a 
downward trend of its negative impact on the probability of belonging to the laggards – 
as indicated by the positive coefficient of the interaction between the quality of human 
capital and time, p * labour_cost, in the second (0,0051) and third (0.0043) periods – 
while an increase of (negative) magnitude of the impact on the probability of belonging 
to the climbers is observed – as shown by the negative coefficients of p * labour_cost in 
the second (-0.0045) and third (-0.0068) periods.  
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2.6.2 Discussion 
 
The second part of this chapter allows us to characterise the four groups of firms: 
laggards, climbers, and static and dynamic leaders. Laggards employ a cost-cutting 
strategy based on the use of labour of lower quality and take a cost advantage from the 
flexible labour market. Leader firms are younger, smaller, and use more skilled labour. 
The climbers use a mixture of strategies to reach the frontier.  
The sign of skill_ratio is in the expected direction. Variations in this ratio have 
an effect especially on the extreme groups: an increase in the ratio is positively 
associated with the increased probability of being dynamic leaders and reduces the 
probability of belonging to the group of laggards. This result supports the hypothesis 
that investment in human capital is more valuable for firms close to the productivity 
frontier. A higher share of part-time contracts increases the probability of belonging to 
the group of laggards. Firms in this group use flexible labour more than other firms. 
This evidence is consistent with previous studies: Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2009) found 
that Italian manufacturing firms with a high share of flexible workers and lower labour 
costs had significantly lower rates of labour productivity growth from 2001 to 2003.  
Despite their propensity to lower the quality of labour over time, climbers tend 
to catch up with the frontier over time. However, reduction of their distance to the 
frontier may be associated with the effect of successful servitisation strategies (Baines 
et al., 2009), with the expansion of upstream (e.g., product design) and downstream 
(e.g., marketing and sales) activities. This is explained by the fact that these firms have 
a higher and less dispersed ratio of white- to blue-collar workers with respect to 
laggards.  
The negative effect of firm size contrasts with a substantial proportion of the 
literature, which  shows a positive relationship between size and productivity. However, 
firms may have undergone downsizing. And, as we saw in the first period, increased 
efficiency was also due to scale effects. The results of the effect of age and firm size on  
productivity dynamics are in fact consistent with those identified by Hall et al. (2009). 
Analysing a panel of SME Italian manufacturing firms in the period 1995-2003, these 
authors found that larger and older firms were less productive. A negative relationship 
CHAPTER 2 – A NEW LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY OF ITALIAN FIRMS 
61 !
between size and efficiency was also found by Diaz and Sanchez (2008) in the case of 
Spanish firms and by Dhawan (2001) in the United States.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
Earlier studies on the Italian economic slowdown pointed to a generalised failure of the 
entire productive system to meet the challenges posed by increased globalisation of 
markets. However, the analysis presented here indicates that the high heterogeneity of 
firm behaviour lay behind this generalized economic stagnation. 
 The evidence presented here is consistent with that obtained in other studies 
carried out with different methods (Antonelli et al., 2013; Bugamelli et al., 2010; Dosi 
et al., 2012). The approach we followed more precisely isolated the component of 
productivity growth due to technological change. Our results clearly point to growing 
dualism among firms. Some firms showed sustained productivity growth, while others 
clearly failed to keep pace with the group of innovators. In the latter part of the chapter, 
we question whether this dynamic is related to different patterns of strategic adaptation.  
The evidence reinforces the hypothesis that firms followed different paths in 
adapting to external shocks and that the different use of labour played a decisive role in 
this process. The labour market reforms implemented in Italy in the 1990s definitely 
and dramatically reduced labour costs, and also the quality of newly hired workers. We 
hypothesised that firms took advantage of the emergence of a dualistic labour market. 
The availability of flexible labour, less expensive but also less skilled, was the easiest 
solution to competition for some firms, whereas more efficient and dynamic ones 
competed in innovation. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess the long-term effectiveness 
of these different modes of adaptation, although the initial evidence we have encourages 
more careful analysis of this hypothesis. 
The analysis is based on a sample of continuing firms and is silent about the 
actual effect of entry and exit on technological progress. Population ecology theories 
suggest that innovation, in the form of organizational change, occurs at the population 
level essentially through organizational births and deaths (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). 
The hypothesis of newly established firms being more science-based and 
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technologically advanced is consistent with the entrepreneurial process of ‘creative 
destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1934). However, in an intermediate-technology context such 
as Italian manufacturing, young innovative firms may not be enough creative and 
autonomous to shape their innovative processes. Hence, they need to acquire external 
knowledge in order to foster their own innovation activity (Pellegrino et al, 2011). In 
our context, new entrants do not necessarily cause a shift of the technological frontier, 
but they are more likely to acquire technologies already in the market, and the survivors 
occasionally produce changes of the frontier. This pattern would be consistent with our 
findings and with the strand of research which suggests within-firm changes in existing 
firms as the principal driver of aggregate productivity dynamics (see, e.g. Bottazzi et al., 
2010). It is nevertheless necessary to integrate findings discussed in this chapter with 
empirical evidence on the impact of entry and exit for better understanding of the 
origins of the long stagnation of productivity in Italy. 
A final remark is necessary. Our results can only give some insights into the 
strategic nature of the observed heterogeneity of productivity. Although the explanatory 
variables used were measured at the beginning of each period, concerns about 
endogeneity (cash flow, in the first place) still remain. The evidence put forward should 
also only be considered in a descriptive sense, although it does suggest that the strategic 
nature of the observed heterogeneity has a foundation and that different groups of firms 
actually pursue different strategies to adapt to new market conditions. 
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2.8 Appendix   
2.8.1 2A: Capital stock estimation procedure  
  
To obtain estimates of capital stock, the procedure used historical values of tangible 
assets and adapted the perpetual inventory method. Specifically, the procedure assumes 
that assets are purchased and then replaced over a certain period of time depending on 
their estimated average duration.  
 The first step consisted of estimating capital for the base year – the firs year. It is 
was assumed that first-year assets were bought gradually in the past and then replaced 
in subsequent years. For the base year, the historical value of tangible assets was 
divided for the estimated average duration and each portion deflated with the deflator 
for the period in question. The estimated capital stock for the first year (base) was as 
follow: 
 
 
 
where kbase is the historical value of tangible assets for the base year,  is the average 
asset duration calcuated at two-digit level and defli is the deflator for year i. Deflators 
were obtained by processing ISTAT data. In particular, due to the unavailability of the 
investments series at two-digit level, the deflator was common to all firms and was built 
as the ratio of the monetary value of total investments at current prices, in a given year, 
over the corresponding value in the chained series; the base year was 2000.  
 For subsequent years, capital stock was divided into two parts: the estimated 
quantity of capital which survive dat time t and the estimated new investment at time t. 
Thus for year t the adjusted value of tangible assets kt is as follows: 
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where kt-1 is the historical value of tangible assets at time t-1 and dt-1 is the average 
duration caculated for year t-1. Specifically, the first component on the right-hand side 
of the above equation represents the estimated volume of tangible assets still surviving 
at time t, and the second component is the estimated new investment at time t. 
Therefore, the estimated stock of capital at time t was obtained as follows: 
 
 
 
The procedure was implemented with the  Stata software. 
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2.8.2 2B: Bootstapping Malmquist index 
 
Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000) defined a bootstrap simulation method, which can 
construct confidence intervals and bias-corrected DEA efficiency scores.  
 The idea underlying the bootstrap method of Simar and Wilson (1998) is to 
approximate the sampling distributions of the DEA indexes by mimicking the data-
generating process (DGP). The authors used a univariate kernel estimator of the density 
of the original distance function estimates, and constructed pseudo-data from this 
estimated density. Re-solving the DEA model for each observation with the new data 
and repeating this process many times lead to a good approximation of the true 
distribution.  
 Simar and Wilson (1999) extended the bootstrapping distance estimator 
presented in Simar and Wilson (1998) to the case of Malmquist indexes. They proposed 
a consistent method, using a bivariate kernel density estimate via the covariance matrix 
of data from adjacent years and adaptation of the reflection method of Silverman (1986) 
to gain consistency. The procedure may be summarized as follows: 
[1] Calculate the Malmquist index  for each firm in a given period t, t+Δt; 
[2] Construct    the   pseudo-data  set     to  create  the 
        reference bootstrap technology using the bivariate kernel density  estimation and  
        adapting the reflection method of Silverman (1986); 
[3] Calculate the bootstrap estimate of the Malmquist index for each firm by 
applying the original estimator to the pseudo-sample attained in step 2; 
[4] Repeat  steps 2 and 3 for a  large number  of times  B, thus   obtaining B sets  of  
 estimates for each firm. 
With the calculated bootstrap value, a bias-corrected estimate of Malmquist index may 
be computed as: 
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 The bias-corrected estimator may have a higher mean-square error than the 
original one. Simar and Wilson (1999) suggested that the bias-corrected estimator 
should be considered when the sample variance of bootstrap values is less 
than one-third of the squared bootstrap bias estimate of the original estimator. 
 The procedure was implemented with the  “FEAR” R package (Wilson, 2008). 
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Table 2.3-b. Bias-corrected Malmquist index and its decomposition into Efficiency Change (EffCh) and 
Technological change (TeCh). Period 1996-2006. 
 
Industry 
1996-2006  
Malm EffCh TeCh  
Food and beverages 1.037 0.066 0.960  
Textiles and clothing 0.356 -0.453 0.779  
Leather goods 0.019 -0.304 0.312  
Wood  0.250 0.297 -0.059  
Paper and printing 0.053 0.613 -0.579  
Petroleum -1.012 -1.039 -0.035  
Chemicals  -0.123 0.136 -0.274  
Rubber and plastic mat. 0.452 0.194 0.249  
Non-met. mineral prod. 0.059 -0.005 0.051  
Fabricated metal prod. 0.226 -0.052 0.262  
Machinery and equip. 1.011 0.153 0.846  
Electronics 1.153 -0.164 1.304  
Transportation equipment 0.553 0.221 0.303  
Other manufacturing  0.190 -0.216 0.397  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4-b. Bias-corrected Malmquist index and its decomposition into Efficiency Change (EffCh) and 
Technological change (TeCh). Subperiod: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-2006. 
 
Industry 
1996-2000  2000-2003  2003-2006 
Malm EffCh TeCh  Malm EffCh TeCh  Malm EffCh TeCh 
Food and beverages -0.871 0.362 -1.251  1.603 0.509 1.063  6.899 -0.725 7.646 
Textiles and clothing -0.341 0.071 -0.431  0.883 -0.305 1.171  0.870 -1.147 1.947 
Leather goods -0.914 -0.217 -0.715  0.811 0.091 0.693  1.234 -0.762 1.960 
Wood  -0.066 0.872 -0.962  0.980 -0.809 1.786  0.452 0.660 -0.230 
Paper and printing -1.578 1.578 -3.166  1.893 0.904 0.950  0.681 -0.865 1.539 
Petroleum -4.299 -0.859 -3.567  8.494 0.218 8.178  -4.586 -2.337 -2.352 
Chemicals  -1.378 -0.231 -1.167  1.771 1.354 0.361  -0.239 -0.459 0.188 
Rubber and plastic mat. 0.013 0.974 -0.966  1.729 0.654 1.049  -0.052 -1.257 1.207 
Non-met. mineral prod. -0.699 0.792 -1.495  0.369 0.663 -0.321  1.055 -1.387 2.442 
Fabricated metal prod. -0.236 0.771 -1.029  1.228 0.420 0.779  0.181 -1.643 1.801 
Machinery and equip. -0.507 0.648 -1.161  0.739 -0.098 0.822  3.472 -0.198 3.655 
Electronics 0.508 0.826 -0.342  1.087 0.360 0.693  2.485 -2.109 4.643 
Transportation equipment -1.031 0.174 -1.275  0.459 0.794 -0.421  2.632 -0.434 3.001 
Other manufacturing  -0.569 0.316 -0.900  0.045 -0.542 0.573  1.573 -0.487 2.041 
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Table 2.5-b. Bias-corrected Efficiency Change (EffCh) and its decomposition into Pure Efficiency 
Change (PEffCh) and Scale Efficiency Change (SEffCh). Subperiods: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-
2006. 
 
Industry  
1996-2000  2000-2003  2003-2006 
EffCh PEffCh SEffCh  EffCh PEffCh SEffCh  EffCh PEffCh SEffCh 
Food and beverages 0.362 0.630 -0.304  0.509 0.312 0.160  -0.725 -0.708 -0.049 
Textiles and clothing 0.071 -0.141 0.150  -0.305 -0.382 0.000  -1.147 -1.499 0.125 
Leather goods -0.217 -0.185 -0.095  0.091 0.047 -0.021  -0.762 -0.832 0.001 
Wood  0.872 0.497 0.336  -0.809 -0.551 -0.292  0.660 0.483 0.136 
Paper and printing 1.578 1.161 0.288  0.904 1.193 -0.390  -0.865 -1.009 0.064 
Petroleum -0.859 -0.886 -0.002  0.218 0.615 -0.408  -2.337 -1.008 -1.363 
Chemicals  -0.231 -0.422 0.110  1.354 0.570 0.683  -0.459 0.112 -0.627 
Rubber and plastic mat. 0.974 0.804 0.110  0.654 0.149 0.451  -1.257 -0.841 -0.477 
Non-met. mineral prod. 0.792 0.852 -0.142  0.663 -0.255 0.820  -1.387 -1.263 -0.217 
Fabricated metal prod. 0.771 0.063 0.656  0.420 0.122 0.247  -1.643 -0.694 -1.027 
Machinery and equip. 0.648 0.048 0.531  -0.098 0.205 -0.376  -0.198 -1.011 0.744 
Electronics 0.826 0.547 0.186  0.360 -0.807 1.103  -2.109 -1.398 -0.812 
Transportation equipment 0.174 0.481 -0.467  0.794 0.527 0.140  -0.434 0.167 -0.704 
Other manufacturing  0.316 0.163 0.113  -0.542 0.308 -0.878  -0.487 -0.318 -0.213 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.7-b. Bias-corrected Technological Change (TeCh) and its decomposition into Pure Technological 
Change (PTeCh) and Scale Technological Change (STeCh). Subperiod: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-
2006 
 
Industry 
1996-2000  2000-2003  2003-2006 
TeCh PTeCh STeCh  TeCh PTeCh STeCh  TeCh PTeCh STeCh 
Food and beverages -1.251 -1.257 0.035  1.063 1.784 -0.669  7.646 0.186 0.202 
Textiles and clothing -0.431 0.011 -0.398  1.171 0.831 0.302  1.947 2.357 -0.502 
Leather goods -0.715 -0.923 0.217  0.693 -0.747 0.639  1.960 1.876 0.008 
Wood  -0.962 -0.189 -0.709  1.786 1.156 0.492  -0.230 0.594 -0.815 
Paper and printing -3.166 -2.293 -0.695  0.950 0.461 0.400  1.539 2.143 -0.608 
Petroleum -3.567 -4.409 0.952  8.178 8.046 -0.007  -2.352 -3.427 1.071 
Chemicals  -1.167 -0.052 -0.890  0.361 1.153 -0.837  0.188 -0.489 0.700 
Rubber and plastic mat. -0.966 -0.201 -0.730  1.049 1.347 -0.308  1.207 1.312 -0.091 
Non-met. mineral prod. -1.495 -1.138 -0.300  -0.321 0.428 -0.777  2.442 2.932 -0.513 
Fabricated metal prod. -1.029 -0.229 -0.810  0.779 1.040 -0.334  1.801 1.064 0.739 
Machinery and equip. -1.161 -0.503 -0.650  0.822 0.534 0.249  3.655 4.823 -1.182 
Electronics -0.342 0.101 -0.437  0.693 2.032 -1.421  4.643 4.477 0.216 
Transportation equipment -1.275 -0.416 -0.733  -0.421 -0.245 -0.255  3.001 2.878 0.008 
Other manufacturing  -0.900 -0.605 -0.258  0.573 -0.207 0.771  2.041 1.955 0.022 
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Table 2.8-b. Technological Change (TeCh) and its decomposition into MaTeCh and Input Biased 
Technological Change (IbTeCh). Subperiod: 1996-2000, 2000-2003, 2003-2006.  
 
Industry 
1996-2000  2000-2003  2003-2006 
TeCh MaTeCh IbTeCh  TeCh MaTeCh IbTeCh  TeCh MaTeCh IbTeCh 
Food and beverages -1.251 -1.603 0.380  1.063 0.129 0.956  7.646 -0.456 9.457 
Textiles and clothing -0.431 -0.644 0.230  1.171 1.046 0.132  1.947 1.663 0.278 
Leather goods -0.715 -0.982 0.284  0.693 -0.318 1.033  1.960 1.526 0.767 
Wood  -0.962 -1.322 0.381  1.786 1.170 0.625  -0.230 -0.759 0.564 
Paper and printing -3.166 -3.349 0.212  0.950 0.611 0.351  1.539 1.223 0.358 
Petroleum -3.567 -11.201 9.495  8.178 3.786 4.205  -2.352 -7.177 5.851 
Chemicals  -1.167 -1.957 0.954  0.361 0.138 0.221  0.188 -0.199 0.404 
Rubber and plastic mat. -0.966 -1.163 0.207  1.049 0.831 0.232  1.207 0.989 0.222 
Non-met. mineral prod. -1.495 -1.940 0.458  -0.321 -0.630 0.307  2.442 2.146 0.295 
Fabricated metal prod. -1.029 -1.468 0.462  0.779 0.523 0.264  1.801 0.403 1.447 
Machinery and equip. -1.161 -1.375 0.213  0.822 0.657 0.161  3.655 3.306 0.347 
Electronics -0.342 -0.606 0.266  0.693 0.480 0.204  4.643 3.751 0.872 
Transportation equipment -1.275 -1.817 0.647  -0.421 -0.987 0.599  3.001 2.224 0.752 
Other manufacturing  -0.900 -1.109 0.216  0.573 0.332 0.255  2.041 1.630 0.411 
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3 Uncovering the influence of managerial and location 
factors on efficiency of personal service firms: the 
case of hotels10 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The observation of wide differences in productivity across sectors and countries, 
especially in services (Inklaar et al., 2008), has spurred a debate on what lies behind this 
phenomenon. Although there is still little empirical evidence regarding firm-level 
productivity in the services, pioneering studies have found that the dispersion of firm 
productivity is even greater in services than in the manufacturing industry (Oulton, 
1998; Faggio et al., 2007).  
In the services sectors, two - not necessarily exclusive - explanations are proposed 
and compared. In the first, dispersion of efficiency is common in a sector in which the 
use of resources depends greatly on demand. If fixed factors enter the production 
function and demand depends on firm location, production efficiency simply reflects the 
intensity of that demand: better located firms will attract more customers and 
consequently use resources better than firms located in less fortunate environments. By 
contrast, other scholars maintain that this explanation does not fully explain the 
observed heterogeneity and assign roles to internal factors, such as management (Bloom 
et al., 2012), the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the 
quality of human capital. In this second case, efficiency dispersion is also observed 
among firms with similar locations and sharing the same demand.  
Distinguishing the various sources of efficiency differences is particularly 
interesting for research in tourism management, and in the hotel industry in particular. 
In this context productive efficiency is a key dimension of organizational performance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This chapter is part of a joint research project with Marco Corsino (University of Bologna) and Enrico 
Zaninotto (University of Trento) on efficiency in the hotel industry. 
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(Barros, 2005a), playing a crucial role in determining the profitability and survival of 
hotels (Chen, 2007). Efficiency scores are also used to estimate the relative position of 
hotels with respect to competitors and to design programs for performance improvement 
(Hwang and Chang, 2003; Morey and Dittman, 2003). However, lack of knowledge of 
the relevant sources of efficiency differences may hamper improvements in 
performance and make benchmarking ineffective. In spite of this, with few exceptions 
(e.g. Assaf and Knežević, 2011), existing studies in the literature on hotel efficiency are 
mainly concerned with measuring efficiency, without a thorough analysis of the factors 
which explain the heterogeneity in efficiency levels across hotels. 
Eﬃciency is essentially a residual; it refers to the comparison between observed 
and ‘optimal’ outputs and inputs. As Lovell (1993) stated, “the identification of the 
factors that explain differences in efficiency is essential for improving the results of 
firms although, unfortunately, economic theory does not supply a theoretical model of 
the determinants of efficiency”. This chapter aims at contributing to the literature by 
empirically exploring, respectively, the influence of location and selected 
entrepreneurial factors on hotel efficiency, in a two-step approach. After a measure of 
productive efficiency had been obtained by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), an 
evaluation of the heterogeneity due to the location in various destinations was first 
obtained. For this, a metafrontier approach was used since, in a DEA framework and for 
destinations characterized by clear-cut demand patterns, it helps to distinguish the 
efficiency component due to destination from a residual component attributed to firm 
management features. With this method, it was found that much of the variance of 
productive efficiency cannot be explained by destination, and the residuals, presumably 
due to entrepreneurial factors, are still very large. Second, the role of entrepreneurial 
factors was directly estimated by regressing efficiency scores, measured with respect to 
the local (i.e. destination) frontier, on a number of covariates which represent some 
entrepreneurial features and management choices. This two-stage approach to 
productive efficiency analysis in the hotel sector allowed us to isolate some firm 
characteristics affecting efficiency: for instance, family involvement in hotel operations 
and investment behavior in technological improvements can definitely influence 
productive efficiency even after controlling for intra-destination demand factors.  
Our analysis was carried out in a region in the Alps, the Trentino province in 
north-east Italy, on a very large sample of the hotels in the region. On one hand, this 
CHAPTER 3 – EFFICIENCY OF PERSONAL SERVICE FIRMS: THE CASE OF HOTEL 
73 !
relatively small geographical area contains several highly homogeneous locations, 
allowing us to compare locations which face very different patterns of demand. On the 
other hand, the rather uniform character of the large majority of hotels (small, single-
outlet, family-run) gives particular value to our analysis and reduces control problems 
of firm-specific features.  
The evidence of several external and internal factors affecting productive 
efficiency has important consequences, particularly from the viewpoint of public 
policies in the sector. The large weight given in the past to the role of demand on using 
of production factors indicated an approach to destination management focusing on 
promotion of tourist resorts. The evidence we present, giving weight to internal 
determinants of efficiency, shows that there is room for improvements in existing hotel 
performance which are independent of demand management.   
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 we review the literature on hotel 
efficiency. Section 3.3 illustrates our estimation method and Section 3.4 presents the 
empirical context and the dataset. Section 3.5 discusses the results. In the concluding 
section, we draw some consequences of our analysis in terms of management 
implications and public policies toward tourism. 
 
3.2 Literature Review  
 
In the services context, and for personal service industries in particular, simultaneity of 
production and consumption is a distinctive characteristic. As a result, both the demand 
density of the particular area in which firms are located and the demand fluctuation over 
time greatly affects firm productivity (Morikawa, 2011, 2012). However, recent 
contributions in the field of economics (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Chun et al., 2011) 
however, have demonstrated persistent differences in productivity and efficiency levels 
which recommend that careful study should be applied to the relative importance of 
factors such as ICT adoption, human capital, and managerial practices (Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2007; Bloom et al., 2012), as opposed to sources of performance heterogeneity 
which are external to the firm (Syverson, 2011). 
 This problem of what determine efficiency is particularly interesting in research 
on the hotel industry. Higher levels of efficiency are indeed positively related to hotel 
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profitability and the likelihood of surviving when competitive pressure increases 
(Hwang and Chang, 2003; Chen, 2007). 
The primary concern of the literature on efficiency and productivity in the hotel 
industry refers to measurement of productive efficiency. Research measures the 
managerial efficiency of hotels by assessing their distance from a production frontier 
which represents the best observed input/output combination. Contributions draw on 
various methodologies, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (Hwang and Chang, 2003; 
Sigala et al., 2004; Barros, 2005a,b; Barros and Dieke, 2008; Barros et al., 2009; Assaf 
and Knežević, 2010; Shang et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2011), and Stochastic Frontiers 
methods (Anderson et al., 1999; Barros, 2004; Pérez-Rodríguez and Acosta-González, 
2007).  
Less attention has been paid to the factors explaining the great heterogeneity in 
the levels of productive efficiency across hotels. Drawing on the existing literature, we 
identify two groups of factors claimed to account for these differences.  
One group focuses on location effects: for example, contrasting city vs rural 
(Barros, 2005b) or seaside areas (Bernini and Guizzardi, 2010), as well as differences in 
infrastructural endowment (Barros, 2005b). Agglomeration effects may also convey 
positive externalities (Barros, 2005b) and destination management may influence hotel 
performance  (Molina-Azorin et al., 2010). Also, demand for hotel services is generally 
derived from attractions – for instance, ski trials – or activities located in specific areas. 
Consequently, on the one hand, location determines proximity to points of tourist 
interest influencing demand uncertainty, excess capacity costs, and eventually affects 
hotel efficiency. On the other hand, hotel efficiency is to large extent influenced by 
competitors located within the same destination. Baum and Mezias (1992) demonstrate 
significant impacts of localized competition on failure rates of hotels. Economic 
literature linking market size and firm selection (e.g., Syverson, 2004) shown how in a 
denser market are less efficient firms that are less likely to survive. 
A second group of factors comprises ones related to the internal characteristics 
of hotels. In particular, it has been shown that factors such as ownership (Barros, 2004; 
Barros and Dieke, 2008; Assaf et al., 2010), strategy, quotation on the stock market and 
M&A (Barros et al, 2011), firm size and classification (Assaf et al., 2010), star rating 
(Assaf and Knežević, 2010) and organizational form (Botti et al., 2009) all affect hotel 
efficiency. Very few papers look at management practices and characteristics. Assaf and 
Knežević (2011) report the negative influence of management tenure on the efficiency 
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of 23 large hotels in Slovenia. Daskalopoulou and Petrou (2009) report the positive 
influence of age, training and previous experience in the tourist sector but the negative 
influence of experience in management on the efficiency of 95 tourist businesses in a 
single Greek city.  
As the above analyses are based on small samples of hotels or are concentrated 
on a restricted number of managerial practices and entrepreneurial characteristics, the 
results can hardly be generalized to the industry as a whole. Indeed, to our knowledge, 
there is no empirical evidence of the relationship between family involvement and hotel 
performance. This fact is quite curious, in view of the family business nature of many 
tourism businesses. 
To address this shortcoming, an empirical exploration based on a large, 
representative sample of hotels located in an Italian Alpine region (Trentino) was 
carried out. Drawing on a large sample allows us to address issues of potential selection 
bias and considerably improve the internal validity of the analysis (Denrell and Kovacs, 
2008). 
Efficiency was measured by DEA; with a metafrontier approach, the part of 
inefficiency which can be properly attributed to internal factors was isolated. The 
explanatory power of a large set of management and entrepreneurial variables was then 
tested in a regression analysis based on model of Simar and Wilson (2007) model. In 
particular, we focused on the quality of managerial practices, such as the introduction of 
quality programs, the family business character of the firm, adoption of information 
technology, decisions to carry out substantial physical improvements to the hotel 
building and its facilities, and quality of entrepreneurial human capital.  
 
3.3 Econometric framework 
 
The estimation procedure starts by measuring the productive efficiency of each hotel, 
defined as its distance from the production frontier, i.e., the boundary of the production 
possibility set. In formal terms, two vectors of inputs  and outputs  
represent each hotel, and production possibility set T is defined as the set of all feasible 
input/output combinations: 
 
Qx +ℜ∈
My +ℜ∈
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.       Eq. 3.1 
           
 An output-oriented distance function is defined with respect to the production 
possibility set T as: 
 
         Eq. 3.2 
      
 This distance function is relative to each firm and may be interpreted as the 
potential increase of output which can be achieved by that firm using a given quantity of 
inputs. In particular, scalar   identifies the potential expansion of output y, so 
that production possibility  lies on the production frontier. Therefore, a firm 
may be said to be efficient if and only D x, y( ) =1 .  
Once data on inputs and outputs for random samples of hotels are available, we 
can estimate efficiency by either a parametric or a non-parametric approach. However, 
as pointed out by Simar and Wilson (2008): “the parametric specification must be a 
reasonable approximation of the underlying true model”. Non-parametric estimators 
avoid the risk of misspecification and allow the treatment of multi-output units, but are 
more sensitive to outliers and have a rate of convergence which is slower than that of 
parametric estimators. In this chapter we use the DEA estimator. 
The DEA technology set assuming CRS and free disposability of input and 
output is estimated as: 
 
    Eq. 3.3 
 
 Consistent estimators of  can then be obtained by substituting true, but 
unknown, production set T with estimator  (Simar and Wilson, 2008). Estimates of 
, assuming CRS and output orientation, are computed by solving the linear 
program (Charnes et al., 1978): 
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                     M.3.1 
 
We used the DEA output-oriented model under Constant Return to Scale (CRS). 
CRS has already been found in the hotel industry (Brown and Dev, 2000) and is a 
reliable assumption when analyses of small firms are carried out. By measuring the 
efficiency of firms with respect to the same level of scale, we can obtain higher 
discrimination power (see, e.g. Curi et al., 2012).  
Estimating efficiency for each hotel is the first step of our analysis. The second 
step aims at exploring the different source of heterogeneity in observed hotel efficiency. 
So far, we have made the (implicit) assumption that hotels located in the region 
shared the same common production frontier. However, in some conditions firms may 
face different production opportunities, attributed to the physical, social and economic 
environments in which production takes place (O’Donnel et al., 2008). This means that 
part of the observed performance heterogeneity may be due to the fact that firms belong 
to different technology sets (groups). This problem takes on particular relevance when 
the focus of analysis is the hotel industry, in which the destination in which hotels are 
located plays an important role.  
As a general point, local differences in the level of external inputs available to 
firms indicate that production frontiers should be location-specific (Tveteras and 
Battese, 2006). In the hotel industry customers (tourists) first chooses their preferred 
destination and then hotels inside that destination (Molina-Azorin et al., 2010). This 
implies different demand conditions across destinations which cannot be controlled by 
the single hotel. In view of the simultaneous occurrence of production and consumption 
which characterizes the hotel industry, demand factors are likely to influence the 
technology set and therefore the production frontier of destinations.  
 The metafrontier approach (O’Donnel et al., 2008) provides a suitable method to 
capture influences associated with the destination effect successfully. In detail, by 
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taking into account the existence of destination-specific frontiers, we consider the 
estimated regional frontier as a metafrontier, defined as:  
 
         Eq. 3.4 
            
where Tdest is the group-specific production possibility set – in our case, the production 
possibility sets of destination dest = 1 ,.., K. Therefore, for each hotel, we also obtain 
the distance from its destination frontier Ddest(x,y), constructed by estimating DEA 
model M. 3.1 and using as reference the group of hotels operating in its destination. The 
following relationship can then be established between the distance from the regional 
frontier and the destination frontier itself:  
 
            Eq. 3.5 
 
    is called the metatechnology ratio, and gives an estimate 
of the influence of destination on the production frontier. It may be interpreted as the 
relative disadvantage (or advantage) of running the business in a particular destination 
within the region. 
The use we made of the metafrontier approach may be seen as equivalent to the 
conditional frontier approach (Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007; Badin et al., 2012) in 
which the efficiency score of each production unit analysed is evaluated with respect to 
a frontier constructed by conditioning on uncontrollable external factor11. Here, we 
defined an indicator variable which accounts for the different destination belonging: 
conditioning on this variable, separate frontiers are then estimated for each destination. 
Accordingly, we estimate efficiency with respect to the metafrontier (unconditional 
efficiency) and with respect to destination frontiers. 
The efficiency measure obtained by conditioning the frontier on the hotel 
destination can be attributed to hotel-specific factors 12 . We use the conditional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 We share this interpretation with other authors such as Fallah-Fini et al. (2012) 
12 Here we assume that external conditions are homogeneous for hotels within each destination. 
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efficiency later, in a second stage, in which we regress this quantity on a set of 
explanatory variables related to several hotel factors13. 
 
3.3.1 Regressing efficiency scores on firm factors  
  
In order to allow valid inferences on the relationship between the set of covariates and 
efficiency scores in the chosen DEA approach, the two-stage semi-parametric methods 
of Simar and Wilson (2007) were applied. This statistical model assumes Farrell's 
(1957) output efficiency measure , to be a function of a set of 
covariates. 14 
We expressed efficiency scores according to Farrell (1957), i.e., the reciprocal of 
the distance function used in the first step: . It follows that, the 
closer the score to one, the more efficient the firm. Consequently, a negative sign of the 
estimated parameters reveals an increase in hotel efficiency, and a positive sign 
indicates a decrease. 
As in Simar and Wilson (2007), we chose a linear function specification: 
 
           M. 3.2 
 
where, Zi is the vector of covariates, β the vector of parameters to be estimated, and εi is 
an independently distributed random variable representing the part of inefficiency not 
explained by Zi. Error term εi in M.3.2 was assumed to be distributed  with left-
truncation at . As recommended by Simar and Wilson (2007), a truncated 
normal regression was performed. As DEA is a consistent estimator, we obtained 
consistent estimates of the regression parameters by maximum likelihood estimation, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 In Badin et al. (2012) conditional efficiency is regressed nonparametricaly on the environmental 
(external) factors. In this chapter we used a parametric linear specification of the second stage model. 
Although this choice adds more structure to the model, it does allow us to easily manage and distinguish 
the separate effect on efficiency of continuous, categorical and dummy independent variables. More 
flexible regression models may be considered in future research. 
14 The model in Simar and Wilson (2007) requires some regularity conditions, including the separability 
assumption, which allows environmental variables to affect the efﬁciency scores but not the frontier. In 
our second stage we still have the problem of separability, which may be relaxed in future work. 
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and were therefore able to make inferences about regression parameters by carrying out 
parametric bootstrapping of the regression model. 
 The estimation procedure involves the following steps (Algorithm #1 in Simar 
and Wilson, 2007)15: 
 
 
[1] Estimate the following truncated regression by maximum likelihood: 
 where ,  i=1,…,n is the Ferrell efficiency score 
computed as reciprocal of the Shepard distance obtained in the first stage with 
respect to the local frontier, Zi is a vector of covariates and β is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated using the m < n observations where  and obtain 
an estimate   of β and  of  . 
[2] Loop  over  the  next  three  steps  ([2.1] - [2.3])  L  times  to  obtain  a  set of 
bootstrap estimates as follows. 
[2.1] For each j = 1,...,m draw εj from the  distribution  with left-
 truncation at  . 
[2.2] Compute:   
[2.3] Use  the  maximum  likelihood  method   to  estimate  the  truncated 
 regression of   on Zj, yielding estimates . 
[3] Use  the   L   bootstrap  values  in  A  and  the  original  estimates   and   to 
construct   percentile  bootstrap  confidence  intervals for each element of β and 
using the k-th element  of each bootstrap value  to find values  and  such 
that :   
[4] calculate the estimated confidence interval:  . 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 The procedure was been implemented with the R statistical package. 
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3.4 Empirical context and database 
 
This study is based on a large dataset covering nearly all the hotels operating in a small 
region (the province of Trento, or Trentino), the features of which are known in great 
detail. It was thus possible to identify resorts with similar patterns of demand inside the 
region. 
Trentino is an Alpine province with nearly 500,000 inhabitants. Thanks to the 
variety of attractions – Lake Garda and its surroundings, the Dolomites, and many 
historic towns and cities, about 2,300,000 tourists visited the region in 2006, spending 
more than 11,000,000 nights in it. The contribution of the hotel and restaurant industry 
to the local value added ranged between 6.7% and 6.9% in the period 2004-2006.  
The region contains as many as 14 distinct tourist districts, each with quite 
different environmental conditions. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of monthly 
average tourist numbers during the year in selected destinations: those in the most 
popular Alpine resorts are characterized by full winter and summer seasons, and have a 
two-peak tourist season (e.g., Valle di Fassa and Brenta-Paganella); other districts only 
have a summer peak (e.g., Garda); ancient towns enjoy a fairly constant arrival of 
tourists throughout the year (e.g., Trento). 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Average number of presences (nights spent) over the year in selected destinations 
 
Jan Mar May Jul Sept Nov
(a) Valle di Fassa 
Jan Mar May Jul Sept Nov
(b) Brenta−Paganella 
Jan Mar May Jul Sept Nov
(c)  Garda
Jan Mar May Jul Sept Nov
(d)  Trento
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Each district has a public agency (coordinated by a central office) defining 
promotion policies in the area. In 2006, 1600 hotels were registered, for a total number 
of more than 47,000 rooms.  Although the hotels are unevenly distributed among the 
tourist districts, despite the wide heterogeneity of demand, they are highly 
homogeneous: most of them, without regard to the district in which they operate, are 
small family firms, a common feature of the tourist industry in Alpine regions, in Italy, 
Austria and Switzerland. In 2006, the hotels had an average of  30 rooms each, with 6.2 
employees; only 15% were owned by limited liability companies. Two-thirds of them 
were three-star hotels.  
 
3.4.1 Data 
 
The database is a unique and original collection of data allowing thorough exploration 
of productivity differentials in the hotel industry. The final database (DBhotelTN 
database) consisted of establishment-level data for a representative sample of hotels 
located in the Trentino province, constructed in collaboration with the Statistics Office 
of the local government. Some of the strengths of these data are worth mentioning. 
First, their fine-grained spatial disaggregation can capture location effects at very 
detailed level. Second, the sample is representative of the entire population of hotels 
even at destination level. Third, analysis can be made of small privately owned hotels 
which are not generally considered, due to lack of data.  
The construction of the database involved several stages: Administrative 
archives were examined in order to identify all legal entities located in the province of 
Trentino in 2006, the primary activity of which accrues to the 3-digit sector 55.1 - hotels 
and similar accommodation - as defined in the NACE Rev.2 classification of economic 
activities. Consultation of these archives led us to identify 1382 subjects fulfilling this 
criterion in 2006. The numbers of active units in the previous four years were 
respectively 1372 in 2005, 1395 in 2004, 1367 in 2003, and 1407 in 2002. The archives 
allowed us to retrieve information on legal form (i.e., sole proprietorships, partnerships 
and limited liability companies) and on the revenue figures of each hotel considered 
here. 
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The previously identified units were matched with those profiled in the 
Informative Tourism System at the Statistics Office of the province of Trentino. This 
second source comprises information on structural characteristics, tourism flows and 
workforce for the population of hotels operating in the entire territory. We matched 
1142 legal entities from the first source with 1188 hotels profiled in the second source 
for year 2006: this implies that 46 legal entities were linked to more than one hotel. For 
the previous four years, the matching procedure gave the following results: 1094 legal 
entities associated with 1143 hotels in 2005, 1062 legal entities and 1108 hotels in 2004, 
1017 legal entities and 1062 hotels 2003, and 981 legal entities and 1023 hotels in 2002. 
 We integrated the data with the geographical coordinates of each hotel obtained 
from the ASIA database, the statistical enterprise archive managed by ISTAT (Italian 
Institute of Statistics). The ASIA database is the most comprehensive and reliable 
collection of information on the location and sector of economic activity for the 
population of firms operating in Italy.  
          Lastly, we matched the hotels constituting Sample A with data from the 
survey “Indagine sull’imprenditoria alberghiera in Trentino” (survey of hotel 
management in Trentino), covering the population of entrepreneurs running hotels in 
the province, carried out by the local Statistics Office in 2004. The survey detailed 
hotel-level data on management characteristics (personal data of owners/managers, i.e. 
age, education and training), human resources, scope and financing arrangements for 
structural improvement of hotels, and adoption of management practices. Merging the 
data in Sample A with the above survey data yielded detailed descriptions of several 
management and entrepreneurial factors for 753 hotels (Sample B).   
 
3.4.2 Input and output variables 
 
We define input and output variables following the literature on productivity and 
efficiency analysis in services (Morikawa, 2011) and in the hotel sector in particular 
(Anderson et al., 1999; Brown and Dev, 2000; Barros, 2005a; Daskalopoulou and 
Petrou, 2009; Assaf et al., 2010; Barros et al., 2011). Three input variables were 
selected: labor, fixed capital, and intermediate input. Labor input was measured by 
aggregating the annual average of two categories of workers: family workers and paid 
employees, including part-time workers. The number of available rooms was used as a 
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proxy for fixed capital. Intermediate inputs were measured as the total cost of raw 
materials and services. 
Various measures of output may be used. In manufacturing, in which the output 
constant quality assumption is more reliable, physical measures are the preferred way of 
measuring output. In services, instead, financial measures are more suitable to 
incorporate the quality variations caused by the heterogeneity of services and the effects 
on perceived quality by customers participation (Grönroos and Ojasalo, 2004). Thus, as 
aggregate output we chose the monetary value of revenue (Brown and Dev, 2000; 
Daskalopoulou and Petrou, 2009). We also deflated hotel revenues by a sectoral price 
index in order to mitigate the distorting effect of inflation on prices and consequently on 
revenues. However, prices may reflect idiosyncratic demand shifts or market power 
variations rather than quality. In order to avoid this problem we also considered as 
second output a physical output, i.e. the number of nights guests spent in the hotels. In 
the end, the production model consists of three input and two output. 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the input and output variables for 
hotels in Sample A for the year 2004, the mid point in the observation period.  
 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for input and output variables (year 2004; n=1068). 
Variable Description Mean St dev Min Max 
employees average number of employees (input) 6.5 5.5 0.3 50.8 
rooms number of rooms (input) 31.3 17.8 5.0 154.0 
intermed_inputs costs of row mat. and services (input) (€) 157680.0 178136.9 2618.0 2773761.0 
nights_spent nights guests spent in the hotel (output) 7476.4 6701.8 91.0 83585.0 
revenue  hotel revenue (output) (€) 364461.1 384273.4 7083.0 4738303.0 
       
 
 
3.4.3 Firm-level determinants of efficiency 
 
The main aim of this chapter was to distinguish the effect of external from that of 
internal to the hotel factors on efficiency. Several firm-level sources of performance 
heterogeneity were taken into account. In particular, three sets of variables to explain 
differences in hotel residual efficiency were used.  
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 The first set includes proxies of the investing behavior, quality of management 
practices, and hotel organization. Investing in hotel improvements may affect not only 
the production function but also efficiency measured with respect to it, as a 
consequence of better technology embedded in new capital (Blake et al., 2006) or 
higher effort exerted by hoteliers to recover the investments. As a proxy of the 
propensity to invest in physical capital, we defined a variable which took value 1 if the 
hotelier answered positively to the question of whether the hotel had been extended or 
improved during the ten years before the survey (i.e., until 2003) and 0 otherwise. 
Hotels whose owners introduced information technologies tended to perform better 
(Law et al., 2009). The variable ict_adopt was then added, with value 1 if the hotel used 
a computer and 0 if not, as a proxy of the adoption of ICT.  
The introduction of quality programs (e.g., ISO 9000) can improve both 
management practices and production processes, and these improvements may translate 
into efficiency gains (Corbett et al., 2005; Tzelepis et al., 2005). We used the variable 
quality, with a value of 1 if the hotel adopted a quality process certification, and 0 
otherwise. 
 Both agency theory and the resource-based view of the firms indicated that 
certain family factors can lead to benefits, while others impose costs and are liabilities 
to firm performance (Dyer, 2006). We thus defined two variables to distinguish two 
dimensions of family participation in hotel operations. The first is a measure of the 
intensity of family involvement, that is, the number of family members employed in the 
hotel (fam_num). On one hand, family ties are expected to align goals and eventually 
increase efficiency (Herrero, 2011); on the other, they may favor redundancies and 
slackness on the part of family employees. The second variable family_involv was 
assigned value 1 if three key activities – accounting and administration, customer 
relations, and marketing – were simultaneously run by family members, and 0 if not. 
This variable captures a more qualitative aspect of the employment of family members, 
as such members may be more motivated, but perhaps less well trained, than 
professional employees.  
 Hotel’s performance may be related to the education, experience, and skills of 
the entrepreneurs, as well as to their personal entrepreneurial characteristics (Lerner and 
Haber, 2001; Daskalopoulou and Petrou, 2009). A second set of variables covers some 
entrepreneurs' demographic characteristics: age, experience as hoteliers, and education. 
For this set, we defined three categorical (3-level) variables, entr_age, entr_wexp and 
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entr_edu, related respectively to entrepreneurs' age, experience as hoteliers, and 
education level.  
Lastly, we defined two variables related to structural choices: a categorical 
variable legal, with value 1 in the case of sole proprietorship, value 2 if a partnership, 
and value 3 if a limited liability company, and a dummy variable category, with value 1 
if the hotel belonged to three-star, four-star, or higher categories, and 0 if it was one-star 
or two-star. 
Table 3.2 lists explanatory variables, categories defined for each variable, and 
descriptive statistics for hotels in Sample B. 
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for variables explaining productive efficiency (n = 753). 
Variable Description Mean St dev Min Max 
Managerial factors      
invest propensity to invest (dummy) 0.563 0.496 0 1 
quality quality process certification (dummy) 0.074 0.261 0 1 
fam_num number of family members  2.395 1.369 0 8 
fam_involv involvement of family members in key activities 0.540 0.499 0 1 
ict_adopt current use of computers (dummy) 0.910 0.285 0 1 
Entrepreneur’s experience as hotelier (categorical)     
entr_wexp1 <10 years  0.150 0.357 0 1 
entr_wexp2 10-35 years  0.468 0.499 0 1 
entr_wexp3 >35 years  0.382 0.486 0 1 
Entrepreneur’s education (categorical)     
entr_edu1 middle school 0.255 0.436 0 1 
entr_edu2 secondary school 0.675 0.468 0 1 
entr_edu3 university 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Entrepreneur’s age (categorical)     
entr_age1 18-33 years old 0.131 0.337 0 1 
entr_age2 34-65 years old 0.797 0.403 0 1 
entr_age3 >65 years old 0.072 0.259 0 1 
Legal form (categorical)     
legal1 sole proprietorship 0.177 0.381 0 1 
legal2 partnership 0.709 0.454 0 1 
legal3 limited liability company 0.114 0.318 0 1 
      category category (dummy) 0.692 0.462 0 1 
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3.5  Results and discussion 
 
As suggested in the literature, we first screened  outliers (Simar, 2003; Banker and 
Chang, 2006). To this aim we apply the approach of  Sampaio de Souza and Stosic 
(2005), based on the effect produced on the estimated efficiencies of all the other 
observations when each observed firm is removed from the dataset. The outliers are 
expected to display very large effects (see Appendix A, for further details).  
After detecting outliers, efficiency was obtained by applying DEA model M.3.1 
to the pooled dataset of hotels in the whole region, i.e. with respect to the common 
regional frontier (D). We then estimated efficiency with respect to destination frontier 
(Ddest ) and calculated the ratio between destination frontier and common regional 
frontier, i.e., the metatechnology ratio (MTR). The relative quantities were calculated 
for each year in the period 2002-2006 for the hotels in Sample A; all quantities were 
calculated for each hotel and then aggregated at the level of tourist destination. Table 
3.3 lists the estimated averages and standard deviations of the quantity defined above 
for each destination. The data reveal large differences in the average performance of 
hotels belonging to different destinations. In particular, there is a considerable 
difference in terms of global performance (D) between the average efficiency of the best 
performing destination (Lake Garda area, 76.8%) and the worst (Piné-Cembra area, 
54.4%).  Also identified is a group of the best-performing destinations, for which the 
average efficiency ranges from 76.8% at Garda Trentino to 67.6% for the Madonna di 
Campiglio area. 
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Table 3.3. Estimated efficiencies and metatechnology ratio by destination. 
Destination Year  
D  MTR  Ddest 
Mean St dev  Mean St dev  Mean St dev 
           
Trento 2004  0.728 0.179  0.841 0.075  0.859 0.169 
 All years  0.716 0.177  0.837 0.084  0.852 0.168 
           
Brenta-Paganella 2004  0.678 0.140  0.861 0.059  0.786 0.142 
 All years  0.694 0.142  0.859 0.058  0.806 0.144 
           
Pinè-Cembra 2004  0.511 0.091  0.582 0.054  0.880 0.142 
 All years  0.544 0.114  0.626 0.071  0.872 0.140 
           
Valle di Fiemme 2004  0.639 0.141  0.792 0.093  0.804 0.138 
 All years  0.652 0.137  0.795 0.090  0.818 0.135 
           
Valle di Fassa 2004  0.705 0.128  0.949 0.047  0.744 0.134 
 All years  0.711 0.136  0.940 0.058  0.757 0.137 
           
San Martino di Castrozza 2004  0.606 0.157  0.756 0.080  0.794 0.168 
 All years  0.622 0.152  0.767 0.090  0.808 0.160 
           
Valsugana-Tesino 2004  0.602 0.164  0.755 0.075  0.794 0.175 
 All years  0.609 0.165  0.769 0.075  0.789 0.183 
           
Folgaria 2004  0.568 0.144  0.736 0.076  0.773 0.174 
 All years  0.568 0.140  0.713 0.079  0.796 0.160 
           
Rovereto 2004  0.570 0.176  0.741 0.117  0.770 0.186 
 All years  0.634 0.204  0.804 0.126  0.785 0.192 
           
Garda 2004  0.742 0.155  0.944 0.036  0.784 0.153 
 All years  0.768 0.159  0.951 0.048  0.806 0.158 
           
Comano-Brenta 2004  0.544 0.133  0.689 0.058  0.792 0.186 
 All years  0.570 0.148  0.737 0.076  0.775 0.181 
           
Madonna di Campiglio 2004  0.659 0.155  0.889 0.096  0.746 0.172 
 All years  0.676 0.160  0.873 0.083  0.775 0.168 
           
Valle di Sole 2004  0.684 0.131  0.855 0.060  0.799 0.135 
 All years  0.692 0.139  0.867 0.061  0.797 0.145 
           
Valle di Non 2004  0.544 0.171  0.706 0.111  0.779 0.231 
 All years  0.565 0.179  0.745 0.091  0.762 0.224 
           
Places outside tourism destinations 2004  0.538 0.126  - -  - - All years  0.544 0.145  - -  - - 
          NOTE: All Years: values calculated as average over period 2002-2006. 
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Figure 3.2. Relationship between global efficiency (D) and metatechnology ratio (MTR). 
 
 
The destinations with higher MTR are Garda Trentino (95.1%), Valle di Fassa 
(94.0)% and Madonna di Campiglio (87.3%). Therefore, the best-performing hotels in 
these destinations largely define the regional frontier (metafrontier).  
Figure 3.2 shows a positive linear relationship (ρ=0.540, statistically significant 
at 5%) between production efficiency calculated as the distance from regional frontier 
(D) and MTR. The average level of efficiency with respect to the global frontier of the 
province of  Trento is higher in those areas where the destination frontier is closer to the 
regional frontier. Thus, we can argue that the contextual factors which characterize each 
area drive the destination frontier as close as possible to the regional frontier and raise 
the average performance of hotels, measured in terms of overall efficiency. The upper 
right-hand part of the figure shows the areas with the best results: these are the most 
prestigious destinations in the province and have a greater flow of tourists over longer 
seasons. 
In contrast, Figure 3.3 shows that there is no association between MTR and 
average efficiency calculated with respect to destination frontier Ddest (ρ=-0.015). This 
indicates that favorable local conditions do not affect the efficiency of hotels lagging 
behind the best performers in the same location. The hotels in each destination produce 
about 80% of the output of the best-performing units in the same area; the two 
exceptions are those of Pine-Cembra (87.2%) and Trento (85.2%).   
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Figure 3.3. Relationship between local efficiency (Ddest) and metatechnology ratio (MTR). 
 
 
To summarize, although the results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
environmental conditions impose restrictions on the production frontier, in all 
destinations, including those with better environmental conditions, a significant 
proportion of inefficiency is not due to location. In the rest of this section, we assess 
whether and how factors related to hotel management can account for the unexplained 
variation.   
 
3.5.1 Influence of managerial factors 
 
We now turn to the internal factors explaining the residual component of the efficiency 
of hotels with respect to the best-performing ones operating in the same external 
conditions. Cross-sectional analysis was carried out by regressing the destination 
efficiency scores previously calculated on a set of hotel-level variables. We used the 
data for the hotels in Sample B - for which detailed information on entrepreneurial 
characteristics and management practices at the end of 2003 were available - and the 
calculated efficiency scores for 2004. Consequently, in our regression analysis the 
estimated efficiency (dependent variable) and the independent variables were not 
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observed simultaneously; this procedure, albeit not completely, does avoid endogeneity 
problems, particularly with respect to investment choices.   
Table 3.4 lists the results obtained by regressing the efficiency scores on the set 
of covariates previously identified. 
 
Table 3.4. Estimated coefficients and confidence intervals. (Mod. 1) 
 
  Bounds of bootstrap estimated Confidence Intervals
b 
  Est. Coeff.a (90%) (95%) (99%) 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Constant 1.480 *** 1.289  1.671 1.256  1.712 1.192  1.796 
         
legal1   0.103 -0.013   0.221 -0.037  0.247 -0.078  0.291 
legal3 -0.248* -0.452 -0.023 -0.489  0.033 -0.550  0.153 
category -0.257*** -0.372 -0.149 -0.394 -0.127 -0.435 -0.065 
         
entr_wexp1  0.032  -0.102  0.184 -0.129  0.213 -0.182  0.271 
entr_wexp3  0.022  -0.090  0.129 -0.107  0.150 -0.152  0.195 
         
entr_edu1 -0.015  -0.125  0.098 -0.151  0.123 -0.201  0.160 
entr_edu3  0.151  -0.031  0.350 -0.068  0.389 -0.129  0.481 
         
entr_age1  0.103  -0.057  0.269 -0.088  0.305 -0.136  0.371 
entr_age3  0.101  -0.066  0.284 -0.093  0.330 -0.164  0.414 
         
 
invest -0.270*** -0.376 -0.169 -0.395 -0.144 -0.440 -0.089 
fam_num  0.084***  0.047  0.123 0.040  0.130 0.022  0.145 
fam_involv -0.166*** -0.262 -0.065 -0.286 -0.046 -0.319 -0.007 
quality -0.147  -0.332  0.073 -0.362  0.119 -0.424  0.243 
ict_adopt -0.261*** -0.405 -0.119 -0.433 -0.086 -0.484 -0.026 
         
 0.439  0.397 0.498 0.385 0.506 0.366  0.518                               * , **, and *** : statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; a Efficiency  
            scores expressed according to Farrell (1957), i.e., parameters with negative sign  
            indicate sources of efficiency; b Number of bootstrap iterations: 3000. 
 
 
 
Let us first comment on the firm variables which represent structural choices: 
hotel class and legal form. Limited liability companies and partnerships are subject to 
requirements which increase administrative, structural and organizational fixed costs, 
e.g., formal accounting practices, which can be afforded if demand and costs are 
carefully managed. The same is true of hotel class: higher classes require better 
standards in terms of room equipment and services. The results of our analysis indicate 
εσˆ
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that higher-class as well as limited liability hotels (significance level 10%) achieve 
higher efficiency.  
A second group of factors is related to the effect of entrepreneurs' human capital 
on efficiency. We used the largest category as a reference for each variable.16 Note that, 
despite the expected signs, we found little evidence of the influence of individual 
managers' characteristics, such as experience, education or age, on productive 
performance. Lastly, the analysis revealed that several factors had a statistically 
significant effect on efficiency scores. First, a higher propensity to invest in 
technological improvements, measured by invest, had a positive bearing on the 
productive efficiency levels of hotels. This result confirms the positive relationship 
between efficiency and investing attitude in renewing physical capital by providing new 
equipment and infrastructures (Blake et al., 2006). Investment is usually considered to 
improve productivity, due to the innovations involved in it. Investment also commits 
managers and entrepreneurs to better use of capital, or investors self-select on the basis 
of their managerial skills. 
Second, the coefficient of the variable fam_num has a positive sign, implying 
that a higher numbers of family members are associated with lower efficiency. In our 
context, the firms are mainly small hotels, i.e. it is probable that family members cannot 
easily be made redundant, even when their performance is poor. In addition, it is not 
easy for small family firms to attract and finance qualified employees from the labor 
market.  
Family members may be entrusted with auxiliary services, ranging from cooking 
to routine maintenance, but also with important functions. In this regard, the coefficient 
of fam_involv shows a negative sign, pointing to a positive relationship between family 
members filling crucial roles, such as accounting, customer relations and marketing, and 
hotel efficiency. In other words, hotels which can develop the skills necessary to run 
key activities within the family boundary have a competitive advantage and suffer less 
from agency problems.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 When a qualitative variable with more than two categories is included in the regression equation, 
additional constraints on the parameters are required. A common strategy in this case consists of omitting 
one of the dummy variables related to each category. The decision as to which category to omit is often 
arbitrary. In our case for each variable we omitted the largest group. The omitted category was then the 
category to which all the other categories were be compared: the coefficient on each dummy variable 
related to a particular category shows the effect on efficiency of being in this category rather than on the 
omitted. 
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As regards the effect of the adoption of ICT, Table 3.2 clearly shows that the 
proportion of firms which do not use computers (our proxy of the adoption of ICT) is 
limited: this is indeed a particularly conservative indicator of the attitude toward 
information technologies, and results confirm that it is associated with low productive 
performance. Lastly, the introduction of quality control has no statistically significant 
effect.  
Our results need a final comment. In the two-stage approach of Simar and Wilson 
(2007) we often reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of a dummy variable (modeled 
to represent differences in levels between groups) is significantly different from zero, 
because of the low power of the test of the significance of coefficients for this type of 
variable in the stage 2 regression (Zelenyuk, 2009). Consequently, on one hand, 
although caution is recommended in inferring no differences in efficiency between 
groups when the estimated coefficients of dummy variables are not statistically 
significant, on the other, the difference in efficiency levels between groups is likely to 
be quite large in reality, when the estimated coefficients are found to be statistically 
significant. This fact reinforces our findings related to investment behavior, family 
management, and structural choices 
 
3.6 Robustness check 
 
In the first part of the analysis we disentangled the effect of destination factors on the 
production frontier and obtained efficiency estimates that account for different 
destination frontiers. We then explained efficiency scores as function of hotel-level 
factors. 
 However, demand variability can affect efficiency also within destinations, 
where best located hotels are likely to enjoy better demand conditions during the year, 
than peripheral ones. Specifically, hotel can enjoy externalities due to factors exogenous 
to the economic actors related to the capacity of a particular location to attract visitors 
and consumers. Attraction factors may include natural features of the environment (e.g., 
scenic landscapes), man-made features (e.g., historic and artistic attractions), or even 
more practical ones (such as high level of tourism facilities). Touristic flows can be 
thought to be spatially distributed depending on the distribution of these touristic 
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attractions within destinations and it is reasonable to consider that proximity to physical 
and natural attraction points gives to each hotel a different degree of attractiveness and 
eventually impacts on efficiency.  
We use a market-potential function (Harris, 1954; Mion, 2004; Graham, 2009) 
to construct an index of proximity such that the impact of tourism attraction points on 
hotel performance decreases with their distance from the hotel. Given the specificity of 
alpine tourism, we consider ski areas, touristic lakes and places with scenic views as the 
most important touristic attractions. Formally, our measure of hotel market proximity is 
defined as the sum of the reciprocal of the distance from the selected attraction points as 
follow:  
       
MP _hi = dij 
−1
        ∀i =1,...,N
j=1
T
∑        Eq. 3.6 
          
where MP_hi is the market proximity of an hotel in location i and dij is the (euclidean) 
distance between the hotel i and the attraction point j,  j = 1 ,…, T.17 The above function 
assigns then to each hotel an index that measures the intensity of possible contact with 
tourists: the higher is the market proximity of the location in which a hotel is located the 
more attractive for tourist the hotel is.  
To account for externalities that arise from concentration of attraction points at 
different (small) spatial scales, we constraint our measures of proximity on several 
distance thresholds. From the point where the focal hotel is located we calculated the 
proximity to attraction points at distance bands corresponding to radius of 0.5, 1, 2.5 
and 5 kilometers respectively. Therefore we introduce the MP_h index in the regression 
analysis as additional fine-grained control of the effect of demand factors on hotel 
efficiency.18 
 Moreover, other unobserved destination conditions (e.g., different degree of 
effectiveness of destination management policy) can impact also on how far hotels are 
from the destination frontiers, i.e. efficiency, other than on the shape of the frontier. We 
control for this possibility by further adding the set of destination dummies in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 We retrieved information on latitude and longitude of attraction points from the Geographical 
Information System (GIS) of the Trentino province. 
18 Proximity could be better measured by transport time instead of distance from the attraction points. 
However, given the small spatial scale of our empirical setting, we think that distance can be a suitable 
measure of proximity. 
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second stage regression. Finally, by assuming constant return to scale technology, part 
of estimated inefficiency may be due to departure from the optimal production scale. 
Therefore, we introduce in the regression analysis a proxy of firm size (see Curi et al., 
2012). In accordance with the literature on hotels (De Jorge and Suárez, 2013), we use 
as proxy of hotel’s size the number of available beds. 
Table 3.5 reports the results obtained by adding the above controls to the second 
stage regression. As expected, demand factors are positively related to hotel efficiency 
even at very small spatial scales. Notwithstanding, the effect of the propensity to invest, 
the effect of category as well as the relationship between family involvement and hotel 
efficiency are confirmed. While the sign of the coefficients related to the legal form are 
still in the expected direction, they are no longer statistically significant. 
 
3.7 Management implications and conclusions 
 
The above analysis: a) separates the effects of location of efficiency from that under the 
control of hotels; b) assesses in depth how managerial factors affect efficiency. The 
study shows that the regional best practice frontier is determined by hotels which 
operate in the most prestigious tourist areas, i.e., those which have better destination 
characteristics. Hotels with better organization and management in these areas can offer 
services of the highest quality which result in higher performance, and can better exploit 
fixed costs, due to higher demand over longer seasons. However, a relatively less 
expected result was that differences between destinations only explains a small 
proportion of the variability in hotel efficiency. In particular, the average inefficiency of 
hotels is high everywhere and is not dissimilar between destinations. Destination, in 
other words, affects the performance of the more efficient hotels, whereas most hotels 
do not seem to be able adequately to detect and exploit the opportunities which various 
contexts make available to them.  
If we assume that, after separating the destination effect from efficiency, the 
residual component of efficiency mainly reflects factors under the control of hotels, this 
means that there is room for improvement, regardless of the “comparative advantage” 
which some hotels have in terms of destination endowment. We isolated three sets of 
internal factors which may affect managerial efficiency. The first set is related to 
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managerial behavior and practices, the second to the personal characteristics of the 
entrepreneur who runs the hotel, and the third covers structural management choices 
such as category and legal form. Results show that management practices and structural  
 
Table 3.5. Robustness check: estimated coefficients. 
 
  Mod. 2 Mod. 3 Mod. 4 Mod. 5 
     
Constant 1.940 *** 1.949 *** 1.953 *** 1.962 *** 
 [1.671, 2.214] [1.677, 2.239] [1.680, 2.242] [1.701, 2.249] 
legal1 0.082 0.080 0.079 0.076 
 [-0.043, 0.218] [-0.040, 0.207] [-0.045, 0.207] [-0.045, 0.206] 
legal3 -0.181 -0.180 -0.180 -0.180 
 [-0.387, 0.039] [-0.394, 0.039] [-0.408, 0.042] [-0.388, 0.046] 
category -0.158 *** -0.152 ** -0.150 ** -0.148 ** 
 [-0.300, -0.034] [-0.296, -0.031] [-0.291, -0.028] [-0.275, -0.023] 
entr_wexp1 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.004 
 [-0.151, 0.152] [-0.147, 0.147] [-0.145, 0.154] [-0.152, 0.154] 
entr_wexp3 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 [-0.107, 0.121] [-0.110, 0.124] [-0.105, 0.125] [-0.105, 0.118] 
entr_edu1 -0.034 -0.035 -0.031 -0.031 
 [-0.151, 0.079] [-0.152, 0.082] [-0.145, 0.087] [-0.150, 0.086] 
entr_edu3 0.141 0.148 0.152 0.150 
 [-0.044, 0.349] [-0.036, 0.366] [-0.029, 0.363] [-0.032, 0.353] 
entr_age1 0.103 0.102 0.101 0.100 
 [-0.057, 0.279] [-0.047, 0.279] [-0.051, 0.273] [-0.057, 0.268] 
entr_age3 0.109 0.110 0.104 0.099 
 [-0.066, 0.305] [-0.071, 0.308] [-0.076, 0.304] [-0.074, 0.288] 
invest -0.267 *** -0.269 *** -0.268 *** -0.268 *** 
 [-0.382, -0.173] [-0.383, -0.171] [-0.385, -0.177] [-0.383, -0.175] 
fam_num 0.081 *** 0.081 *** 0.079 *** 0.077 *** 
 [-0.044, 0.125] [-0.041, 0.125] [0.043, 0.122] [0.041, 0.122] 
fam_involv -0.174 *** -0.175 *** -0.175 *** -0.172 *** 
 [-0.283, -0.078] [-0.285, -0.079] [-0.284, -0.073] [-0.281, -0.073] 
quality -0.100 -0.099 -0.094 -0.094 
 [-0.278, 0.109] [-0.285, 0.114] [-0.285, 0.109] [-0.276, 0.102] 
ict_adopt -0.153 *** -0.151 ** -0.150 ** -0.146 ** 
 [-0.312, -0.001] [-0.316, -0.003] [-0.314, -0.003] [-0.308, -0.004] 
size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 [-0.004, 0.001] [-0.004, 0.001] [-0.004, 0.001] [-0.004, 0.001] 
MP_h_0.5km -0.157 *** - - - 
 [-0.254, -0.057]    
MP_h_1km - -0.160 *** - - 
  [-0.254, -0.057]   
MP_h_2.5km - - -0.142 *** - 
   [-0.226, -0.057]  
MP_h_5km - - - -0.144 *** 
    [-0.222, -0.068] 
Dummies destination Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 0.399 0.397
 0.397 0.395 
 [0.371, 0.464] [0.369, 0.462] [0.368, 0.462] [0.370, 0.460] 
    Note: Bounds of bootstrap estimated confidence intervals at 95% level in parenthesis; Number of 
    bootstrap iterations: 3000   
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choices are the main internal drivers of productive efficiency; the influence which 
entrepreneurs may have on the productive efficiency of hotels is less clear. Results are 
confirmed even after controlling for demand influence at fine-grained spatial scale. 
 Some management implications follow. First, the weight given to destination 
management, as a way of improving tourist resort welfare, is only partly justified. 
Promotion of demand should be accompanied by actions aimed at improving hotel 
management and at inducing better use of resources. This is particularly important when 
demand grows, especially in areas sensitive to environment sustainability like Alpine 
resorts: more efficient established hotels, instead of new ones, may successfully cope 
with the increasing number of tourists. Second, particular attention must be paid to 
family businesses. Highly motivated, well-trained family members are of value for hotel 
efficiency. Conversely, family ownership may induce overstaffing and slack periods 
which depress hotel productivity. Training plans and the adoption of a professional 
attitude in family-run hotels can transform a cause of inefficiency into a competitive 
asset.  
 Our results do offer some insights for managers and public policy-makers in 
designing programs for performance improvement. In the past, much attention has been 
given to destination management as a tool for improving the tourist sector. Without 
denying the importance of destination management, our study supports the view that 
there is room for improvement within each destination. Significant improvements in 
efficiency can be obtained by focusing on the internal operations of hotels, considering 
the most important factors which improve efficiency: primarily, the quality of human 
capital, demand and cost management, and updating of organizational practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !
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4 Evaluating the effect of public subsidies on firm 
performance: Empirical and methodological issues 
in the case of hotel businesses19 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Although the provision of public money to firms through subsidies is seen as a viable 
policy instrument to rectify market failures, reduce unemployment and boost economic 
growth, its efficacy is debated (Buigues and Sekkat, 2011). Public intervention is 
expected to be beneficial for firms directly supported, but it may generate both positive 
and negative externalities, which extend the effect of the policy to non-supported firms. 
However, the econometrics on which quantitative evaluations are generally based – 
Rubin’s (1974) causal model – is centred on the assumption that the potential outcomes 
of a unit are fixed and do not depend on the treatment status of other units - the Stable 
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA, Rubin, 1986). Under SUTVA, interactions 
among firms are ruled out, making it difficult to identify the indirect effects due to the 
externalities that public policies are likely to generate. This fact has implications for the 
quality of the estimated effects and prevents knowledge of the true effectiveness of a 
policy.  
 This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on industrial policy 
evaluation by estimating both direct and indirect effects of a place-based subsidisation 
policy directed to co-finance capital investments on the performance of micro and small 
hotel businesses, which form an important part of tourist services in Italy. We exploit a 
detailed and unique dataset on a large, representative sample of eligible hotels operating 
in the Trentino province (north-east Italy) over the period 2002-2006, obtained by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19  This chapter has been developed in the research project DEM/FBK-IRVAPP: “Analisi della 
produttività nel settore alberghiero: fattori manageriali e ruolo delle politiche pubbliche” financed by the 
Caritro Foundation and under the supervision of Enrico Zaninotto (University of Trento) and Roberto 
Gabriele (University of Trento). 
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integration of several data sources. The empirical domain of analysis has two important 
advantages:  the local dimension of the context of analysis and the focus on a single 
narrowly defined sector reduce the ex ante heterogeneity of the firms analysed, and the 
firms in the region cannot receive grants from other institutions other than the Trentino 
province. This is because, in 2002, provincial law 6/99 was the only tool of intervention 
in the economic activities of the local government and therefore the only source of 
subsidies available to firms in the region.  
 Several steps were followed in the construction of the econometric model and 
estimation, starting with the standard model and addressing and overcoming empirical 
and methodological issues in each step. Under standard assumptions 20 , we first 
estimated the direct average treatment effect on treated hotels in a single treatment, i.e., 
hotels which applied for and actually received only one grant during the period 2002-
2006 were considered as treated. We therefore extended the matching estimator of 
Abadie and Imbens (2002) and Imbens (2004) in a panel data setting by implementing a 
Conditional Difference-in-Difference matching estimator 
In the second step, we extended the framework to the case of time-varying 
treatments, i.e., we examined the hotels' history of treatments over the period of 
analysis. Under the Sequential Conditional Independence Assumption (SCIA, Robins, 
2000), which extends the standard model to a dynamic treatment setting, we estimated 
the direct average treatment effect on the final outcome when the treatment assignment 
at a given time depended on the history of previous treatments and on time-varying 
confounders. Drawing on previous literature (Hogan and Lancaster, 2004; Azoulay et 
al., 2009), we used a Marginal Structural Model and, in order to improve the estimation 
with selection within this approach, estimated the causal effect of subsidies by the 
Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) estimator.  
In the third step, we departed further from the standard model by allowing 
subsidisation to interfere across hotels. In particular, the outcomes of a potential hotel 
were allowed to change when the treatment status of its neighbours changed. This 
represents a critical departure from the traditional causal inference framework in which, 
in the SUTVA assumption, potential outcomes in treatment or control conditions are 
fixed and do not depend on the overall set of treatment assignments..  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 The second important assumption is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) to control for 
confounding factors which drive both assignment to treatment and potential outcomes. We discuss 
assumptions of standard models later in the chapter. 
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Relaxing the SUTVA assumption was necessary in order to isolate the indirect 
effects of a policy, i.e., spillovers or, more generally, externalities. One possibility of 
relaxing SUTVA and estimating this indirect effect is by design, e.g. selecting proper 
control units located outside the target area of the policy intervention. In this chapter, 
however, building on contributions in the emerging strand of research that relaxes 
SUTVA in analysis (Hong and Raudenbush, 2006; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; 
Ferracci et al., 2013), we defined a framework which improves not only the 
identification and estimation of the direct average treatment effect but also estimation of 
the indirect effect of a policy, considering only eligible firms, i.e., ones located in the 
target area. More specifically, as relevant  interactions in the hotel industry are expected 
to be local, that is, among hotels within relatively compact, well-defined geographic 
areas or destinations (Baum and Mezias, 1992), we considered hotels embedded in their 
own tourist destinations within the region and defined hotel outcomes as a function of 
hotel treatment and of that of other hotels in the same destination. We were thus able to 
extend our econometric framework to explain the hotel’s history of treatment and that of 
other hotels in the same destination. 
We considered several single-factor measures of the productive performance of 
hotels. In the last part of the chapter, we also examined the case in which the outcome is 
technical efficiency, estimated within the non-parametric frontier framework by DEA 
models, which also measure total factor productivity since they consider multiple inputs 
and outputs. In order to estimate the effect of subsidies on efficiency, we added to the 
two-stage semi-parametric model of Simar and Wilson (2007) a pre-processing step to 
reduce problems of selection bias (Ho et al., 2007a).   
Our results highlight the direct positive effects of subsidies on hotel 
performance. We also found empirical evidence of SUTVA violation and indirect 
subsidy effects. Specifically, our results indicate heightened competition among hotels 
within destinations as a result of policy intervention. 
 The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section reviews 
the relative literature. Section 4.3 defines the conceptual framework guiding empirical 
exploration, and section 4.4 describes the context in which the analysis was carried out. 
Section 4.5 details the data and variables used. Section 4.6 presents the econometric 
framework, within which the direct average treatment effect on treated hotels (section 
4.7) in the single treatment was estimated. Section 4.8 extends the analysis to 
longitudinal histories of treatment, and section 4.9 further extends the framework to 
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allow violation of SUTVA. Section 4.10 adapts the standard framework when the 
outcome is hotel efficiency, measured within the non-parametric frontier framework. 
Section 4.11 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
The traditional argument for subsidising particular kinds of investment is the 
possibility of divergences between private and social returns due to externalities. This 
indicates the possibility of under-investment in the market. This argument is 
straightforward as regards investments in Research and Development (R&D), because 
firms making the investments do not appropriate all the gains originating from their 
innovative effort (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). DeLong and Summers (1991) argued 
that investments in equipment, as opposed to other kinds of fixed capital, may also 
generate externalities and that private returns from this kind of investment would be 
below social returns. Subsidies are also seen as viable instruments to reduce 
unemployment and, in general, to spur economic growth in depressed areas (Bernini 
and Pellegrini, 2011). 
Although public subsidies are widespread among several sectors of economic 
activity, empirical evidence of their effectiveness is mixed (Buigues and Sekkat, 2011). 
As regards investments in physical capital, productivity growth is one of the most direct 
outcomes observed. Bergstrom (2000) examined the effect of capital subsidies on the 
growth of total factor productivity of a sample of manufacturing firms in Sweden. He 
found a positive correlation between subsidisation and growth of value added in the first 
year after the subsidies were granted, but the provision of capital subsidies later 
appeared to be negatively correlated to total factor productivity growth. Harris and 
Trainor (2005) presented evidence that capital grants were more likely to have a 
positive impact on total factor productivity compared with other forms of grant aid in 
Northern Ireland. In Greece, Skuras et al. (2006) showed that capital subsidies improved 
total factor productivity through technical change, not through scale efficiency. Tzelepis 
and Skuras (2004) found that capital subsidisation affects firm growth but fails to 
improve other measures of performance, such as efficiency. Bernini and Pellegrini 
(2011) showed that, although subsidies spurred output, employment and fixed assets 
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growth of subsidised Italian manufacturing firms, the productivity growth of subsidised 
firms was less than that of non-subsidised ones.  
A common trait of previous research dealing with evaluation of industrial policy 
is its focus on manufacturing. In the field of services, tourism is one of the sectors most 
frequently targeted by subsidy programmes. Subsidies to tourism were mentioned by 62 
of the 97 members of the World Trade Association between 1995 and 2004 (WTO, 
2006). Although subsidies for the development of tourism-related infrastructure play a 
significant role in developing countries, in developed countries support to the tourist 
industry usually takes the form of marketing support or support to small firms (WTO, 
2006). Scholars have analysed the effects of subsidies to tourist firms, mainly either 
theoretically (Schubert and Brida, 2008) or by conducting qualitative analyses (Logar, 
2010). Quantitative analysis is lacking. 
To our knowledge, Bernini and Pellegrini (2013) are the only scholars who have 
carried out a rigorous quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of public subsidies to 
private firms in the tourist sector. Their analysis was carried out on a sample of Italian 
tourist corporations which had applied for financial support provided by Italian law 
488/1992. A Difference-in-Difference matching estimator was employed; subsidised 
and control firms were matched on propensity scores, i.e., the probability of receiving 
subsidies, given a set of observable firm characteristics. Among other measures of 
performance, the analysis concentrated on labour productivity and found a negative 
effect of capital subsidisation. It must be noted, however, that this analysis was 
restricted to tourism corporations with established balance sheets (available in AIDA, a 
commercial database on Italian limited liability firms, maintained by Bureau van Dijk). 
As the authors stressed, their results could not be extended to very small firms, which 
represent the bulk of the accommodation industry in many Italian destinations.  
On the estimation side, Rubin's Causal Model (1974) is now the standard 
framework for quantitative evaluation studies in the literature on both statistics and 
econometrics (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Rubin's causal inference model, based 
on the concepts of potential outcomes and assignment to a treatment mechanism, 
focuses on two fundamental assumptions: the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA) to control for confounding factors which drive both assignment to treatment and 
potential outcomes, and the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which 
rules out any influence of a unit’s treatment status on another individual’s potential 
outcomes (Rubin, 1986).  
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The need to account for interactions between units, i.e., relaxing the SUTVA 
assumption, is increasingly viewed as a serious problem in economics applications. 
Authors dealing with spillovers generally consider as their unit of analysis aggregated 
areas, such as census areas (Hanson and Rohlin, 2013) or local labour systems (De 
Castris and Pellegrini, 2012). Cerqua and Pellegrini (2013) made one of the first 
attempts to address the issue of SUTVA and spillover estimation when the firm is the 
unit of analysis. These authors discuss a taxonomy of strategies to estimate spillover, 
centered on assumptions regarding the scope of the spillover and the selection of proper 
control firms in non-eligible areas (i.e., areas not targeted by the policy), in which 
spillovers are not likely to be present.  
Instead, in a different emerging strand of literature, mostly in the fields of 
epidemiology and social science, the standard SUTVA is relaxed by incorporating 
agents’ interactions directly in the models. Papers in this literature have modelled unit 
outcomes as depending not only on individually received treatments, but also on 
treatments received by other units, in a two-stage randomisation approach in which 
interference occurs within pre-specified groups and interference between groups is ruled 
out (Hong and Raudenbush, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2007). Hudgens and Halloran (2008) 
developed general modelling under randomisation when interference is present. Starting 
from a two-stage randomisation setting, these authors provided a precise 
characterisation of causal effects with interference in randomised trials. Tchetgen-
Tchetgen and VanderWeele (2010) presented an inferential approach for observational 
studies, based on a generalisation of the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator 
when interference is present.  
In this chapter, we assess the effect of public capital subsidisation on the 
competitiveness of micro and small firms in the hotel sector in a place-based 
subsidisation programme. The ex ante homogeneity of units, obtained by focusing on a 
narrowly defined industry, and the local dimension of the context in which subsidisation 
was carried out, considerably improved the comparability of the units analysed. We 
exploited the advantages of our empirical setting by considering only hotels operating in 
the Trentino province (north-east Italy) and questioning the plausibility of SUTVA, in 
the emerging strand of research which attempts to relax this assumption in analyses 
(Hong and Raudenbush, 2006; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Tchetgen-Tchetgen and 
VanderWeele, 2010). 
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4.3 The effect of capital subsidisation on hotel performance: 
rationales and empirical implications 
 
In our context, public intervention is aimed at promoting the economic growth and 
competitiveness of the region (i.e., Trentino province). With respect to tourism, the 
intervention consists of co-financing capital investments to foster firms’ renewal and 
quality upgrading processes. The particular characteristics of the tourist sector may help 
to clarify how the effect on hotel performance can be best understood.  
Tourist firms cannot be considered separately from the destinations in which 
they operate. Destination characteristics define the external environment in which hotel 
businesses operate and, consequently, drive their competitiveness in world markets. The 
tourist product is thus highly characterised by the destination environment (natural, 
technological, social), which in turn affects the quality of tourist destinations (Murphy 
et al., 2000).  
However, while destinations are considered as the actors which compete in 
attracting tourists, the resources and competences used to produce the goods and 
services composing the final destination product (e.g., accommodation, transport, food, 
etc.) are related to other firms operating in each destination21. The fact that the final 
product is at the level of destination and resources and competences are at the level of 
individual firms makes it necessary for individual firms to participate in the co-
production of the destination product (Haugland et al., 2011). This product may thus be 
conceived as a collection of elementary services and goods demanded by tourists and 
supplied by various private firms, each producing part of the final product (Alvarez-
Albelo and Hernandez-Martin 2012; Andergassen et al., 2013; Candela et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, the success of a destination and that of individual firms are closely 
connected and rely on the coordinated resources, products and services of individual 
firms (Beritelli et al., 2007; Haugland et al., 2011).  
In an extension to the above argument, upgrading the overall quality of a 
destination and thus increasing its competitiveness in the market, also relies on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Here, the destination refers to a system of fragmented services delivered by many firms (mostly micro 
and small firms) as opposed to centrally managed destinations owned by one or a few subjects (Beritelli 
et al., 2007; Franch et al., 2010). The former include the traditional European tourist regions with a 
community character. Governance in these destinations is based on a process of public choice and the role 
of public authorities is substantial.!
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collective private investing effort of all firms operating within a specific destination. In 
fact, improved capital endowment is a good indicator of higher quality of services 
delivered (Israely, 2002), and the room features and availability of a hotel's amenities 
and facilities play an important role in tourists' purchasing decisions (Kashyap and 
Bojanic, 2000; Choi and Chu, 1999). Renewed physical capital may even enhance a 
hotel’s competitiveness by achieving lower costs and higher-quality output, i.e., higher 
productivity (Orfila-Sintes and Mattsson, 2009). However, coordination among firms 
does not always happen naturally, due to market failures resulting from significant 
externalities, and government intervention can be supported.  
The incentive for private firms to invest may be low because investment 
profitability also depends on the actions of other firms (Rodriguez-Clare, 2005). In 
particular, the quality of a certain hotel affects that of its neighbours (Calveras and 
Vera-Hernández, 2005). Market failure generated by quality improvement is likely to 
arise because the benefit to  a hotel generated by investing in quality is non-excludable. 
Let us imagine that, in a certain neighbourhood, one hotel improves its quality, for 
instance, by restructuring its building and adding new facilities to its accommodation, 
and pays for these improvements. This action by one hotel also improves the value of 
the neighbourhood: it may positively affect the quality of tourists’ experience, their 
length of stay and likelihood of return, and may eventually be beneficial for all 
providers of services and goods – including other hotels – in the neighbourhood, and for 
the overall image of the destination. Neighbours can add positive externalities to their 
production process and enjoy these benefits even though they do not pay for them. The 
presence of externalities creates a discrepancy between the private and public rate of 
return of investments, and individual hotels therefore tend to under-invest in projects 
aimed at upgrading their quality. Destination quality upgrades are then conceived as a 
public good (Calveras and Vera-Hernández, 2005), and government should incentivise 
hotels to upgrade their physical endowments. 
On one hand, to the extent that public intervention can rectify market failures, a 
positive effect on hotel performance is expected. Investment in physical capital plays an 
important role in augmenting the productivity and competitiveness of tourist firms 
(Blake at al., 2006). The reduced cost of capital then makes subsidised hotels more 
competitive by increasing the demand for their services. As agglomeration externalities 
in the hotel industry are likely to be mostly demand-side agglomeration (McCann and 
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Folta, 2009), being close to subsidised hotels will be beneficial also for non-subsidised 
ones, which can gain from enhanced demand.  
On the other hand, subsidisation can enable hotels to capture otherwise 
neglected opportunities. In this case, subsidisation increases competition among hotels: 
if destinations compete in attracting tourists (Buhalis, 2000; Murphy et al., 2000), once 
those tourists have selected a destination, hotels within it will compete to become the 
tourists’ first choice (Molina-Azorin et al., 2010; Zirulia, 2009). Therefore, if two hotels 
in the same destination are direct competitors but only one of them receives public aid, 
this will negatively affect the unsubsidised hotel’s future competitiveness. This 
argument even gains strength when applied to micro and small family-owned firms. 
Small firms often have limited resources which may restrict their ability of access to 
information, particularly as regards new technologies and opportunities in the market. In 
addition, small firms find it difficult to obtain capital or credit (Carreira and Silva, 
2010) and internal resources become the real way of financing their investments 
(Carpenter and Petersen 2002). 
In the end, the bias in the estimated effect potentially introduced by considering 
the outcome of hotels to be independent of the support given to other hotels may act in 
both ways: the overall effect of the policy will be under-estimated (i.e., indirect effects 
will be positive) if positive spillovers stem from subsidies in supported hotels, but it 
will be over-estimated (i.e., the indirect effect will be negative) if unsubsidised firms are 
damaged as they lose relative competitiveness with subsidised hotels.  
Mapping the expected effects of public subsidies with observed variables, which 
properly measure firm outcome, is not always straightforward. Competitiveness is 
ultimately related to the perceived quality of services and goods, and to how resources 
and competences are combined to produce them. At firm level, as far as subsidies to 
physical capital investment are concerned, productivity growth is one of the most direct 
outcomes studied (Bergstrom, 2000; Harris and Trainor, 2005; Skuras et al., 2006; 
Tzelepis and Skuras, 2004; Bernini and Pellegrini 2011). In tourism, the effective and 
efficient use of available resources is a major concern in establishing, raising and 
sustaining the competitiveness of tourist firms and destinations (Tsai et al., 2009), so 
that hotel productivity is the preferred measure of hotel competitiveness. 
A desirable complementary aim of a public policy should be that of achieving 
sustainable growth (Schwab, 2012). As argued by scholars in this field (Ritchie and 
Crouch, 2000), the competitiveness of tourist destinations is in fact illusory without 
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sustainability. Smoothing demand variability over time (i.e., reducing seasonality), 
especially when tourist demand increases, is one of the main challenges in achieving the 
policy objective of overall sustainability in this sector (see, for instance, the “Agenda 
for a sustainable and competitive European tourism”, Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007).  
As the hotel industry faces high fixed costs, which make the occupancy break-
even level quite high, demand fluctuation becomes very problematic for hotel 
management. Hotels can partly benefit from destination management policies aimed at 
promoting the destination by adding new services or attractions during off-peak seasons 
(Baum and Hagen, 1999). Despite this, hotels which invest in renewing their buildings 
still face challenges of increased capital intensity. Therefore, receiving subsidies is 
linked to reduced demand variability, to the extent that the investment increases the 
attractiveness of the hotel during off-peak months, allowing better use of installed 
capacity.  
 
4.4 The context of analysis 
 
The Trentino is an Alpine province in north-east Italy, with nearly 500,000 inhabitants. 
Thanks to the variety of attractions – Lake Garda and its surroundings, the Dolomites, 
and many historic towns and cities – about 2,300,000 tourists visited the region in 2006, 
spending more than 11,000,000 nights there. The contribution of the hotel and 
restaurant industry to the local value added ranged between 6.7% and 6.9% in the 
period 2004-2006.  
The Trentino spans more than 14 tourist districts with quite different 
environmental conditions: a number of districts enjoy a mild climate most of the year 
and a long peak season (Lake Garda); the districts in the best Alpine resorts are 
characterised by full winter and summer seasons, and have a two-peak tourist season; 
other districts only have a short summer peak season. Lastly, ancient towns enjoy a 
fairly constant arrival of tourists throughout the year. 
Differences among tourist districts are not only due to their endowment in 
natural resources, because they are community-type destinations (Beritelli et al., 2007; 
Franch et al., 2010), i.e., areas with a variety of autonomous tourist operators, in which 
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destination marketing is managed by several local agencies (Aziende di Promozione 
Turistica). In these areas, destination management – in which hotels are predominant - 
plays a fundamental role in coordinating tourist operators to achieve an overall image 
and  increase destination package tours. 
In 2006, 1600 hotels were registered, for a total number of more than 47,000 
rooms.  The hotels are unevenly distributed in the tourist districts. There are very many 
in Valle di Fassa (18.31% of the total in 2006), near Lake Garda (9.75%) and in the 
high mountain resorts. As regards class, measured as one to five stars, the majority of 
which (more than 60%) are three-star hotels. The Trentino hotel industry is 
characterised by the widespread presence of small family firms. In 2006, its hotels had  
an average of 30 rooms with 6.2 employees; only 15% were owned by limited liability 
companies. 
 A distinguishing feature of this institutional setting is that firms operating in the 
province of Trento can apply only for subsidies awarded by the local government. In 
this setting, Provincial Law 6/99 (hereafter, PL6) provides guidelines on the economic 
incentives to firms operating in the province. It comprises a large set of incentive 
schemes which are meant to foster fixed investments, research and development 
expenditure, firm restructuring, the adoption of production processes to safeguard the 
environment, and re-location of firms within the province.  
 All firms operating in the province of Trento can apply for PL6 grants by 
submitting a project to the local authority. Although there is no deadline for submission 
during the calendar year, since a first-in-first-out criterion is used to assign financial 
resources, some firms may be refused once the budget is exhausted.  There are two 
types of evaluation mechanism, basically determined by the magnitude of the 
investment: selective and automatic. Through the selective mechanism, once a hotel 
applies for a grant, its application is examined for its economic viability and financial 
sustainability. Only if the project receives a positive assessment can it be co-financed by 
the local government. Instead, automatic subsidies are granted only after examination of 
applications. 
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4.5 Data and description of variables 
 
4.5.1 Data 
 
We relied on several sources to construct the database. Administrative archives, held by 
the local government, are the primary source of information on hotels receiving grants. 
In particular, primary data on firms’ applications for public subsidies come from the 
APIAE (Agenzia provinciale per l’incentivazione attività economiche), the 
administrative body that manages the subsidisation programme on behalf of the local 
government. The APIAE archives (DBApiae database) allowed us to recover all the 
applications (2774) filed from 1999 to 2011 concerning tourism-related industries: 
accommodation (hotels, camp-sites, etc.), restaurants, travel agencies and other 
recreational activities. For each application it was possible to retrieve information on: 
name of the applicant (ragione sociale), tax code, address of the applicant (sede lagale), 
description of economic activity, date of submission and of assessment/approval of 
application, type of subsidization procedure (selective or automatic), final outcome of 
the application assessment (obtained, rejected, other outcomes). We consider subsidies 
granted through both selective and automatic procedure. 
Data collected through subsidy applications are not sufficient for conducting an 
impact evaluation, mainly because they do not comprise information on firm 
characteristics and their financial performance. In our context, only about 15% of hotels 
are limited liability firms. In fact, only limited liability firms are obliged to make 
publicly available their annual balance sheet, the main source of information at firm 
level. Therefore, in order to obtain information on hotels in the province we could not 
rely on publicly available databases. 
We overcome this limitations using the DBhotelTN database, an extensive 
repertoire built in partnership with the Statistical Office of the Trentino province and 
already used in previous analysis of the hotel sector in the Trentino province22. The 
database contains information on hotel characteristics (e.g., revenue and cost figures, 
legal form, structural characteristics, location, etc.) for a representative sample of the 
population of hotels operating in the province. Because of constraints on the time span 
over which hotel-level data are available in the DBhotelTN database, we focus our !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 For further details on the DBhotelTN database, see data description in Chapter 3. 
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$
!
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!
Applications (selective and automatic) from firms in 
tourism-related industries. 
 
Application'from'hotel'businesses'up'to'2006'
Application from hotel businesses up to 2006, actually led to the 
grant of a subsidy 
Subsidies'actually'granted'within'the'period'2002E2006.''(*multiple'subsidies'in'a'year'are'considered)'
Recoded subsidies granted within the period 2002-2006. 
 
Subsidised' hotels' after' merge' (E20%' subsidies;' E23%'hotels).'Data'on'subsidies'+'hotel'characteristics''
Balanced'panel'of'hotels'with'at'least'one'subsidy'receipt'during'the' period' 2002E2006.' (after' balancing:' E11%' sussidi;' E11%'alberghi)''
DBhotelTN$
DBApiae$
MERGE$
Balancing$
410$hotels$
no$subsid.$
+' Balanced' panel' of' non' subsidised' hotels' over' the' period'2002E2006.''
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MERGE$STU$
$131$hotels$not$merged$$
(163$subsidies)$
$
353$appications$
discarded$
$
231 applications discarded becouse 
of not related to hotel business; 122 
applications discarded becouse the 
applicat (ragione sociale) were 
associate to more then one hotel 
 
analyses on the period from 2002 to 2006. The final database (BDevalHTN) contains 
data for 426 subsidised and 410 non subsidised hotels over the period 2002-2006. 
 
  
 
Figure 4.1. Construction of the final database (BDevalHTN) 
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The construction of the database unfolded in several steps (see also Figure 4.1):  
1. We select all applications for subsidies submitted by firms in tourism-related 
industries in the Trentino province from 1999 to 2006. We identify 1518 
applications.  
2.  Data on these 1518 applications were merged with the hotels registered in the 
STU23. Records were merged with the tax code, and further checked against the 
name (the “ragione sociale”) and address of the hotel in question. This merging 
process allowed us to identify the applications related to a hotel business and 
made possible the subsequent merge with data contained in the DBhotelTN 
database. The merge was possible for 1165 applications (Table 4.1), while 353 
applications were discarded24.  
 
Table 4.1. Selected applications: type of assessment procedure and final outcome 
 
granted rejected revoked refused other n.a. TOT 
Automatic 745 75 13 0 2 13 848 
 72% 95% 68% 0% 33% 93% 73% 
 88% 9% 2% 0% 0% 2% 100% Selective 294 4 6 8 4 1 317 
 28% 5% 32% 100% 67% 7% 27% 
 93% 1% 2% 3% 1% 0% 100% TOT 1039 79 19 8 6 14 1165 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 89% 7% 2% 1% 1% 1% 100%  
 
3. We focus only on applications which actually led to the grant of a subsidy: 1039 
applications submitted by hotels up to the 2006.  
4. To evaluate the effect of a subsidy information before and after the treatment 
(the receipt of a subsidy) is needed. According to the LP6, investments linked to 
applications following the automatic procedure must be completed one year 
after the grant of the subsidy. Instead, investment associated with a selective 
procedure must be completed in the three years after the announcement of 
allowance of a grant. Unfortunately, our data did not contain exact information 
on the year of the beginning of the investment. Therefore, we made the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 The STU (Sistema Informativo del Turismo – Provincia autonoma di Trento) is the official register of 
hotel businesses in the Trentino Province managed by the Statistical Office of the local government. The 
register contains information for the entire population of hotel in the province. 
24 Among the discarded applications, we identify some applications (122) where the applicant (ragione 
sociale) was associate to more then one hotel, making not possible the one-to-one matching. We identify 
78 hotels  potentially subsidised, which were escuded. 
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following assumptions: for selective subsidies the year of subsidisation 
corresponds to the year in which the hotel receives a notification of allowance 
from the local government; for automatic subsidies the year of subsidisation is 
the one in which the application is filed. Following the above assignment rule, 
we identified 898 subsidies granted to hotel businesses in the period from 2002 
to 2006 (see Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2. Number of grants directed to hotel businesses during the period 2002-2006. 
Year Number of 
subsidies 
Hotel size 
Average Std. Dev. 
 micro small other 
2002 332 269 63 0 42368.89 102576.3 
2003 119 92 27 0 110181.6 228353.7 
2004 137 102 35 0 109191.4 190736.2 
2005 128 107 21 0 122794.5 211376.6 
2006 182 136 44 1 218077.2 354520.1 
Total 898 706 190 1 108698.6 228191.1 
  
 
5. It can be the case that a hotel received more then one subsidy in a year. We 
consider a firm as treated if it received at least one subsidy in a given year. 
Accordingly, we recoded subsidies per year, ending up with 856 subsidisations 
(608 hotels) over the period 2002-2006.  
6. After having identified the subsidised hotels, we merged the data with the 
DBhotelTN database. The merge (made on the STU internal code) was possible 
for 693 (about 80%) of subsidization events associated to 477 (78%) hotels. We 
selected only those hotels observed in each year within the period 2002-2006, 
hence a balanced panel structure (426 hotels; 618 subsidies). Although this 
choice can lead to the exclusion of some subsidised hotels, it allows to observe 
the temporal order of events and to control for time-invariant unobserved 
individual differences. 
At the end of the whole process of merging and balancing, we obtained a balanced 
panel of 426 hotels that received at least one subsidy during the period 2002-2006. 
Table 4.3 shows the distribution of subsidies grants to hotels observed in the period for 
each tourist destination in the region. There is a discontinuity on the number of subsidy, 
especially after 2002, probably due to the fact that in 2001-2002 there was the first large 
wave of applications after the necessary period for the policy to become definitely 
operative. 
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Table 4.3. Distribution of subsidies across touristic destination and year 
TD Tourism destination  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 TOT. 
1 Trento  9 3 1 2 6 21 2 Brenta-Paganella  16 13 14 7 12 62 3 Pinè-Cembra  6 0 3 0 4 13 4 Valle di Fiemme  16 6 6 7 8 43 5 Valle di Fassa  56 20 23 22 31 152 6 San Martino di Castrozza  11 5 4 5 9 34 7 Valsugana-Tesino  22 7 5 7 3 44 8 Folgaria  9 0 2 2 4 17 9 Rovereto  5 3 2 0 0 10 10 Garda  18 6 11 8 11 54 11 Comano-Brenta  6 2 1 5 2 16 12 Madonna di Campiglio  16 8 6 4 6 40 13 Valle di Sole  27 12 9 11 10 69 14 Valle di Non  5 1 5 5 1 17 o.d. Places outside tourism destinations  10 4 5 4 3 26 TOT.   232 90 97 89 110 618  
 
As final step, we add to the panel of subsidised hotels a panel of 410 hotels that 
did not received any subsidy (did not apply for subsidy) up to the 2006 contained in the 
DBhotelTN database. For all of these non-subsidised hotels we have the same type of 
information as for the subsidized ones. Therefore, we obtained a panel of 836 hotels 
(DBevalHTN database) for which we have data on the subsidisation status (subsidised 
vs non-subsidised), hotel characteristics, and outcomes of interest in each year within 
the period 2002-2006. 
After the merging process we checked for possible selection due to the 
discarding of those hotels which lacked data for our evaluation purposes. We compared 
our sample with the whole population of hotel in terms of average size and spatial 
distribution. The data (see Appendix 4A) show that our final sample is representative of 
the hotel industry in the region. 
 
4.5.2 Outcome variables 
 
We defined several outcome variables and, in particular, used the following single-
factor measures of productive performance: 
• Labour productivity, measured as the ratio of total deflated revenue to total 
employment (lab_prod). A second proxy of labour productivity was obtained as 
the ratio of value added to total employment (lab_prod_2). 
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• Occupancy rate (occ_rate), defined as the ratio of total guest nights spent in a 
year to the number of beds available, multiplied by the number of days the hotel 
was operative. The occupancy rate is an index of the hotel’s level of activity. 
This measure has the advantage of being widely used among hotels. It is also 
regarded as a performance indicator in the hotel industry (Orfila-Sintes and 
Mattsson, 2009; Sainaghi, 2010) and performance heterogeneity among hotels 
stems from the different ability of hotels to transform a given capacity into sold 
nights and services (Yu and Lee, 2009).  
• The revenue per available room (revpar), obtained as the ratio of the (deflated) 
yearly revenue to the number of rooms, multiplied by the number of days the 
hotel was operative; it is considered as a proxy of capital productivity and is 
widely used as measure of performance in the hotel industry. 
• A measure of variability of the level of activity over time (occ_var), defined as 
the coefficient of variation of the number of monthly arrivals over the year. An 
increase in this variable (i.e., increased demand variability) may be highly 
detrimental to productivity in services (Morikawa, 2012). 
 
We also used efficiency scores as an outcome variable, which has the further 
advantage of explicitly considering multiple inputs and outputs.   
We obtained an estimation of hotel efficiency (efficiency) by non-parametric CCR 
DEA. Input and output variables were defined according to the literature on hotel 
efficiency (Anderson, 1999; Brown and Dev, 2000; Barros, 2005a,b; Assaf et al., 2010; 
Barros et al., 2011). Three input variables were selected: labour, fixed capital, and 
intermediate input. Labour input was measured by aggregating the annual average of 
two categories of workers: family workers and paid employees, including part-time 
workers. The number of available rooms was used as a proxy for fixed capital. 
Intermediate inputs were measured as the total cost of raw materials and services. 
Different measures of output can be used. In manufacturing, where the output constant 
quality assumption is more reliable, physical measures are the preferred way of 
measuring output. Instead, in  services,  financial measures seem to be a more suitable 
way of incorporating quality variations caused by services heterogeneity and the effects 
on perceived quality by customer participation (Grönroos and Ojasalo, 2004). We used 
the deflated hotel revenue as output. However, prices may reflect idiosyncratic demand 
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shifts or market power variations rather than quality. In order to mitigate this problem, 
we also considered as a second output a physical output, i.e., the number of guest 
nights. 
 
4.5.3 Covariates 
 
We consider as covariates a set of factors which are likely to influence both the 
propensity of hotels to apply for public grants and hotel performance: 
• The legal form, which indicates the attitude of the firm towards risk and also the 
chance of entering public subsidisation programmes (Almus and Czarnitzki, 
2003). By using a limited liability legal form, for instance, owners can minimise 
their risk up to a certain amount and thus have higher incentives to pursue more 
risky projects. In addition, legal forms may signal the varying quality of firms. 
Hence, we used a categorical variable legal_form , which classifies hotels into 
sole proprietorship, partnership, and limited liability forms.  
• Both different levels of subsidies and different performance may depend on firm 
size. Firm size is also a useful predictor of financial constraints (Hadlock and 
Pierce, 2010), and the capacity of receiving external finance (e.g., bank loans) is 
correlated with firm size. In accordance with the literature on hotels (De Jorge 
and Suárez, 2013), we used hotel size (size) as a proxy for the number of 
available beds.  
• Hotel category indicates the level and complexity of services provided. Higher 
categories comprise more services, equipment complexities and organisational 
aspects. In our context, hotel category is informative about the “type” of 
hotelier. In fact there is a sharp polarization of the distribution of “active” and 
“passive” entrepreneurs across hotel categories: only 7% to 12% of active 
entrepreneurs belong to 1 and 2 star categories, while only 8% to 12 % of 
passive entrepreneurs belong to 3 and 4 stars categories (see PAT – Servizio 
Statistica, 2006). Category cross-comparison can thus explain an important part 
of the unobserved differences in entrepreneurial behaviour and hotel 
performance. We defined a variable (category) with two values: high for three- 
and four-star hotels, and low for one- and two-star ones.  
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• Hotels which are attractive to international tourists are expected to be more 
efficient (Assaf and Cvelbar, 2011). The international trade literature also 
supports this claim, arguing that firms which can sell their products to foreign 
customers are more productive than domestically oriented ones. Hotels 
operating in foreign markets are also able to generate new knowledge from 
international tourists and may be more interested in restructuring and improving 
their equipment and facilities than hotels mainly operating in the domestic 
market. A high percentage of international sales may also be considered as an 
indirect measure of quality of management and employment: hosting foreign 
customers requires higher skills and competences (e.g., knowledge of foreign 
languages). We defined a measure of internationalisation (int) for each hotel as 
the ratio of the number of nights spent by foreign guests to the total number of 
nights over the year. 
• Location defines the environment in which firms operate and thus influences 
firms' behaviour and performance. The link between location and firm efficiency 
is marked in services, and personal services in particular where, due to 
simultaneity of production and consumption, demand factors are important 
(Morikawa, 2011). Therefore, in our analysis we controlled for cross-sectional 
heterogeneity among destinations by introducing a set of dummy variables 
(dest). 
• We also account for fine-grained effects of unevenly distributed spatial demand 
densities. Here, it is reasonable to consider that proximity to physical and natural 
amenities makes hotels differently attractive to tourists. We used a measure of 
“proximity” (prox), so  that the impact of attraction points decreases with 
distance from the hotel, like the market-potential function (Harris, 1954). As 
attraction points we considered ski areas, touristic lakes and well-known beauty 
spots. Formally, our measure of market potential was defined as the decreasing 
function of the distance from the selected attraction points, as follows:  
 
  proxi = dij 
−1
j=1,...,n
∑                 Eq. 4.1 
 
where dij is the (Euclidean) distance between hotel i and attraction point j, j = 
1,…,n.  
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• Co-location may affect hotel performance as well as hotel managers' choice to 
apply for subsidies. Firms may benefit from positive externalities accruing from 
agglomeration economies. Several studies have addressed the role of 
agglomeration in the hotel industry (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Baum and 
Haveman, 1997; Ingram and Baum, 1997; Chung and Kalnins, 2001; Kalnins 
and Chung 2004). Co-location may provide opportunities for frequent 
interactions, exchanges of information among hotel managers and reduced 
monitoring costs (Gan and Hernandez, 2011). As a consequence, co-location 
may increase the chances that hotel behaviour, with respect to subsidy 
opportunities, may be influenced by other existing hotels which are planning to 
apply for subsidies. We controlled for the co-location effect by using an index 
(co_loc), which is a decreasing function of the distance of a hotel from all other 
hotels (as in the case of the prox variable): 
 
         Eq. 4.2 
 
where qij is the (Euclidean) distance between hotel i and hotel j,  j = 1,…,m.  
• Hotels may have different investing propensity as well as profitability. Firms 
with smaller capital intensity are expected to have smaller ‘operating leverage’, 
and therefore smaller volatility of earnings, given the same demand fluctuations 
(Lev, 1983; Baginski et al, 1999). We used as a proxy of capital intensity (cap), 
the ratio of amortisation of tangible capital to revenue (Baginski et al, 1999; 
Cheng, 2005; Asthana and Zhang, 2006). 
 
 
4.6 The Rubin’s causal inference framework: definition and standard 
assumptions 
 
The reference econometric method is the Rubin’s causal model (Rubin, 1974). Based on 
the concept of the counterfactual, two structures form the basis for this model: the 
theory of potential outcomes and the concept of a treatment assignment mechanism. 
co− loci = qij 
j=1,...,m
∑
−1
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Let indicates receipt of treatment: z = 1 if received and z = 0 if not. 
Accordingly, each unit i has two potential outcomes, Yi(1) under receipt of treatment, 
and Yi(0) under non-receipt. Given the two potential outcomes, the within-individual 
causal effect of treatment is obtained by contrasting the two outcomes: δi = Yi(1) – Yi(0).
 The difficulty with inferring a within-individual causal effect from observed data 
is that only one of the potential outcomes can be observed (the “fundamental problem of 
causal inference” (Holland, 1986)). In particular, for binary treatment, the observed data 
on individual i consists of (Z, Y), where is the observed treatment status and:  
 
Yi = Z · Yi(1) + (1 – Z) · Yi(0)        Eq. 4.3 
            
is the observed response. Two causal effects are of main interest: the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE) for the overall sample:  
  
ATE = E(Yi(1) – Yi(0)) = E(Yi(1)) – E(Yi(0))     Eq. 4.4 
 
and the Average Treatment effect for the Treated (ATT):  
  
ATT = E(Yi(1) – Yi(0) | zi = 1) = E(Yi(1) | zi = 1) – E(Yi(0) | zi = 1)    Eq. 4.5 
 
Since only one of the two potential outcomes can actually be observed, we can 
only obtain the expected treatment outcomes for treated,  
 
E(Yi | Zi = 1) = E(Yi(1) | Zi = 1)      Eq. 4.6 
 
and the expected control outcomes for the non-treated,  
 
E(Yi | Zi = 0) = E(Yi(0) | Zi = 0)       Eq. 4.7 
 
In general, the conditional expectations in Eqs. 4.6 and eq. 4.7 differ from 
unconditional averages, due to differential selection of units in the treatment and control 
conditions, leading to biased estimates from observed outcomes. 
z ∈ 0,1{ }
Z ∈ 0,1{ }
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One way of establishing an ignorable selection mechanism is to randomize units 
into treatment and control conditions. Randomisation ensures that potential outcomes 
are independent of treatment assignment Z. Because of this independence, the 
conditional expectation of the outcome of treated is equivalent to the unconditional 
expectation of the potential treatment outcome: 
 
E(Yi | Zi = 1) = E(Yi(1) | Zi = 1) = E(Yi(1))      Eq. 4.8 
 
for treated, and: 
 
E(Yi | Zi = 0) = E(Yi(0) | Zi = 0) = E(Yi(0))      Eq. 4.9 
 
for control. Therefore, the difference in observed group means is an unbiased estimator 
for both ATE and ATT in a randomized experiment.  
However, in practice, randomisation is often not possible. In ex post evaluations 
in particular, selection in treatment mechanism is not under the control of the analyst 
and selection bias problems arise. In our context, some hotels were more likely to apply 
for public subsidies than others, given certain ex ante characteristics. Thus, potential 
outcomes cannot be considered as independent of treatment status. In the standard 
Rubin’s model the identification and estimation of treatment eﬀect are possible under 
the following assumptions:  
 
Assumption 1: Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) 
a. Potential outcomes are fixed and one-dimensional, i.e., the potential 
outcomes of one unit should be unaffected by the particular assignment 
of treatments to the other units (no interference). 
b. Each treated unit receives the same type of treatment from the policy. 
 
Assumption 2: Conditional independence (CIA) (or selection on observables) 
Y Z( )Z | X , i.e. Z is independent of Y(Z), Z = 0,1 conditional on X = x;  
 
Assumption 3: Overlap 
c < Pr(Z = 1 | X = x) < 1 − c, for some c > 0.  
CHAPTER 4 – EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
121 
4.7 Average Treatment Effect on Treated in presence of single 
treatment 
 
Under the assumptions of the standard model (assumptions 1-3), we first estimated the 
direct average treatment effect on treated (ATT) in presence of single treatment, i.e. for 
those hotels which received only one subsidy. In this setting we avoid the distorting 
effect stemming from the receipt of multiple treatments over time; we used a 
Conditional Difference-in-Difference matching estimator. 
 
4.7.1 Multivariate matching estimator 
 
Several matching estimators have been proposed and can be distinguished according to 
the method used to match observation from the two groups of treated and controls 
(Stuart, 2010). We used the nearest neighbor matching estimator introduced by Abadie 
and Imbens (2002) and Imbens (2004). This estimator summarizes information from 
multiple variables in a single index according to the vector norm , where V 
is the positive definite variance matrix25 used to weight variables trough normalisation 
by standard deviation. The distance between two observations is defined as , 
where w and x are the vectors of observable characteristics for the two observations. 
The estimator of the ATT is given as: 
 
 δ ATT = 1
N
1
Y
i
1( )− Yˆi 0( )


i:Z=1
N
1
∑        Eq. 4.10 
 
where N1 is the number of observation in the treated group and the subscript i represent 
individual observations. While Yi(1) is the observed outcome variable for the i-th treated 
individual, but Yi(0) is not observed and is estimated. If M is the predetermined number 
of matches and JM(i) = {j : unit j belongs to the group of the M nearest neighbors to unit 
i} the index set of matches for each unit i = 1, …,N which indicates the M nearest 
matches for unit i. The imputed potential outcome is defined as follows: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 In this chapter V is defined as the diagonal matrix constructed of the inverse of the variances of each 
element of the covariate vector. 
xv = x
'
Vx( )
1 2
w -z
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Yˆ
i
0( ) =
1
# J
M
i( )
Y
m
0( )
m∈J
M
i( )
∑        Eq. 4.11 
 
The imputed potential outcome for the i-th treated individual, Yˆ
i
0( )  if Z=1, is 
then the average of the outcome variables for all matched observations in the control 
group.  
The matching estimator employed allows for matching over a multi-dimensional 
set of covariates. Abadie and Imbens (2002) show that when exact matching is not 
reached the estimator can be biased because of difference in covariates between 
matched units and their matched controls.  In order to address this problem, they 
develop a bias corrected matching estimator adjusting the difference within the matches 
for the difference in covariate values through a regression imputation strategy. With the 
bias correction, the matching estimator can be shown to be consistent (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2002).  
 
4.7.1.1 Extension to panel data: The Conditional Difference-in-Difference estimator 
 
 
We extended the cross-sectional matching estimator to a longitudinal setting and 
implemented a Conditional Difference-in-Differences matching estimator (CDiD). Once 
matched treated and control observations, we adopt a CDiD matching estimator as 
follows (Smith and Todd, 2005):  
 
δˆCDiD =
1
N
1
Y
t
1
i
1( )−Yt
0
i
0( ) − Wij Yt1 j 0( )−Yt0 j 0( ) 
j∈I
0
∩Sp
∑







i∈Ii∩Sp
∑   Eq. 4.12 
 
where N1 is the number of treated firms; Yt0i, Yt1i, are the values of the outcome variable 
on respectively before and after the treatment for firm i in the treated group (I1); Yt0j, Yt1j, 
are the values of the objective variable on respectively before and after the treatment for 
firm j in the control group (I0); Wij represents the weights and depends on the particular 
cross-sectional matching estimator employed. In our case the implemented CDiD is as 
follows: 
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δˆCDiD =
1
N
1
Y
t
1
i
1( )−Yt
0
i
0( ) −
1
# J
M
i( )
Y
t
1
m
0( )−Yt
0
m
0( ) 
m∈J
M
i( )
∑







i:Zi=1
∑  
 
The CDiD estimator allowed us to control also for temporally invariant 
differences in outcomes between treated and non-treated firms (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
The control group used in the CDiD is the sample of M non-subsidized hotels which are 
matched to the treated hotel i in the period (t0) before receiving the treatment. The 
differences in performance before (t0) and after the treatment (t1) of the two groups are 
then compared.  
 
4.7.2 Empirical setting 
 
The treatment consists of the receipt of a subsidy in a year. In this section, we 
focus on those hotels that received only one subsidy during the period 2002-2006, 
ruling out potential problems due to the overlapping of more than one subsidy received 
by hotels over time.  
An appropriate sample of controls is necessary. Given the definition of treatment 
used, a condition to be eligible as control is that of not having received any subsidy 
during the period under analysis. The non-subsidised hotels contained in the 
DBevalHTN database are then suitable to be used as controls. However, the general 
condition for identifying the causal effect in the Conditional DiD strategy employed is 
that treated and controls units should be similar except for the treatment status26. If 
hotels are not subsidised only because of their low propensity to invest, this might 
introduce a dangerous bias in the analysis. To reduce this concern, we made a 
preliminary screening of non-subsidised hotels and discarded those with negative 
changes of amortization cost on tangible assets over the entire period under analysis.27 
After the screening, we were left with 372 non-subsidised hotels. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 In the absence of the treatment, variations from pre to post treatment levels of the outcomes among 
treated and non-treated should be, on average, identical. Formally, this implies that pre-post variations of 
the outcomes are independent from the treatment, after conditioning for hotel characteristics X. 
27 Amortization of tangible capital is the accounting process of allocating the acquisition costs of tangible 
assets in a systematic manner to the periods expected to benefit from the use of the asset. For instance, let 
suppose that a firm invests in a period t, the acquisition cost of the new asset is then split into k shares 
(usually equal shares) that are recorded in each annual balance sheet over the period from time t to time 
t+k, where k is the useful life of the asset. Therefore, a positive variation in the amount of annual 
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Under the assumption that hotels in the treatment and control sample show as 
similar as possible willingness to invest, the selection problem should be addressed. For 
instance, for larger, more profitable and capital intensive, less risk-averse hotels the 
outcome can be different from those non-subsidised even in the absence of the 
incentive. Additionally, location and managerial ability may influence hotel outcome 
and the probability of being subsidised. The procedure we employ is thus intended to 
reduce this bias. Specifically, we control for factors which are likely to influence both 
the propensity of hotels to apply for public grants and hotel performance: the legal form, 
which indicates the attitude of the firm towards risk; the hotel size which is a useful 
predictor of financial constraints and the capacity of receiving external finance; the 
degree of internationalisation as indirect measure of quality of management and 
employment; an index of capital intensity to account for different past investing 
decision as well as profitability; and the hotel category which indicates the level and 
complexity of services provided and explains an important part of unobserved 
differences in entrepreneurial behaviour and hotel performance. Moreover, we control 
for location factors, namely the destination, the proximity to attraction points as well as 
to other competitors, which define the environment in which firms operate and thus 
influences firms' behaviour to apply for subsidies and performance. 
We identify the pre-treatment period as the year before the granting of the 
subsidy. Differences in outcome between the treated and controls are evaluated in two 
post-treatment periods: one and two years after the receipt of the subsidy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. CDiD matching approach. Hotels are matched at time t0 (before treatment) and 
variations in the outcome of treated hotels are compared with that of comparable controls 
(the counterfactual) at time t1 after treatment. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
amortization costs recorded at time t with respect to time t-1 would imply that an investment has been 
done at time t. 
ΔY!!
t0% t% t1%
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We pooled the data across years, i.e. we consider the group of treated firms 
regardless of the calendar year in which they receive the subsidy. However, an 
important feature of the chosen matching estimator is that it allows an exact match with 
respect to a set of covariates. Thus, we stratified control and treated hotels along the 
relative dimensions. In particular, we imposed exact matching on the category, 
destination, and also on year. Therefore, treated hotels were matched with control hotels 
which operate in the same destination, in the same category and with reference to the 
same year. For the other variables, the bias due to possible not exact match is corrected 
using the procedure suggested in Abadie and Imbens (2002).28 
Table 4.4 compares the variables of interest for treated and control hotels. 
 
 
Table 4.4. Characteristics and outcomes for treated and control hotels (1 year before treatment) 
 
Variable 
 Treated    Non-treated   
diff p-value 
N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev.  
Outcomes           
occ_rate 154 0.329 0.129  1488 0.296 0.134  0.032 0.003 
occ_var 154 0.932 0.351  1488 0.942 0.359  -0.009 0.742 
revpar 154 23.018 12.638  1488 20.740 14.245  2.277 0.037 
lab_prod 154 41078.2 13703.7  1488 41019.0 21699.5  59.192 0.962 
lab_prod_2 154 18138.2 12357.1  1488 18479.5 12786.9  -341.26 0.745 
           
Cov. (continuous)           
ext 154 0.249 0.246  1488 0.273 0.260  -0.024 0.242 
cap 154 0.174 0.105  1488 0.142 0.124  0.031 0.000 
size 154 62.76 37.17  1488 56.56 37.31  6.201 0.030 
co-loc 154 542.05 3880.8  1488 1745.6 11631.8  -1203.6 0.005 
prox 154 0.0126 0.0078  1488 0.0127 0.0078  -0.0014 0.800 
           
Cov. (discrete*)           
cat 154 0.721   1488 0.623   0.097 0.017 
legal_form1 154 0.143   1488 0.250   -0.107 0.003 
legal_form2 154 0.753   1488 0.641   0.111 0.006 
legal_form3 154 0.104   1488 0.108   -0.004 0.870 
    NOTE: data are pooled across years; * only mean value are reported. 
 
4.7.3 Results 
 
Table 4.5 lists the estimates of the average treatment effect on treated (ATT) 
obtained with the conditional difference-in-difference estimator  (CDiD). The results 
indicate that receiving subsidies had a positive and statistically significant effect on all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 The analysis was implemented via the nnmatch module in Stata (Abadie et al., 2004).  
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outcomes considered, and that the influence of subsidies increased over time. The 
occupancy rate (occ_rate) of subsidised hotels increased by about 2% after one year and 
by about 3.5% after two years. The effect on the revenue per available rooms (revpar) 
was also positive and increases over time. The variability in demand over time 
(occ_var) fell for subsidised firms after one year and the fall was even more evident 
after two years. Labour productivity (lab_prod), measured as gross output to 
employees, was also positively affected by subsidies: the effect is of more then four 
thousand euro after one year and more than five thousand after two years. When 
measured as value added to employees, differences in labour productivity growth 
(lab_prod_2) between treated and control hotels followed similar trend. 
 
Table 4.5. Estimates of the Average Treatment Effect on Treated 
 
 Outcomes after one year  Outcomes after two years 
 δCDiD Std. Err. z-stat p-value  δCDiD Std. Err. z-stat p-value 
occ_rate 0.019 0.008 2.59 0.010  0.036 0.012 2.99 0.003 
occ_var -0.092 0.027 -3.38 0.001  -0.108 0.037 -2.89 0.004 
revpar 2.624 0.641 4.09 0.000  4.223 1.022 4.13 0.000 
lab_prod 4033.3 1696.3 2.38 0.017  5393.9 2062.8 2.61 0.009 
lab_prod_2 3563.1 1161.2 3.07 0.002  3770.7 1491.2 2.53 0.011 
            NOTE: Estimate are given as the difference in levels between Treated and Control hotels; Exact match  
            on hotel category, destination and year; percent of exact matches: 100;  
 
 
 The CDiD estimator controls for time-constant unobserved factors. In view of 
the short time-period analysed, we reasonably assumed that unobserved factors which 
are potentially time-varying are also temporally invariant; therefore, in this case, CDiD 
successfully controls for all unobserved potential sources of bias. 
 It is possible to derive testable implications of the assumed identifying 
restriction29. In particular, by conditioning on the observable hotel characteristics the 
changes in the outcomes referring to before treatment periods should be the same 
among treated and non-treated hotels. If not rejected, this fact provides evidence in 
favor of the internal validity of the estimated causal parameter. Table 4.6 shows the 
results of the over-identification test. We consider variations in the outcomes between 
two and one year before the treatment. The results of the test show not statistically 
significant difference for subsidized and non-subsidized hotels. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The CDiD identifying restriction is not directly testable since it involves counterfactuals.  
CHAPTER 4 – EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
127 
 
Table 4.6. Over-identification test. 
 
outcome δCDiD Std. Err. z-stat p-value 
occ_rate -0.001 0.007 -0.14 0.890 
occ_var 0.026 0.018 1.44 0.151 
revpar -0.312 0.469 -0.66 0.506 
lab_prod 701.4 1161.7 0.60 0.436 
lab_prod_2 -1345.4 1035.2 -1.30 0.194 
   NOTE: Estimate  are given as the  difference  in levels  
         between  Treated   and  Control  hotels;   Exact match  
   on  hotel  category,  destination  and year;   percent of  
   exact matches: 99. 
         !!
4.8 Average Treatment Effect in longitudinal multiple treatments: 
Extending the CIA 
 
In this section we extended the standard framework to a dynamic treatment setting, i.e. 
treatment is no longer a single treatment, but is the longitudinal history of treatments up 
to a certain time t. To this aim, we first defined the potential outcomes in terms of a 
linear model and introduced the Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) 
estimator. Finally, we extended the model to handle longitudinal multiple treatments. 
 
4.8.1 Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting estimator (IPTW) !
It possible to define the potential outcomes in terms of a linear model (Hogan and 
Lancaster, 2004): 
 
E[Y(z)] = α* + δ*z            M. 4.1 
 
where δ* is the average treatment effect (i.e., z changes from 0 to 1). The empirical 
counterpart of model M.4.1 can be specified as a regression model, so that: 
 
E(Y | Z) = α + δZ            M. 4.2 
 
Because of nonrandom selection to receipt of treatment, regression parameter δ 
generally not equal to the causal parameter δ*: estimation of δ under the empirical 
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model M. 4.2 will yield inconsistent estimates of causal parameter δ*.  In order to 
improve estimation in presence of selection, the Inverse Probability of Treatment 
Weighting (IPTW) estimator can be used. As for matching techniques the IPTW 
estimator relies on the CIA assumption. The idea of IPTW is that units which are 
underrepresented in the treated or control group are up-weighted and units which are 
over-represented in one of the groups are down-weighted.  
When the estimate of interest is the average treatment effect, the inverse 
probability of treatment weight for the treated units is given by wi =1 pˆi , and for the 
control units is wi =1 1− pˆi( ) , where pˆi = Pr Zi =1| Xi( )  is the estimated propensity 
score for hotel i. For both group together we may write the weights as a function of 
treatment status and the propensity score: 
 
w
i
=
Z
i
pˆ
i
+
1− Z
i( )
1− pˆ
i( )         
Eq. 4.13 
 
The average treatment effect can be estimated by estimating model M.4.2 by 
weighted least square with weights wi. If all the relevant confounders are observed and 
included in X, weighting by wi  effectively creates a pseudo population in which X no 
longer predicts selection into subsidizing and the causal association between subsidy 
and outcome is the same as in the original population30.  
In the next section we extended model M. 4.2 to longitudinal multiple 
treatments. 
 
4.8.2 IPTW estimation in presence of longitudinal multiple treatments 
 
Let us again consider treatment (i.e. the receipt of subsidies) as binary variable. The set 
of potential treatments for unit i is now defined in terms of treatment histories 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 The model described in this section is a Marginal Structural Model (MSM). MSM is a regression model 
for the relationship between the outcome and the treatment assignments: the confounders are not included 
in the model, but by weighting each observation with the inverse of the probability of the observed 
treatments, the distorting effect of confounders is neutralized. Two models must be specified: an outcome 
model and a model for estimating the weights. However, as suggested in Hogan and Lancaster (2004), 
variables (X) used as confounders in the treatment model and variables used as control in the outcome 
model may overlap. 
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where represents the treatment histories of hotel i up to time t 
and Ht is the set of all possible t-sequences of 0s and 1s. Clearly, there are 2T possible 
counterfactuals, only one of which is observed for each hotel. The average treatment 
effect of subsidy history  on outcome y of hotel i is thus defined as 
, the average difference between outcomes when i follows the 
treatment history  and outcomes when never receiving subsidies.  
Let us assume that, at each point in time t = 1,…, T,  for each hotel i we observe 
(Y, Z, X) where Y, Z and X represent the outcome, treatment status and a vector of hotel 
characteristics, respectively. In order to reduce the complexity of the problem, we can 
model the mean of the outcome variable as conditional on control covariates X and 
treatment history  as (Hogan and Lancaster, 2004): 
 
E Y z
it( ) | Zit,Xit = β0 +β1
'
X
it
+δg Z
it( )         M. 4.3 
 
where g(·) is a known function of treatment history.  
 To estimate the causal effect consistently, we use an extension of the IPTW 
estimator. Its reliability depends on the validity of the Sequential Conditional 
Independence Assumption (SCIA), which provides a formal way of extending the 
assumption of selection on observables to the case of dynamic treatment (Robins et al., 
2000; Hogan and Lancaster, 2004): 
 
Assumption 4: Sequential Conditional Independence (SCIA) 
 
 Y zit( )Zit | Zit−1,Xit−1
TVC
,X
it        
 
where X
it
 is the history of hotel-level variables and X
it
TVC  the history of time-varying 
confounder that is defined in the IPTW literature (see Azoulay et al., 2009) as a time-
varying variable that (i) is correlated with future values of the dependent variable in 
question, (ii) predicts selection into treatment, and (iii) is itself predicted by past 
treatment history. Under SCIA the average treatment effect δ is identified and can be 
recovered by estimating: 
 
z
it
= z
i0
, z
i1
,..., z
it{ } zit ∈ Ηt
z
it
E y z
it( ) −E y 0( ) 
z
it
Z
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y
it
= β
0
+β
1
'
X
it
+δg Z
it( )+εit            M. 4.4 
 
by weighted least squares, where the weights correspond to the inverse probability of 
following  the actual treatment history of subsidies up to time t for hotel i. (Hogan and 
Lancaster, 2004; Azoulay et al., 2009) 
The weights (wit) for the IPTW estimation procedure for each firm i at time t are 
computed as follows: 
 
 
w
it
=
1
Pr Z
iτ | Ziτ−1,Xiτ−1
TVC
,X
iτ( )τ=0
t
∏                 Eq. 4.14 
 
 Each element in the denominator of Eq. 4.14 represents the probability that the 
hotel i received it own observed treatment (either subsidized or not subsidized) at time t, 
conditional on past treatment history and its past history of confounder variables. 
Therefore, the denominator of wit represents the conditional probability that an hotel 
followed its own treatment history up to time t.  
 The probabilities in the denominator of Eq. 4.14 may vary significantly when 
time-varying confounders are strongly associated with the receipt of a subsidy, and the 
resulting IPTW estimator will have a very large variance. Thus we replace the weights 
with a “stabilised weights” (swi,t) computed, as follows:  
 
sw
it
=
Pr Z
iτ | Ziτ−1,Xiτ( )
Pr Z
iτ | Ziτ−1,Xiτ−1
TVC
,X
iτ( )τ=0
t
∏
      
Eq. 4.15 
 
 The use of stabilized weights increases IPTW efficiency without influencing its 
consistency (Hernan et al, 2000). 
Let T1 denote the set of years in which the hotel received at least one subsidy and 
T2 the set of years during which the hotel i receives no subsidies. The denominator of 
swit is then estimated as: 
 
               Eq. 4.16 
 
pˆit
den
t∈T
1
∏ 1− pˆitden( )
t∈T
2
∏
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where  is the probability of being subsidised at time t, conditional on past treatment 
history and its past history of confounder variables. This probability are obtained by 
estimating a pooled cross-sectional logistic regression on the whole dataset as follows: 
 
pˆit
den
= Pr Zit =1( ) = γ0 +γ1Zit−1 +γ2Zit−2 +γ3Xit−1
TVC
+γ
4
Xit +ζ t     M. 4.5 
 
The numerator of swit is defined in a similar way, except that the time-varying 
confounders are omitted from the list of covariates in model M. 4.5. 
Lastly, in order to estimate model M. 4.4, the form of function g(·) must be 
chosen. In this chapter we use two parameterisations  (Ko et al., 2003): 
 
Parameterisation 1:      Eq. 4.17 
Parameterisation 2:                   Eq. 4.18 
 
The estimated causal parameter δ under parameterisation 1 quantifies the direct 
causal benefit of receiving additional subsidies, regardless of the timing with which 
subsidies are assigned. For instance, if only one subsidy was received over period t-2 to 
t, the relative benefit is equivalent, regardless of when it was received. Under 
parameterisation 2, the timing of subsidisation affects outcomes. In addition, cumulative 
subsidisation is not assumed to have a linear effect on the current value of the outcome 
variable analysed. Under both parameterisations, subsidies received before time t-2 
have no causal effect on outcomes. 
 
4.8.3 Empirical setting 
In this section we used the whole set of subsidised hotels contained in the DBevalHTN 
database (426 hotels). The hotels can receive one or more subsidy during the observed 
period (2002-2006). We consider also 372 non-subsidised hotels.31 Figure 4.3 plots the 
distribution of number of subsidies for the hotels in our sample. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 As in section 4.7, we do not consider non-subsidised hotels that show very low propensity to invest, i.e. 
we discarded those non-subsidised hotels with negative changes of amortization cost on tangible assets 
over the entire period under analysis. 
pˆit
den
δg Z
it( ) = δ Zit + Zit−1 + Zit−2( )
δg Z
it( ) = δ1Zit +δ2Zit−1 +δ3Zit−2
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Figure 4.3 Subsidies for hotel in the DBevalHTN database 
  
The figure shows that most of the treated hotels received one subsidy throughout 
the observed period. However, the number of hotels which obtained two or three was 
not negligible. In a few cases, more than three subsidies were even granted.  
In this section, the treatment is no longer the receipt of a single treatment in a 
year, but is a history of treatment, i.e. a sequence of 0s and 1s of the treatment status 
over the years. Accordingly the counterfactual is a differing sequence of 0s and 1s of 
the treatment status. 
We consider as time-varying confounders the pre-treatment value of hotel size 
(size), capital intensity index (cap_int), legal form (legal_form), hotel category (cat) and 
degree of internationalization (int). As control variables in the outcome model we 
considered the co-location index (co_loc), proximity index (prox), contemporaneous 
category, legal form, size, internationalization, and capital intensity, as well as the 
whole set of destination dummies (see section 4.5.3 for details on these variables). The 
analysis is carried out on the outcome variables defined in section 4.5.2, i.e., the varying 
level of capacity utilisation (occ_var), average occupation rate (occ_ratio), revenue per 
available room (revpar), and the two proxies of labour productivity (lab_prod and 
lab_prod_2). Results are obtained under the two parameterisations of functions g(·) for 
each outcome variable. 
 
4.8.4 Results 
 
This section reports the results of estimating models M.4.4. Table 4.7 lists estimated 
coefficients when parameterisation 1 of function g(·) is employed. In this case, the 
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diﬀerence in the average outcome depends only on cumulative subsidisation over period 
t-2 to t, and the timing of subsidisation relative to the current outcome level does not 
play a role: all treatment histories with the same cumulative subsidisation are 
considered exchangeable, regardless of when the subsidy was received. Accordingly, 
interpretation of causal parameter δ is the average diﬀerence in the outcome between 
the two versions of treatment history, which diﬀer by one unit in cumulate 
subsidisation. The results show that δ is positive and statistically significant for the 
various outcomes considered. The only exception is for labour productivity, where the 
coefficient is positive but not statistically significant.  
 
Table 4.7. Weighted least square estimates. Model M. 4.4, parameterisation 1. 
 
Variables Treatment history parameterisation  occ_var occ_ratio revpar lab_prod lab_prod_2 
             
g(Z) δ(Zt+Zt-1+Zt-2)       
  (δ) -0.064*** 0.040*** 5.285*** 1,059.010 623.762 
   (0.019) (0.007) (0.858) (1,063.483) (562.196) Controls        
        
co-loc   0.002 0.002** -0.090 -134.924 -30.707 
   (0.003) (0.001) (0.145) (179.448) (94.863) 
prox   0.093** 0.013 2.154 5,646.340** 4,763.340*** 
   (0.045) (0.017) (2.005) (2,483.858) (1,313.057) 
Legal_form_2   -0.091*** 0.036*** 5.375*** 4,745.117*** 2,109.943** 
   (0.031) (0.012) (1.373) (1,700.916) (899.166) 
Legal_form_3   -0.054 0.062*** 16.364*** 8,323.566*** 2,297.585* 
   (0.046) (0.017) (2.050) (2,540.479) (1,342.989) 
cat   -0.135*** 0.065*** 5.948*** 6,121.176*** 3,011.739*** 
   (0.031) (0.012) (1.379) (1,708.251) (903.043) 
size   -0.014 0.021** -2.157* 4,233.195*** 4,032.608*** 
   (0.027) (0.010) (1.190) (1,474.064) (779.243) 
ext   -0.095 0.078*** -7.109** 2,963.113 3,175.908* 
   (0.062) (0.024) (2.789) (3,456.003) (1,826.968) 
cap_int   0.354*** -0.194*** -28.432*** -6,231.002 4,246.950 
   (0.117) (0.044) (5.235) (6,486.397) (3,428.945) 
   
 
 
 
 
 Observations   798 798 798 798 798 
R-squared   0.175 0.346 0.247 0.172 0.263 
R_adj   0.151 0.327 0.225 0.148 0.241 
F   7.152 17.80 11.05 7.014 12.00 
       NOTE: Dummy destination are included. 
 
Table 4.8 lists the results when model M. 4.4 is estimated under 
parameterisation 2 of function g(·). Parameterisation 2 is designed to account both for 
total subsidisation (within the three-year period) and its timing. Now, δ1 is the eﬀect of 
subsidisation during current year t, and δ2 and δ3 are the (additive) eﬀects of subsidies 
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received during periods t-1 and t-2, respectively. The estimated parameters show a non-
linear effect over time. Specifically, the results show the decreasing positive effect of 
subsidies on the outcome. That is, the positive bearing on the outcome variable of a 
subsidy received at time t-2 is generally higher than that related to a subsidy received at 
time t-1 or at the same time at which the outcome level was observed. This suggest that 
the direct effect of subsidy receipt does stimulate a process of learning plausibly linked 
to the higher effort exerted by hoteliers to manage the renewed hotel. Alternative cause 
can be, however, the amount of time necessary for the investment to generate results 
(e.g. spread of information, branding). 
 
Table 4.8 Weighted least square estimates. Model M. 4.4, parameterisation 2. 
 
       NOTE: Dummy destination are included. 
 
Variables Treatment history parameterisation  occ_var occ_ratio revpar lab_prod lab_prod_2 
        
g(Z) δ1Zt+δ2Zt-1+δ3Zt-2       
  (δ1) 0.016 0.031** 5.282*** 290.222 511.757 
   (0.033) (0.012) (1.465) (1,815.075) (959.926)   (δ2) -0.122*** 0.034** 4.644*** 2,517.655 946.646 
   (0.035) (0.013) (1.584) (1,961.564) (1,037.398) 
  (δ3) -0.094*** 0.054*** 5.859*** 540.804 449.868 
   (0.034) (0.013) (1.511) (1,871.344) (989.685) 
Controls        
        
co-loc   0.002 0.002** -0.092 -132.519 -30.122 
   (0.003) (0.001) (0.145) (179.614) (94.991) 
prox   0.081* 0.014 2.141 5,777.363** 4,784.870*** 
   (0.045) (0.017) (2.014) (2,494.490) (1,319.243) 
Legal_form_2   -0.089*** 0.036*** 5.382*** 4,709.859*** 2,103.648** 
   (0.031) (0.012) (1.375) (1,702.930) (900.616) 
Legal_form_3   -0.055 0.062*** 16.361*** 8,333.997*** 2,299.545* 
   (0.046) (0.017) (2.053) (2,542.484) (1,344.626) 
cat   -0.135*** 0.065*** 5.969*** 6,099.083*** 3,004.882*** 
   (0.031) (0.012) (1.381) (1,710.433) (904.585) 
size   -0.016 0.021** -2.170* 4,270.774*** 4,040.240*** 
   (0.027) (0.010) (1.191) (1,475.835) (780.514) 
ext   -0.086 0.078*** -7.040** 2,772.683 3,136.253* 
   (0.062) (0.024) (2.798) (3,465.322) (1,832.680) 
cap   0.358*** -0.191*** -28.270*** -6,491.918 4,181.205 
   (0.117) (0.044) (5.249) (6,501.826) (3,438.575) 
        
Observations   798 798 798 798 798 
R-squared   0.185 0.348 0.247 0.173 0.263 
R_adj   0.159 0.327 0.223 0.147 0.239 
F   7.027 16.46 10.15 6.475 11.02 
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4.9 Average treatment effect in longitudinal multiple treatments in 
presence of neighbour interference: Extending the CIA and 
relaxing the SUTVA 
 
Interactions among hotels may be a major concern, since a subsidy affecting the 
outcome of one hotel may affect that of others. Hotels operating in the same 
geographical area (i.e., destination) are in fact likely to interact each other, violating the 
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA; Rubin, 1986). In the following, we 
focus on the violation of SUTVA due to interference (Hong and Raudenbush, 2006; 
Verbitsky-Savitz and Raudenbush, 2012), and define a framework aimed at: (a) relaxing 
the SUTVA assumption, allowing for interference between neighbour treatment 
assignment and the focal hotel outcome; (b) capable to account for different multiple 
treatment histories over time. 
 
4.9.1 The extended framework for causal inference in presence of neighbour 
interference 
 
4.9.1.1 Notation and definitions 
 
Let zt denote the vector of treatment assignment to hotels in a given period t: 
 
zt = (z1t, z2t,…, zNt) = (zit, z-it),        Eq. 4.19 
  
where z-it is the vector of treatment assignment when that of hotel i, zit, is removed. In 
this setting, hotel i has 2N potential outcomes, Yit(zt), corresponding to all possible 
treatment assignment combinations of N hotels. A contrast between any two of the 
possible 2N outcomes is a causal effect. Clearly, the case in which SUTVA is satisfied is 
special, and:  
 
Yit(zt) = Yit(zit, z-it) = Yit(zit).                      Eq. 4.20 
   
The effect of zt on the hotel’s potential outcome may be viewed as operating 
through zit and a many-to-one function v(zt) (Hong and Raudenbush, 2006). The N-
dimensional space is thus reduced to a 2-dimensional space. Hence: 
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Yit (zt) = Yit (zit, z-it) = Yit [zit, v(z-it)].                   Eq. 4.21 
 
Two causal effects can be defined (Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2010): a direct causal 
effect: 
 
DEit = Yit [zit = 1,  v(z-it)] – Yit [zit = 0, v(z-it)]     Eq. 4.22 
 
as the causal effect of the treatment on  a hotel given the treatment status of other hotels; 
an indirect causal effect or “spillover effect”:   
            
IEit = Yit [zit ,  v(z-it)] – Yit [zit , v(z-it')]      Eq. 4.23 
 
as the causal effect on one hotel of the treatment received by other hotels in the 
destination. 
The setting can be extended in order to account for the fact that hotels are 
located in different intra-regional tourist destinations (TDs). Accordingly, we introduce 
an assignment vector, S = (s1,…, si,…, sN) where si can take values j: j = 1,…, J,  where 
J is the number of tourist destinations. The potential outcome becomes Yit [zit, v(z-it), st]. 
In the end, the causal estimand of interest is given by: 
 
E{Yit[zit, v(z-it), st] – Yit[zit', v(z-it'), st']}.                    Eq. 4.24 
 
4.9.1.2 Assumptions   
 
 
In order to identify and estimate the average effect of treatment assignment zt and 
v(zt) we assume32: 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Assumptions 1-4 stated in previus sections are still valid. 
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Assumption 5: 
 Let be st = st' = s*, where s* the observed assignment of hotels in the 
 destinations.  Therefore, given the current localization of hotels in the 
 destinations, the estimand becomes: 
 
E{[Yit (zit, v(z-it),  s*) – Yit[(zit', v(z-it'), s*)] | S = s* }.    Eq. 4.25 
  
 This assumption means that no hotel changed its location as a result of 
 receiving on not receiving subsidies33. 
 
 
Assumption 6: Neighbor-level SUTVA 
The potential outcome of a hotel i belonging to TD j is dependent only on its 
treatment status and that of other hotels within TD j. In other word, treatment 
assignment of hotels in other destinations does not affect the potential outcome 
of the hotel in question. From the non-interference between destinations we 
have: Yit [zit, v(z-it),  s*]  = Yijt[(zijt, v(z-ijt)].              
We also assume that each hotel’s subsidy has the same effect on the potential 
outcome of hotel i. Hence, we define v(z) as a function of the share of treated 
hotels in a destination. Formally, v(z) is as follows:  
 
 
 
v z−it( ) = v =
1         if  n
−1
z−it
T
z−it( ) ≥Me
0        otherwise



     
Eq. 4.26 
 
 
where Me is the median of the distribution of the intensity of treatment across 
destinations.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 The policy allows the re-location of firms. However, this possibility is empirically irrelevant in the case 
of hotels. 
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Figure 4.4 Graphical sequence of implications of SUTVA. Black circles:  hotels receiving 
subsidies; white circles: hotels not receiving subsidies. When SUTVA is satisfied (panels 
(a) and (b)), no influence among units is assumed; outcomes of unit i do not vary if 
treatment status of other hotels varies (e.g., from (a) to (b)); Panels (c) and (d): how 
SUTVA is relaxed in our framework: hotels in a given destination (TD) are assumed to be 
connected and outcomes depend on treatment status of all other hotels in same destination. 
Outcomes of hotel i change when treatment status of other hotels changes, although its own 
treatment status is not changed. 
 
 
Assumption 7: Strongly ignorable treatment assignment 
 Let Xt be a hotel-level vector of covariates and Wt a destination-level vector of 
 covariates. Causal inference is possible if treatment assignments are strongly 
 ignorable within the levels of covariates:  
 
E[Yit(zit, vit) | Zit = zit, Vit = vit, Xit = xit, Wit = wit] =  
= E[Yit (zit, vit) | Xit = xit, Wit = wit].                   Eq. 4.27 
 
Under the above assumptions, we have a framework with a cluster-level randomised 
block design, followed by a hotel-level randomized block design within each cluster 
(i.e. destination). The probability that a TD is assigned to V = 1 (highly subsidised TD) 
given W, is:  
 
Pr(V = 1 | W = w)         Eq. 4.28 
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Given a TD assignment to high or low subsidized TD, hotels are assigned at 
random to Z = 1 (subsidy granted). Therefore, the probability for a hotel of receiving a 
certain treatment is given by: 
 
Pr(Z = z, V = v | X = x, W = w)                    Eq. 4.29 
           
Using the law of probability, Eq. 4.29 can be decomposed into the product of two 
conditional probabilities as follows: 
 
Pr(Z = z, V = v | X = x, W = w) = 
         = Pr(V = v | W = w) · Pr(Z = z | V = v, X = x, W = w)  Eq. 4.30 
   
 
 
4.9.2 IPTW estimation in a 2-level longitudinal setting and neighbours 
interference 
 
We aimed to estimate the average treatment effect of subsidies on hotel performance, 
given the effect of TD exposure to subsidies over time. We, therefore, also had take into 
account the treatment history at TD level. Although the econometric considerations 
developed considering longitudinal history of treatment at the hotel level remained 
applicable to the case of two dichotomous treatments (both at the destination and at the 
hotel level), the estimation of the final weights was different. Suarez et al. (2008) 
proposes an extension of the static IPTW estimation to multiple treatment settings, i.e. 
when subjects in a given time receipt more than one type of treatment. We extended the 
framework in a two-level longitudinal multiple treatment setting in which at each time t 
a hotel receives two treatment: one at destination level and the other at hotel level. 
Specifically, we use the probability of receiving a 2-dimensional treatment defined in 
equation Eq. 4.30 to implement the extended IPTW estimator to the dynamic 2-
dimensional treatment setting. Accordingly, we defined stabilized weights as follows: 
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sw
it
2−level
=
Pr Z
iτ ,Viτ | Ziτ−1,Viτ−1,Xiτ ,Wiτ( )
Pr Z
iτ ,Viτ | Ziτ−1,Viτ−1,Xiτ−1
TVC
,W
iτ−1
TVC
,X
iτ ,Wiτ( )τ=0
t
∏
            =
Pr V
iτ |Viτ−1,Wiτ( ) ⋅Pr Ziτ | Ziτ−1,Viτ−1,Xiτ ,Wiτ( )
Pr V
iτ |Viτ−1,Wiτ−1
TVC
,W
iτ( ) ⋅Pr Ziτ | Ziτ−1,Viτ−1,Xiτ−1TVC,Wiτ−1TVC,Xiτ ,Wiτ( )τ=0
t
∏
      Eq. 4.31 
 
where X
it
and X
it
TVC are hotel-level covariates and time-varying confounder histories up 
to time t, respectively. Similarly, W
it
and W
it
TVC are TD-level covariates and time-
varying confounder histories up to time t. respectively.  
  
 Each element in the denominator of Eq. 4.31 is the conditional probability that 
the hotel i received the 2-dimansional treatment, which is composed by its own 
observed treatment (either subsidised or not-subsidised) and the treatment received by 
the destination (either high or low intensity of subsidisation) at time t. Moreover, each 
element is decomposed as the product of two probabilities. The first, 
pˆV
jt
D
= Pr V
iτ |Viτ−1,Wiτ−1
TVC
,W
iτ( ) , is the probability that the destination where the hotel i is 
located received its own observed treatment (either high or low intensity of 
subsidisation) at time t conditional on its past treatment history and past history of 
destination level confounders; the second, pˆZ
it
D
= Pr Z
iτ | Ziτ−1,Viτ−1,Xiτ−1
TVC
,W
iτ−1
TVC
,X
iτ ,Wiτ( ) , is 
the probability that the hotel i received its own observed treatment (either subsidised or 
non-subsidised) at time t conditional on its own past treatment history and its past 
history of confounder variables, and the past treatment history and past history of 
destination confounders. 
The aim was to estimate for each hotel the probability of being treated according 
to one of the four possible treatment statuses in each period: (Zt = 1, Vt = 1), (Zt = 1, Vt = 
0), (Zt = 0, Vt = 1), and (Zt = 0, Vt = 0). Table 4.9 lists the individual contemporaneous 
numerator and denominator components for calculating stabilised weights. 
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Table 4.9. Numerator and denominator for calculating stabilised weights. 
Treatment status Numerator Denominator 
(Zt = 1, Vt = 1)   
(Zt = 1, Vt = 0)   
(Zt = 0, Vt = 1)   
(Zt = 0, Vt = 0)   
 
 
Let T1 be the set of periods in which the hotel received a subsidy in a destination 
with high intensity of treatment, T2 the set of periods in which the hotel received a 
subsidy in a destination with low intensity of treatment, T3 the set of periods in which it 
did not receive any subsidy in a destination with high intensity of treatment, and T4 the 
set of periods in which it did not receive any subsidy in a destination with low intensity 
of treatment. The calculation denominator and denominator for obtaining stabilised 
weights is reached by multiplying the quantities of interest at time t by their lagged 
values. Formally, for the denominator we have: 
 
      pZit
D ⋅ pV
jt
D
t∈T1
∏ pZitD ⋅ 1− pVjtD( )
t∈T2
∏ 1− pZitD( ) ⋅ pVjtD
t∈T3
∏ 1− pZitD( ) ⋅ 1− pVjtD( )
t∈T4
∏        Eq. 4.32 
 
The probabilities in the above equation were estimated through a logit models as follow: 
 
pˆVjt
D
= Pr Vjt =1( ) = γ0 +γ1Vjt−1 +γ2Vjt−2 +γ3Wjt−1
TVC
+γ
4
Wjt +ζ t       M. 4.6 
pˆZit
D
= Pr Zit =1( ) = γ0 + γqZit−q
q=1
2
∑ ϕ pVjt−1
p=1
2
∑ +ω1Xit−1TVC +ω2Xit +ω3Wjt−1TVC +ω4Wjt +ζ t     M. 4.7 
  
 The numerator of sw
it
2−level  is defined in a similar way, except that one omits the 
time-varying confounders from the list of covariates 
After having obtained the weights, a weighted regression was performed as 
follows: 
 
yit = β0 +β1
'
Xit +β2
'
Wit +δg Zit( )+λh Vit( )+εit                             M. 4.8 
pˆZ
it
N
⋅ pˆV
jt
N pˆZ
it
D
⋅ pˆV
jt
D
pˆZ
it
N
⋅ 1− pˆV
jt
N( ) pˆZitD ⋅ 1− pˆVjtD( )
1− pˆZ
it
N( ) ⋅ pˆVjtN 1− pˆZitD( ) ⋅ pˆVjtD
1− pˆZ
it
N( ) ⋅ 1− pˆVjtN( ) 1− pˆZit
D( ) ⋅ 1− pˆVjtD( )
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In the empirical estimation we also extended the two parameterisation used in 
the previous section to function h(·). Specifically, under parameterisation 1 we have: 
 
                    Eq. 4.33 
                    Eq. 4.34 
 
and under parameterisation 2: 
 
                   Eq. 4.35 
                    Eq.  4.36 
 
4.9.3 Results 
 
This section reports the results of estimating model M. 4.8. As in section 4.8, we 
considered time-variant confounders to be the pre-treatment value of the hotel size 
(size), capital intensity index (cap_int), legal form (legal_form), hotel category (cat) and 
degree of internationalization (int). As control variables in the outcome model we 
considered the co-location index (co_loc), proximity index (prox), contemporaneous 
category, legal form, size, internationalization, and capital intensity. Variables at level 2 
(i.e. at destination level) may be cluster level variables or cluster aggregates of 
individual level variables (Hong and Raudenbush, 2006). Here, we used the aggregate 
value of hotel-level variables at the destination level. In particular, as time varying-
confounders we used the aggregated nights spent, the aggregated revenue, the 
aggregated employment, and the average touristic rate of the destination. As control 
variables we used the total amount of beds, the average proximity of hotels to attraction 
points and the average distance among hotels in the destinations. The analysis was 
carried out on the several outcome variables defined in section 4.5.2, i.e., the varying 
level of capacity utilisation (occ_var), average occupation rate (occ_ratio), revenue per 
available room (revpar), and the two proxies of labour productivity (lab_prod and 
lab_prod_2). Results were obtained under the two parameterisations of functions g(·) 
and h(·) for each outcome variable considered.   
δg Z
it( ) = δ Zit + Zit−1 + Zit−2( )
λh V
it( ) = λ Vit +Vit−1 +Vit−2( )
λh V
it( ) = λ1Vit +λ2Vit−1 +λ3Vit−2
δg Z
it( ) = δ1Zit +δ2Zit−1 +δ3Zit−2
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Although the interpretation of δ is the average direct effect of the receipt of a 
subsidy on hotel outcome – as discussed in section 4.8 in which neighbours’ 
interference was not considered – λs represent the indirect average effect on hotel 
outcome linked to belonging to a touristic destination with high instead of low intensity 
of subsidization. Therefore, it the value of λs differs from zero, violation of SUTVA is 
indicated. In particular, positive values of λ would be consistent with the hypothesis of 
positive externality, meaning that the hotels enjoy the positive externalities stemming 
from being located in a destination, the quality and attractiveness of which is increased 
by the public subsidisation policy. In this case, hotels enjoy the benefits due to the 
overall increased quality of the destination even without improving their own quality. 
Instead, negative values of λ are consistent with the hypothesis that subsidization 
activates competition among hotels and negative externalities are generated.  
Table 4.10 lists the results when parameterisation 1 of both functions g(·) and 
h(·) is applied. As discussed previously, in this case, it is not the timing but only the 
cumulative subsidisation which is assumed to play a role. The direct effect of subsidies 
is still positive and significant. Likewise, there is evidence of SUTVA violation 
consistent with the competition hypothesis, according to which subsidisation has 
indirect negative effects on non-subsidised hotels 
Estimated coefficients when parameterization 2 is assumed are listed in table 
4.11. Now λ1 represents the contemporaneous effect on the hotel outcome of belonging 
to a destination where a high proportion of hotels receive subsidies, λ2 represents the 
additive indirect effect of the hotel being in a context with high intensity of 
subsidization during the year prior to outcome evaluation, and λ3 has the same meaning, 
but when two time lags are considered.  
The results indicate that the contemporaneous (i.e. at time t) indirect effect of 
being in a destination where many instead of few hotels in are subsidized is positive and 
statistically significant when  occ_var and occ_ratio are considered as outcomes, and is 
but not statistically significant for the other outcomes. This evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the policy activates a process of quality improvement which 
generates positive externalities. However, the additional effect attributable to past 
exposure at time t-1 to high density of subsidization is in general lower than the 
contemporaneous one. This effect become in general negative, and for occ_var, 
occ_ratio, and revpar also statistically significant, at time t-2. Moreover, the magnitude 
of λ3 generally more than counterbalances the positive direct effect (δ3) on hotel 
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outcomes, leading to a negative net effect of subsidization at time t-2. Instead, for 
revpar, the net effect is positive. Overall, This evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis of heightened competition. 
In summary, it seems that the policy had a positive direct impact on hotel 
outcomes. The only exception is for labour productivity, in which the sign of the causal 
parameter is positive but not statistically significant. Less clear is the effect due to 
potential externalities generated by the different intensity of subsidization of hotel’s 
neighbours in the destination. However, the trend of the indirect effect over time, which 
is negative at time t-2, is consistent with a process in which the policy first generates 
positive externalities, but after that increases competition among hotels over time.  
 
Table 4.10. Weighted least square estimates. Model M. 4.8, parameterisation 1 
 
Variables Treatment history parameterisation  occ_var occ_ratio revpar lab_prod lab_prod_2 
        
g(Z) δ(Zt+Zt-1+Zt-2)       
  (δ) -0.081*** 0.039*** 5.205*** 1,098.480 608.719 
   (0.019) (0.007) (0.811) (1,135.456) (575.548) h(V) λ(Vt+Vt-1+Vt-2)       
  (λ) 0.034* -0.019** -1.718** -729.757 -174.052 
   (0.020) (0.008) (0.871) (1,220.335) (618.572) 
Controls        
        
co-loc   0.004 0.001 -0.202 -297.484 -59.890 
   (0.003) (0.001) (0.134) (187.479) (95.031) 
prox   0.071 0.036* 3.622* 3,982.847 3,947.330*** 
   (0.049) (0.019) (2.050) (2,870.403) (1,454.970) 
Legal_form_2   -0.130*** 0.042*** 5.926*** 5,645.511*** 1,926.547** 
   (0.029) (0.011) (1.200) (1,680.105) (851.623) 
Legal_form_3   -0.040 0.074*** 15.408*** 9,795.078*** 3,070.663** 
   (0.044) (0.017) (1.844) (2,582.132) (1,308.849) 
cat   -0.149*** 0.059*** 5.094*** 7,073.073*** 3,366.029*** 
   (0.031) (0.012) (1.282) (1,794.543) (909.631) 
size   -0.016 0.027*** -1.978* 3,356.654** 3,670.209*** 
   (0.026) (0.010) (1.081) (1,513.446) (767.146) 
ext   -0.054 0.055** -6.298*** -1,092.897 146.158 
   (0.058) (0.022) (2.397) (3,356.775) (1,701.505) 
cap   0.264** -0.160*** -19.103*** 9,548.197 12,783.280*** 
   (0.117) (0.045) (4.880) (6,833.681) (3,463.903) 
tot_beds   -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.857** 0.976*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.391) (0.198) 
ave_attr   -0.106 -0.129** 1.622 6,495.994 5,713.596 
   (0.133) (0.050) (5.526) (7,738.465) (3,922.527) 
ave_alb   -0.017 0.024*** 1.170 -1,576.950 -909.040 
   (0.022) (0.009) (0.935) (1,309.071) (663.551) 
ave_tur   0.220*** -0.007 -6.564** 2,789.114 -1,237.334 
   (0.067) (0.025) (2.789) (3,905.761) (1,979.779) 
        Observations   798 798 798 798 798 
R-squared   0.147 0.336 0.249 0.142 0.234 
R_adj   0.132 0.324 0.236 0.127 0.221 
F   9.639 28.30 18.58 9.287 17.11 
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Table 4.11. Weighted least square estimates. Model M. 4.8, parameterization 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Treatment history parameterization  occ_var occ_ratio revpar lab_prod lab_prod_2 
        
g(Z) δ1Zt+δ2Zt-1+δ3Zt-2            
  (δ1) -0.019 0.039*** 5.279*** 338.961 503.717 
 
 
 (0.035) (0.013) (1.463) (2,055.437) (1,040.697) 
 (δ2) -0.119*** 0.036*** 5.019*** 1,752.395 874.968 
   (0.033) (0.013) (1.391) (1,954.737) (989.711) 
  (δ3) -0.105*** 0.043*** 5.424*** 1,217.246 454.374 
   (0.034) (0.013) (1.409) (1,978.697) (1,001.843) 
        
h(V) λ1Vt+ λ2Vt-1+λ3Vt-2       
  (λ 1) -0.087** 0.045*** 1.761 1,395.224 490.217 
   (0.041) (0.016) (1.725) (2,423.160) (1,226.881) 
  (λ 2) 0.033 0.007 -2.684 -2,681.575 -1,942.913* 
   (0.039) (0.015) (1.641) (2,305.189) (1,167.150) 
  (λ 3) 0.125*** -0.065*** -4.383*** -2,504.492 -825.611 
   (0.033) (0.013) (1.389) (1,951.464) (988.054) 
Controls        
        
co-loc   0.004 0.001 -0.216 -315.163* -72.454 
   (0.003) (0.001) (0.134) (187.943) (95.158) 
prox   0.068 0.035* 3.501* 3,957.926 3,893.919*** 
   (0.049) (0.019) (2.049) (2,877.748) (1,457.045) 
Legal_form_2   -0.110*** 0.032*** 5.408*** 5,353.317*** 1,869.987** 
   (0.029) (0.011) (1.223) (1,717.399) (869.544) 
Legal_form_3   -0.031 0.065*** 15.207*** 9,916.745*** 3,270.803** 
   (0.044) (0.017) (1.861) (2,613.887) (1,323.448) 
cat   -0.147*** 0.055*** 5.057*** 7,126.378*** 3,435.639*** 
   (0.031) (0.012) (1.288) (1,809.163) (916.005) 
size   -0.014 0.028*** -1.985* 3,320.082** 3,648.710*** 
   (0.026) (0.010) (1.078) (1,515.024) (767.078) 
ext   -0.111* 0.079*** -4.319* 477.906 972.710 
   (0.060) (0.023) (2.494) (3,503.377) (1,773.810) 
cap   0.269** -0.159*** -18.962*** 9,513.090 12,781.818*** 
   (0.116) (0.044) (4.876) (6,850.025) (3,468.265) 
tot_beds   -0.000** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.675* 0.856*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.406) (0.206) 
ave_attr   -0.080 -0.067 -1.940 380.025 473.900 
   (0.162) (0.061) (6.767) (9,506.790) (4,813.423) 
ave_alb   0.002 0.005 0.928 -1,294.442 -459.882 
   (0.026) (0.010) (1.088) (1,528.437) (773.870) 
ave_tur   0.164** 0.029 -5.088* 3,391.988 -1,272.604 
   (0.070) (0.026) (2.911) (4,089.850) (2,070.749) 
        
Observations   798 798 798 798 798 
R-squared   0.164 0.355 0.257 0.146 0.239 
R_adj   0.145 0.340 0.240 0.126 0.222 
F   8.510 23.83 14.99 7.391 13.60 
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4.10 Average Treatment Effect on efficiency scores 
 
In this section we examine efficiency scores as outcome variable, obtaining them by 
means of non-parametric DEA models. Previous research provides us with two possible 
approaches when DEA scores are considered as outcome variable and the independent 
external variable of interest (in our case, treatment variable Z) is dichotomous.  
On one hand, we can frame the estimation strategy within the frontier separation 
approach based on the seminal paper by Charnes et al. (1981). In this approach, units 
are divided into two groups (in our case, between treated and non-treated) and different 
frontiers are estimated for both groups. A bootstrap-based procedure can be used to 
perform a test on the difference of the average efficiency scores of the two groups 
(Daraio and Simar, 2007). On the other hand, the two-stage model can be employed, 
which first estimates efficiency considering only inputs and outputs on the whole set of 
observations, and then introduces the dichotomous treatment variable as a covariate in a 
second-stage regression analysis, in which the efficiency score is the dependent variable 
(Simar and Wilson, 2007; Banker and Natarajan, 2008; McDonald, 2009). The two-
stage approach also has the advantage of considering controls, reducing potential bias 
due to omitted variables. However, in their original formulations, all the above methods 
are not designed to deal with selection bias, which is a critical issue in evaluation 
studies. Selection bias arises because observed units have different probabilities of 
belonging to treated or non-treated groups, due to their different characteristics.     
We designed an estimation strategy composed of three steps. In order to reduce 
problems due to selection bias, a pre-processing step before the outcome analysis was 
performed (Ho et al., 2007a,b). Therefore, under assumption 1-3 (see section 4.6), we 
estimated the probability of receiving a subsidy and then employed a matching strategy 
on the estimated propensity scores, to create a sub-group of treated and control hotels 
with the same (or as similar as possible) distribution of observed pre-treatment 
variables. In the second step, in order to explore the effect of subsidies on efficiency 
measures obtained in the DEA non-parametric framework, we used the two-stage 
approach (algorithm #2) of Simar and Wilson (2007). Specifically, we first obtained an 
unbiased measure of efficiency with the CCR-DEA model and then performed a 
bootstrapped regression, introducing the dichotomous treatment variable as covariate 
CHAPTER 4 – EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
147 
and correcting for a set of factors that were likely to be related to efficiency. The 
procedure is described in details in section 4.10.1. 
 
4.10.1 Estimation procedure 
 
The details of the estimation procedure employed are as follows: 
 
[1] Preprocessing: matching on the propensity score 
 
[1.1] Perform a logistic regression to obtain an estimate of the probability of   
treatment using the set of selected pre-treatment covariates; 
[1.2] Use nearest neighborhood matching on the propensity scores to construct a sub-
sample of hotels; 
 
 
[2] Regress efficiency (Algorithm #2 in Simar and Wilson (2007)) 
 
[2.1] Compute using the output-oriented DEA model on 
the matched subsample; 
[2.2] Obtain an estimate of  as well as an estimate of in the truncated 
regression  using the m < n observations where ; 
[2.3] Loop  over  the  next  three  steps  ([2.2.1] - [2.2.3])  L1  times  to  obtain  n sets 
of bootstrap estimates as follows:   
[2.3.1] For each i = 1,...,n draw εj from the  distribution  with left-   
truncation at ; 
[2.3.2] Compute: ; 
[2.3.3] Set ; 
[2.3.4] Compute  where is obtained by replacing 
Y, X with ; 
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[2.4] For each i=1,…,n the bias-corrected estimator using the 
bootstrap estimates in Di obtained in step [2.3] and the original estimates ; 
[2.5] Use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated regression 
 and obtain ; 
[2.6] Loop over the steps ([2.6.1]-[2.6.3]) L2 times to obtain a set of bootstrap 
estimates : 
[2.6.1] For each i = 1,…,n draw  from the  distribution with left-
truncation at ; 
[2.6.2] Compute ; 
[2.6.3] Use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated 
regression  and obtain ; 
[2.7] Use bootstrap value in A and the estimates after the bias correction to 
construct estimated intervals for each element of the vector of coefficients and 
for  
 
 
4.10.2 Results 
 
In order to estimate the effect of subsidies on efficiency, measured as DEA scores, we 
refer to the most restrictive case, considering the same empirical setting as in section 
4.7.2. 
The first step in the evaluation procedure was specification of the propensity 
score model. We adopted a logit specification of the treatment dummy variable, which 
was 1 if the focal hotel received a subsidy and zero otherwise. In the specification of the 
logit model, we considered the set of control variables presented in section 4.5.3 in their 
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pre-treatment status, i.e., one year before receipt of subsidies. The final specification of 
the logit model for propensity scores and parameter estimates is shown in Table 4.12 
 
Table 4.12 Logit estimate 
Variables Est. Coeff. Std Err. z-value Pr(>|z|) 
Constant -9.996*** 3.031 -3.226 0.001 
capL1  1.531** 0.612 2.501 0.012 
extL1 -0.816 0.529 -1.501 0.123 
prox  0.015 0.343 0.043 0.965 
Co-loc -0.033 0.026 -1.261 0.251 
sizeL1 -3.894* 2.075 -1.876 0.060 
size_sqL1  8.668** 4.098 2.115 0.034 
catL1  0.169 0.257 0.658 0.511 
Legal_form_2 L1  0.476* 0.263 1.803 0.071 
Legal_form_3 L1  0.298 0.418 0.715 0.474 
Destination Yes 
Year Yes 
               NOTE:   * , **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10% 
, 5%, and 1% 
 
 
It is important to analyse the overlap between subsamples of treated and control 
firms. We look at the distributions of the propensity scores for treated and control firms 
before and after matching (Figure 4.5). Their distributions have a support which 
overlaps, allowing us to conduct our evaluation exercises. The matching procedure 
helps us to mitigate the estimation bias further and, after matching, the two distributions 
do show a greater degree of overlap 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of propensity scores for treated and control subsample 
 
The second step consists of estimating the causal effect of receiving of a subsidy 
on efficiency. The estimates of the average treatment effect, considering efficiency 
estimated one year after treatment, are listed in Table 4.13. Receiving a subsidy had a 
direct positive direct effect on the efficiency of hotels.  
 
Table 4.13 Estimated coefficients and confidence intervals. Outcome after 1 year 
 
 
  Bounds of bootstrap estimated Confidence Intervals 
  Est. Coeff.a (90%) (95%) (99%) 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
         
Z -0.126** -0.221 -0.041 -0.235 -0.021 -0.264 0.011 
        
Controls        
Cap  0.052 -0.353 0.480 -0.425 0.552 -0.534 0.733 
Ext -0.428** -0.733 -0.123 -0.780 -0.030 -0.835 0.094 
Prox -0.463*** -0.731 -0.227 -0.774 -0.177 -0.871 -0.057 
co-loc -0.002 -0.017 0.012 -0.019 0.015 -0.025 0.025 
Size -0.058 -0.179 0.068 -0.206 0.103 -0.275 0.158 
cat -0.263*** -0.393 -0.137 -0.425 -0.107 -0.490 -0.070 
Legal_form_2  0.029 -0.105 0.153 -0.122 0.176 -0.172 0.222 
Legal_form_3 -0.425** -0.705 -0.163 -0.748 -0.118 -0.813 0.095 
Destination Yes 
Year Yes 
   0.341 0.331 0.399 0.324 0.407 0.313 0.419          NOTE:   * , **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively; Efficiency scores expressed according to Farrell (1957), i.e., parameters  
with negative sign indicate sources of efficiency. 
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Table 4.14 lists the causal effect on efficiency estimated two years after receipt 
of a subsidy. Its positive effect even increases in the second year after the receipt.  
 
 
Table 4.14 Estimated coefficients and confidence intervals. Outcome after 2 years 
 
 
  Bounds of bootstrap estimated Confidence Intervals 
  Est. Coeff.a (90%) (95%) (99%) 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
         
Z -0.412*** -0.619 -0.242 -0.650 -0.211 -0.741 -0.145 
        
Controls        
cap  0.664* 0.042 1.445 -0.093 1.609 -0.434 1.841 
ext -1.002*** -1.672 -0.419 -1.789 -0.307 -1.973 -0.016 
prox -0.818** -1.357 -0.284 -1.444 -0.190 -1.618 0.040 
co-loc  0.016 -0.010 0.044 -0.015 0.051 -0.025 0.071 
size -0.088 -0.304 0.130 -0.351 0.175 -0.456 0.278 
cat -0.421*** -0.659 -0.200 -0.706 -0.157 -0.804 -0.088 
Legal_form_2  0.107 -0.144 0.344 -0.188 0.406 -0.324 0.502 
Legal_form_3 -0.856* -1.476 -0.197 -1.533 0.010 -1.711 0.492 
Destination Yes 
Year Yes 
   0.480 0.466 0.601 0.450 0.613 0.407 0.635          NOTE:   * , **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively; Efficiency scores expressed according to Farrell (1957), i.e., parameters 
with negative sign indicate sources of efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
4.11 Concluding remarks 
 
 
Whether or not industrial public policies have an effect on private firm 
performance and eventually on aggregate economic growth is still an open question. 
The main purpose of this chapter was to contribute to the debate on policy evaluation by 
assessing the effect of capital subsidies on firms' performance, especially micro and 
small firms in the hotel industry. 
Evaluation with non-experimental data usually relies on two critical assumptions: 
the similarity of treated and control units (except for their treatment status; the 
Conditional Independence Assumption), and no interference between unit outcomes, 
i.e., an individual’s outcome should not depend on other individuals’ treatment status 
εσˆ
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(the SUTVA assumption). We first estimated the effect of subsidies on hotels treated 
with these assumptions (i.e., CIA and SUTVA), considering as treated hotels those 
which received only one subsidy over the period of analysis. We estimated the positive 
effect of subsidisation on all selected outcomes. With these assumptions, we also found 
the positive influence of public intervention on productive efficiency, which accounts 
for multiple inputs and outputs. We then extended analysis to account for the effect of 
multiple treatments over time. Extending the conditional independence assumption to a 
dynamic treatment setting, we estimated the positive effect of the sequence of treatment 
on hotels’ final outcomes. The effect was positive but not statistically significant, only 
for labour productivity.  
However, the most important consequence of the SUTVA assumption was that, if 
the policy generates externalities, their effect on hotel performance cannot be measured 
and the estimation is therefore biased. We tackled this issue by defining a new 
estimation framework which allowed for interference between hotels in the dynamic 
treatment setting. We found that SUTVA may be violated, since a hotel’s potential 
outcomes depend on whether many or few hotels in its own destination are subsidised. 
In particular, when the proportion of subsidised firms is high, the effect on the potential 
outcomes of the focal hotel is negative, consistent with increased competition within 
destinations. This negative dependence strengthens over time.  
Our empirical results clearly indicate the need to focus research on interactions 
and spillovers in industrial public policies directed to private firms. 
Some final remarks are necessary. The use of a dichotomous variable to measure 
the indirect effect of the policy has some limitations. For instance, it can lead to 
considering as equivalent a TD with treated firms only and a TD with a treated/non-
treated ratio slightly above the median. In future works, the framework could be 
improved by considering continuous variable. Also, it remains open the issue of how to 
separate the effect due to spatial proximity of the hotels from the spillover effect 
associated with the subsidies. What should be done is then to clearly identify the net 
spatial effect of subsides considering spillover effect that cannot be attributed to policy 
intervention (see e.g. De Castris and Pellegrini, 2012). Lastly, the analysis showed that 
the effect of time seems to be important: the longer is the period after which the effect is 
evaluated, the higher is the effect observed. In this regard widening the time-span of the 
analysis would be beneficial. 
CHAPTER 4 – EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
153 
4.12 Appendix !
4.12.1 4A: Sample representativeness checks 
After the merging and balancing process we checked for possible selection due to the 
discarding of those hotels which lacked data for our evaluation purposes. Table 4A.1 
reports data on the variations of the spatial distribution of hotels in our final sample and 
for the population of hotels in the Trentino province. Data shows that the whole sample 
as well as the two subsamples of subsidised and non-subsidised hotels contained in the 
final database (DBevalHTN database) reproduce sufficiently well the spatial 
distribution observed in the population. 
 
Table  4A.1. Distribution of hotels across destination (year, 2006) 
TD Population  DBevalHTN database  
Whole sample Subsidised* No-subsidised** 
 
N. 
hotels 
 
(1) a N. hotels (2)
a (1)-(2) N. hotels (3)
 a (3)-(2) (3)-(1) N. hotels (4)
 a (4)-(2) (4)-(1) 
1 49 3.06 16 1.91 1.15 11 2.58 -0.67 0.48 5 1.22 0.69 1.84 
2 127 7.94 79 9.45 -1.51 40 9.39 0.06 -1.45 39 9.51 -0.06 -1.57 
3 39 2.44 13 1.56 0.88 10 2.35 -0.79 0.09 3 0.73 0.82 1.71 
4 103 6.44 54 6.46 -0.02 27 6.34 0.12 0.10 27 6.59 -0.13 -0.15 
5 293 18.31 182 21.77 -3.46 102 23.94 -2.17 -5.63 80 19.51 2.26 -1.20 
6 91 5.69 46 5.50 0.19 27 6.34 -0.84 -0.65 19 4.63 0.87 1.05 
7 118 7.38 56 6.70 0.68 31 7.28 -0.58 0.10 25 6.10 0.60 1.28 
8 80 5.00 44 5.26 -0.26 16 3.76 1.51 1.24 28 6.83 -1.57 -1.83 
9 45 2.81 17 2.03 0.78 7 1.64 0.39 1.17 10 2.44 -0.41 0.37 
10 156 9.75 83 9.93 -0.18 39 9.15 0.77 0.60 44 10.73 -0.80 -0.98 
11 34 2.13 17 2.03 0.09 10 2.35 -0.31 -0.22 7 1.71 0.33 0.42 
12 135 8.44 71 8.49 -0.06 29 6.81 1.69 1.63 42 10.24 -1.75 -1.81 
13 145 9.06 81 9.69 -0.63 41 9.62 0.06 -0.56 40 9.76 -0.07 -0.69 
14 77 4.81 30 3.59 1.22 14 3.29 0.30 1.53 16 3.90 -0.31 0.91 
n.a. 108 6.75 47 5.62 1.13 22 5.16 0.46 1.59 25 6.10 -0.48 0.65 
TOT 1600 100 836 100  426 100   410 100   NOTE: *hotels that received at least one subsidy over the period 2002-2006; ** hotels that did not receive subsidies 
over the period 2002-2006; a values in percentage.  
 
We further checked the representativeness of our sample by looking at the differences in 
the average size of the hotels included in the DBevalHTN database compared to the 
population. We measure firm size as number of rooms, an indicator widely used in the 
literature (Chung and Kalnins, 2001).  
Table 4A.2 shows the number and average size of hotels for the population and 
for the sample and subsample (subsidised and non-subsidised) of interest, by tourism 
destination,. For the whole sample and each subsample, the last two columns show, 
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respectively, the differences in the averages with respect to the population and the p-
value associated with the t-statistic constructed to test the null hypothesis that the 
observed differences are not statistically significant. The results suggest that, with the 
exception of destination 9 (Rovereto area) the average size of hotels in the selected 
sample is not significantly different from those of the entire population. Table 4A.3 
shows how the process of merging with the DBhotelTN did not changed the 
composition of the sample of subsidised hotels. 
 
Table 4A.2. Comparison of size distribution of hotels in the DBevalHTN database with population (year 
2006) 
TD Population   DBevalHTN database  
 Whole sample Subsidised* Not-subsidised** 
 N. hotels 
Avg. 
rooms 
(1) 
N. 
hotels 
Avg. 
rooms 
(2) 
Diff 
(2)-
(1) 
p-val N. hotels 
Avg. 
rooms 
(3) 
Diff 
(3)-(1) p-val 
N. 
hotels 
Avg. 
rooms 
(4) 
Diff 
(4)-(1) p-val 
1 49 32.12 16 40.12 7.43 0.34 11 44.54 11.85 0.20 5 30.40 -2.29 0.85 
2 127 29.48 79 32.69 3.21 0.18 40 35.82 6.34 0.05 39 29.49 0.01 0.99 
3 39 20.77 13 25.23 4.46 0.21 10 25.10 4.33 0.25 3 25.67 4.88 0.49 
4 103 27.48 54 29.75 2.27 0.41 27 34.11 6.62 0.07 27 25.41 -2.08 0.56 
5 293 25.67 182 27.36 1.68 0.24 102 28.78 3.11 0.06 80 25.53 -0.13 0.95 
6 91 21.11 46 29.24 3.13 0.31 27 32.22 6.11 0.11 19 25.00 -1.11 0.80 
7 118 28.44 56 31.03 2.59 0.39 31 33.39 4.94 0.20 25 28.12 -0.32 0.94 
8 80 24.76 44 26.34 1.58 0.61 16 27.37 2.61 0.56 28 25.75 0.98 0.78 
9 45 22.47 17 33.23 10.76 0.02 7 36.28 13.81 0.04 10 31.10 8.63 0.12 
10 156 29.85 83 34.08 4.23 0.20 39 35.69 5.83 0.17 44 32.66 2.81 0.51 
11 34 27.73 17 26.70 -1.03 0.83 10 23.70 -4.03 0.51 7 31.00 3.26 0.64 
12 135 23.99 71 28.29 4.30 0.10 29 32.17 8.17 0.03 42 25.62 1.62 0.60 
13 145 34.64 81 32.13 -2.50 0.49 41 36.36 1.72 0.72 40 27.80 -6.84 0.17 
14 77 23.28 30 26.63 3.35 0.29 14 25.71 2.42 0.56 16 27.43 4.15 0.31 
o.d. 108 17.21 47 17.19 -0.02 0.98 22 18.81 1.60 0.47 25 15.76 -1.45 0.46 
NOTE: *hotels that received at least one subsidy over the period 2002-2006 ; ** hotels that did not receive subsidies 
over the period 2002-2006 
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Table 4A.3. Impact of data merging and balancing on the distribution of observed subsidized hotels 
(year, 2006) 
TD Population      Subsidized hotels* Before merge with DBhotelTN 
     Subsidized hotels** 
After marge with DBhotelTN 
 and balancing 
 N. hotels 
Avg. 
rooms 
(1) 
N. 
hotels 
Avg. 
rooms 
(2) 
Diff 
(2)-(1) p-val N. 
Avg. 
rooms 
(3) 
Diff 
(3)-(2) p-val 
1 49 32.12 15 41.67 -8.97 0.26 11 44.54 2.88 0.81 
2 127 29.48 48 37.18 -7.71 0.01 40 35.82 -1.36 0.65 
3 39 20.77 18 23.44 -2-67 0.38 10 25.10 1.65 0.62 
4 103 27.48 36 32.94 -5.46 0.10 27 34.11 1.17 0.76 
5 293 25.67 128 27.11 -1.44 0.35 102 28.78 1.67 0.29 
6 91 21.11 35 31.68 -5.57 0.12 27 32.22 0.54 0.88 
7 118 28.44 39 30.84 -2.40 0.49 31 33.39 2.54 0.60 
8 80 24.76 18 26.72 -1.96 0.64 16 27.37 0.65 0.89 
9 45 22.47 11 30.27 -7.81 0.16 7 36.28 6.01 0.53 
10 156 29.85 55 35.47 -5.62 0.13 39 35.69 0.22 0.96 
11 34 27.73 14 24.00 3.73 0.48 10 23.70 -0.30 0.96 
12 135 23.99 41 31.41 -7.42 0.03 29 32.17 0.76 0.87 
13 145 34.64 58 36.31 -1.67 0.70 41 36.36 0.05 0.99 
14 77 23.28 22 22.50 0.78 0.82 14 25.71 3.21 0.47 
o.d. 108 17.21 43 17.41 -0.21 0.90 22 18.81 1.40 0.55 
TOT 1600  581    426    
                          NOTE: * start ups are not considered; ** subsidised hotels in the final database  
                DBevalHTN !
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5 Conclusions 
What is it that supports the wide heterogeneity in productivity among firms? Which 
factors matter most, and can firms control them, or are they purely external products of 
the operating environment? These are all primary and challenging questions which still 
require further research. Indeed, shedding further light on these issues will definitely aid 
our understanding of how to design effective policies to boost the productivity growth 
of firms and eventually of nations. In this thesis, we wished to contribute to applied 
research on firm productivity from both empirical and methodological viewpoints.  
 We first empirically addressed the issue of what generates and sustains the 
heterogeneity of firm productivity in manufacturing; with this aim we looked again at 
the productivity slowdown in Italy which started in the mid-1990s. Consistent with 
recent studies carried out with varying methods (Antonelli et al. 2013; Bugamelli et al. 
2010; Dosi et al., 2012), we obtained evidence of high heterogeneity of firm behaviour 
lying behind the Italian economic stagnation. In addition, our estimation approach more 
precisely isolated the component of Total Factor Productivity growth due to 
technological change. We used a non-parametric method (DEA) to highlight how the 
technological frontier (of the best-performing firms which lie on it) have moved over 
time, and how the distance to the frontier of less productive firms has changed. Our 
results clearly point to growing dualism among firms. Some firms experienced 
sustained productivity growth; others clearly failed to keep pace with the group of 
innovators. We questioned whether this dynamic was due to different patterns of 
strategic adaptation, and obtained evidence that the availability of flexible labour, less 
expensive but also less skilled, was the easiest solution, the “low road”, to competition 
for some firms, whereas more efficient and dynamic patterns competed in innovation. 
 Earlier studies on the Italian economic slowdown pointed to generalised failure 
on the part of the entire productive system to meet the challenges posed by increased 
market globalisation.  Our results suggest that, even  in an advanced economy, ample 
dispersion of firm performance exists and in some conditions may even widen over 
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time. These findings support the fact that certain strategies and behaviours are more 
likely in certain firms according to their distance from the industry frontier (see, e.g., 
Coad, 2011). We likened this fact to the dynamics of firm productivity distribution, 
which in turn shapes productivity growth at aggregate, industry and country levels. Our 
evidence may be useful for policy-makers. Designing policy to support “average firms” 
cannot be effective if the heterogeneity of those firms is wide (Bartelsman, 2010). 
 The second part of this thesis moved to the services sector. Despite its growing 
economic weight, there is still little knowledge on the determinants of firm productivity 
in this sector. We used different methods to distinguish the various factors determining 
the efficiency of firms in the hotel industry, and found that destination factors play a 
role: hotels located in better destinations are, on average, more efficient than those in 
less attractive locations. Although expected, this empirically confirms the role of 
destination on the performance of tourist businesses (Molina-Azorin et al., 2010) and 
further extends results, even at the finer intra-regional level.  
 However, what was surprising was that, even considering a narrowly defined 
sector in very restricted, compact areas – intra-regional destinations – the dispersion of 
hotel efficiency remained wide and substantially similar among destinations. This 
clearly suggested the important role of factors internal to hotels. We proceeded by 
looking at factors related to manager/owner characteristics and managerial choices, i.e., 
comparing  the human capital of managers and what they do. Our results revealed the 
predominance of managerial practices on manager characteristics. This supports the 
view of “management as technology”, as recently put forward by Bloom et al. (2013), 
and also points to the role played by family involvement. To our knowledge, this study 
is the first providing empirical evidence of the role families play in determining hotel 
efficiency. Highly motivated, well-trained family members are valuable for hotel 
efficiency. Conversely, family ownership may lead to over-staffing and slack periods, 
which depress hotel productivity. These findings are important, given the family nature 
of the majority of firms in the tourist sector in Italy. The role of internal factors was 
confirmed even after controlling for fine-grained intra-destination location factors. 
 Our results offer insights for managers and public policy-makers in designing 
programmes for improving performance. In particular, we support the view that there is 
room for improvement within each destination. Significant improvements in 
performance can be obtained by focusing on the internal operations of hotels, to identify 
the most important factors which improve efficiency and productivity.   
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 Thus, in the third part of this work (Chapter 4) we studied the effect of public 
intervention in the tourist sector. In particular, we evaluated the effect of subsidies in 
supporting capital investments aimed at improving the quality and performance of 
micro and small hotel businesses. We proceeded in several steps, addressing a series of 
empirical and methodological issues. On the methodological side, we defined a novel 
approach which relaxes SUTVA, allowing identification and estimation of indirect 
effects stemming from the externalities that the policy is likely to generate; we 
estimated the effect in the case of time-varying treatments. Our main results point to the 
positive direct bearing of subsidies on several hotel productivity measures, and also 
empirical evidence of SUTVA violation and indirect effects of subsidies.  
We show how the effect of subsidies on hotel performance depend on how those 
subsidies are assigned to hotels over time and, more importantly, how the net effect of 
subsidies on a hotel’s outcomes depend on whether many or few hotels in its own 
destination are subsidised. In particular, when the share of subsidised firms is high, the 
effect on the potential outcomes of the focal hotels appears to be negative, consistent 
with increased competition within destinations.  This negative dependence strengthens 
over time.  
Our results may be of value for policy-makers' decisions on introducing subsidy 
programmes. Externalities must be an important consideration when deciding how and 
when to target public policies to firms. Specifically, our results indicate the need to 
devote more research to the implication of the SUTVA assumption (see Ferracci et al. 
(2013), for implications in the labour market; Ceruqa and Pellegrini (2013), for the 
implication of subsidies to firms), in both terms of the need to define proper 
methodological frameworks and of the implications on the actual effectiveness of 
policies.  
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7 General appendix 
7.1 A: Detection strategy for outliers 
 
To detect outliers we used a method based on the concept of leverage, that is, the effect 
produced on the efficiencies of all other firms when the observed firm is removed from 
the dataset (Stosic and Sampaio de Souza, 2005). The underlying concept is that outliers 
are expected to display leverage far above the mean. The leverage measure is then 
calculated for each firm, and used to detect and automatically eliminate outliers from 
the dataset.  
 Formally, leverage is measured as the standard deviation of the efficiency 
estimates relative to the full sample, without the observation in question, and the 
inefficiency estimates for the full sample. In order to calculate leverage, the most 
straightforward way is to use jackknife resampling. DEA is first applied to each of the 
firms, the unaltered, original dataset being used to obtain the set of efficiencies  
. A “leave-one-out” strategy is then employed: one by one, each firm is 
removed, and each time the set of efficiencies  is recalculated, 
where i=1,…,K indexes the removed firm. Lastly, the leverage of the i-th firm is defined 
as: 
 
 
 
 A higher leverage value provides evidence for an influential observation.  
 We performed the outlier procedure with respect to the technological frontier at 
industry level in each year, although this approach is, computationally, extremely 
intensive. Therefore, as in Stosic and Sampaio de Sousa (2005), we used a more 
efficient stochastic procedure, which combines bootstrap resampling with the above 
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jackknife strategy. We reduced the computational burden and calculated the leverage 
only for those firms which were efficient, given the extracted subsample; for inefficient 
firms, leverage was set at zero. This was because the elimination of an inefficient firm 
from the dataset under analysis has no effect on the efficiency of any other firm. The 
procedure was implemented with the R statistical package. The details are as follows: 
 
 [1] Loop  the  following  steps  ([1.1]–[1.5])  B  times  and   obtain  estimates  of  
  leverage  
  [1.1] extract  randomly,  without  re-emission,  a  subset  SL  of    
   cardinality     L from the original data et S of cardinality K 
  [1.2] calculate  efficiency  
  [1.3] partition  
  [1.4] loop the following step ([1.3.1])   
   [1.4.1] remove the  current firm  and calculate efficiency 
    ,  where i is the removed firm. 
  [1.5] calculate the leverage 
    
 
[2] calculate the average leverage , where ni is the number of times  
      firm i is extracted. 
 [3] calculate the global average leverage:  
 
 The procedure requires choice of the cardinality of the subsample extracted in 
each iteration and the number of repetitions. Stosic and Sampaio de Sousa (2005) 
suggest a cardinality which is 10-20% that of the entire dataset S and a number of 
repetitions greater than or equal to 1000. In this paper, we chose L=0.2 and B=1000. In 
order to take into account the number of observations used, we defined quantity 
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 as the threshold leverage. Observations with average leverage greater than the 
threshold were omitted.  
€ 
l log K( )
